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Executive summary
We have used data for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US from
1985-2003 to confirm the widely-held belief that Americans do work more
than Europeans. We also confirm the supposition that Americans tend to
work at odd hours of the day and on weekends more often than Europeans.
We have turned up an even more interesting aggregate regularity in high-
income countries which had gone largely unnoticed and has never been ex-
plained or investigated by economists: The sum of market and secondary
(household) work-AllWork-bymen and women tends to be equal at a point
in time, even while it may change over time and diVer across countries-there
is an iso-work fact.
The iso-work fact is challenging for economics for a number of reasons.
First, economic theory should be able to explain why total work diVers so
little at the aggregate level between genders, when there is so much variation
within-gender. Since the market oVers little hint at the rationale for such a
coordination mechanism, we propose social norms in Chapter 2 and inves-
tigate the power of such norms to explain the facts. Second, All Work is the
sum of two diVerent types of labor with sharply diVerent productivities-why
should their sum be equal across gender, without regard to the mix?
To consider these conundrums, in Chapter 3 we examine the theory of
home production and adapt it to allow for norms and fixed costs of mar-
ket work. These fixed costs have a significant impact on the labor supply of
households. Indeed, the most commonly invoked models of home produc-
tion imply a high elasticity of substitution between market and secondary
work. We validate this sensitivity by demonstrating a high elasticity of fe-
male home work in response to changes labor taxation in the G-7 coun-
tries. This strong response makes secondary work a useful “sink” that en-
ables members of society to meet the norm. Yet under certain conditions,
the norm may be diYcult to adhere to. If market work is not very produc-
tive or market wages are low relative to home production, only very costly
norms will lead to iso-work, especially across genders. A meta-analysis of
data sets around the world suggests that the iso-work fact does not hold in
less-developed countries. It is a fact for developed countries only.
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Overall, the issue of whether Europeans are lazy or Americans are crazy
seems of second-order importance relative to understanding the determi-
nants of individual behavior. Amore useful, scientific approach is to assume
that underlying tastes are common to both continents, while technologies,
institutions, or interpersonal influences like norms or externalities may dif-
fer and evolve diVerently. The fact that Americans work on weekends or
more often at odd hours of the day may simply represent a bad equilibrium
that no individual agent can improve upon—and would certainly not wish
to deviate from, given what all others are doing. Especially if norms and
other externalities are important, one should recognize that the invisible
hand may lead agents to places like this.
General introduction
Facts about work time, unemployment and labor-force participation in
the US and Europe have been established for many years. Researchers have
charted their changes, and transatlantic diVerences in their levels and vi-
cissitudes have been studied at great length. Facts about how Americans
and Europeans spend their time away from the labor market and how these
have changed over time have barely been considered. Even within the con-
text of market work, we know almost nothing about how the timing of this
activity—across a day or a week—diVers across the Atlantic. Our general
purpose here is to establish a variety of new facts about both of these dimen-
sions of human behavior—the amount of diVerent types of non-work activ-
ities undertaken in Europe and the US, and the timing of market work—and
to oVer some theoretical explanations for them.
The issues that we study are important for a variety of reasons. If noth-
ing else, however, simply adducing these facts has the tremendous virtue
of enhancing both scholarly and public awareness about some characteris-
tics of human behavior that are central to people’s conceptions about how
societies function and that can inform average citizens’ views of what is oc-
curring in their own and others’ economies and societies. As such, the facts
and their explanations perform, we believe, a general educational function
that should not be underestimated. On narrower, economic grounds they
allow us to study current diVerences and recent changes in well-being (eco-
nomic welfare) across countries along a variety of dimensions. We believe
that this is a major step beyond merely looking at the amount of non-work
activity and basing discussions of well-being on that one dimension, which
is narrow both in terms of what people do and when they do it.
In Chapter 1 we focus on data describing the time that people spend in
each of the many activities that make up their day. We focus on data from
the late 1980s and early 1990s, and for the early 2000s, for Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the US. We examine patterns and changes in non-work
activities that we classify into several major groups; but we also examine
them in less detail for each of twelve other countries, most of them in Eu-
rope. We pay substantial attention to diVerences by gender, but our major
focus is on the patterns of diVerences between the EU and US in the kinds of
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non-market activities undertaken and their distribution. We then proceed
to ask such questions as: How do patterns of work activities diVer over the
week, and over the day, in the EU and US? Would market work in the EU
look the same as in the US if Europeans had the same patterns of daily and
weekly market activity as Americans?
In Chapter 2 we oVer a variety of explanations for some of the facts
that we have discovered in Chapter 1. Of particular interest is our attempt
to explain our findings about male-female diVerences in the amount of to-
tal work—market work plus household production—that we discussed at
length in the previous chapter. We examine the minimal requirements of a
theory that might explain our findings, and in doing so we develop a theory
of the mechanisms by which social norms can aVect sex roles in market and
non-market productive activities. The chapter then proceeds to consider the
welfare implications of coordinating non-market activities within a local or
national economy and develops a model that helps to explain some of the
findings in Chapter 1 on the timing of market work.
While Chapter 2 dealt with the work-leisure distinction and the timing
of work, Chapter 3 is concerned with the mix of work activities between
the market and the home. We first derive some predictions about the rela-
tive importance of income and after-tax wages on market versus household
work. We test these ideas on some of the data that we developed in Chap-
ter 1, focusing on the role of diVerences in labor taxation across the various
EU countries and the US. We then consider how the choice between mar-
ket and home work is altered when working the market engenders set-up
costs—when market work is costly in terms of money and/or time over and
beyond remunerated time. We examine the role and eVects of these costs on
the same current data for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US that
we analyzed in Chapter 1. This discussion allows us to infer how working
in the market alters what people do outside the market; as such, it provide
insights into the welfare eVects of diVerent patterns of market work.
Without going into the specific findings or explanations that this es-
say generates, a reasonable generalization of its results and analysis is that
the US really is diVerent from Europe in ways that had not previously been
pointed out. Nonetheless, there are striking similarities within societies
that, we believe, stem from an underlying sameness in people’s basic val-
ues along a number of dimensions. We hope that our analyses will pave the
way for substantial additional research that compares Europeans and Amer-
icans along dimensions beyond the narrow one of the amount of market
work that is undertaken on the two continents.
CHAPTER 1
Time use and timing of work inside and outside the market
I. Introduction
An immense literature has examined US-European diVerences in
labor-force participation rates, weekly work hours, annual work hours,
vacation time, etc., making the simple distinction between market
work and all other time—all non-work (e.g., recently, Prescott, 2004;
Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote, 2005. The narrower question, “What are
the diVerences between the US and Europe in what people do with their
time when they are not on the job?” has only rarely and partially been ad-
dressed (Freeman and Schettkat, 2005).
The answer to this question is crucial for a variety of reasons. In terms
of understanding diVerences in well-being within the EU, and between the
EU and the US, we cannot simply look at the amount of time spent in work
in the market and time outside the market. While the nature of work dif-
fers across members of the labor force, at least all work can be viewed as
something that individuals must be induced, through the receipt of a wage,
to undertake. No such logical homogeneity exists with the broad category
of non-work time. A half-hour spent changing an infant’s dirty diaper is
probably less enjoyable than a half-hour of sexual activity. Indeed, the two
are totally diVerent conceptually: The former is something that one can
pay someone else to do; the latter cannot be “contracted out”—the pleasure
from it generally cannot be obtained vicariously. With this consideration in
mind, it seems reasonable to examine diVerences in non-market time use
across countries. Equally important, it is worth examining how these diVer-
ences might have changed in the past 20 years.
The scholarly examination of people’s choices between work and non-
work has probably been the most heavily pursued aspect of labor econom-
ics (StaVord, 1986). The reason for this attention is partly the importance
of the topic, but partly too the ready availability of data from many coun-
tries that allow us to examine demographic and economic diVerences in
and the determinants of the probability that people work, their weekly
and annual hours of work, and the behavior of their work time over the
life cycle. Despite the obvious importance of looking more closely at how
people spend their non-work time, relatively little attention has been paid
6
II. THE ECONOMIC MOTIVATION 7
to describing its patterns and examining its determinants. A few stud-
ies have considered how the price of time aVects the distribution of non-
work time (Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1987; Biddle and Hamermesh, 1990);
others (Gronau and Hamermesh, 2001; Hamermesh, 2005) have examined
how economic factors aVect the diversity of activities in which people en-
gage outside the workplace and the extent to which they seek temporal vari-
ety. Generally, however, this line of inquiry has been limited by the relative
paucity of available data sets. Until recently no country provided data on a
continuing basis on how its citizens spend their time, and many have never
provided such information. This absence of data has begun to change, and
that change is what enables us to examine issues of the allocation of non-
market time.
In this initial chapter we discuss a way of classifying the myriad diVer-
ent activities that people undertake outside the market. Some classification
is necessary if we are to make what is an immense amount of information
manageable. We then describe how the relevant data sets are collected and
the benefits—and pitfalls—associated with drawing inferences from these
data. Next we present simple comparisons of time allocation for Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the US separately at a point in time and over
time. We then examine in less detail the same issues across similar data sets
for many countries at a single point in time. We inquire into whether the
observed changes in time allocations within each of the four main countries
studied are attributable to changes in their citizens’ characteristics. The fi-
nal substantive discussion deals with the timing of these various activities—
does timing diVer across countries, and how has it changed.
II. The economic motivation
The basic theory underlying our discussion is that of home
production—the idea that people choose how much to work in the market
and how to combine the remaining time with the goods that they purchase
with their earnings (and unearned income) in order to maximize their sat-
isfaction (Becker, 1965; Gronau, 1980). The fundamental contribution of
this idea is that on average those people with higher prices of time (higher
wage rates) will substitute purchased goods for time in producing “com-
modities” that contribute to their well-being. Thus a high-wage American
couple will spend their time flying to the Côte d’Azur for a one-week holi-
day, while a lower-wage American couple will take a two-week caravan trip
to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park. Both households have the
same amount of time; but because the former has, at least potentially, a
much higher income, unless it saves the entire diVerence between its in-
come and the lower-wage couple’s income, it will enjoy vacation time that
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is more “goods-intensive.” The well-oV household must economize on its
relatively scarce time; the poorer household must economize on the relative
scarcity of goods it can purchase.
The number of diVerent possible activities—combinations of goods and
time—that one might consider is nearly infinite. All of these household ac-
tivities can be viewed as part of household production—the generation of
satisfaction-enhancing commodities through the combination of time and
purchased goods. Yet we need to devise some way of aggregating them into
useful economic categories in order to be able to talk about them and mea-
sure them. There is no single correct way of classifying these commodities
and the time inputs into them: Aggregation methods are necessarily arbi-
trary. The one we use here has the virtue of providing fairly clear-cut eco-
nomic distinctions while still reducing the number of aggregates to manage-
able proportions.
The first type of activity is that for which people are paid: Market work.
We assume that people would not be working the marginal hour in the mar-
ket if they were not paid, so that at the margin work is not enjoyable (or at
least is less enjoyable than any non-work activity at the margin). Market
work is the only category of activity currently included on the production
side of national income accounts. In the economics literature it has, as our
Introduction suggested, generally been treated as the flip-side of the aggre-
gate of all activities outside the market.
Some of the activities in which we engage at home, using our own time
and some purchased goods, are those for which we might have purchased
substitutes from the market instead of performing them ourselves. We can
hire someone to cook our meals (and buy the food) and clean up the dishes
afterwards; we can hire nannies to care for our children instead of spending
the time ourselves; and we can hire a painter rather than paint the living
room ourselves. Such secondary activities, those that satisfy the third-party
rule (Reid, 1934) that substituting market goods and services for one’s own
time is possible, may be enjoyable, even at the margin; but they still have the
common characteristic that we could pay somebody to perform them for us
and we are not paid for performing them.
The extent to which secondary activities are contracted out is important
in evaluating levels and changes in households’ well-being, since we mea-
sure economic well-being by GDP, what is produced in the market. To the
extent that in any country over time households are reducing the amount
of secondary activities that they undertake, measured GDP will be growing
more rapidly than the country’s actual economic welfare. For that reason
alone it is crucial to measure levels of and changes in secondary activities
and to distinguish them from other household activities, and some eVorts
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have been made to propose methods of doing that (Abraham and Mackie,
2005).
Other activities are things that we cannot pay other people to do for us
but that we must do at least some of. We must sleep, have sex or eat for
ourselves in order to derive any benefits from these activities—nobody else
can do these for us and still let us derive any benefit from them. Someone
else can shop for the bed, condom or food for us; but the actual production
of the activity is ours alone. Such tertiary activities form the third general
aggregate. It should be prima facie clear from this distinction between them
and secondary activities why it is important to disaggregate non-market
time: A drop in non-market time because people are contracting out more
activities has much diVerent implications for their well-being than does a
similar decline in tertiary activity. The two types of activities are imperfect
substitutes, nor are they likely to be equally substitutable for market work
(the standard condition allowing aggregation).
The fourth and final aggregate is leisure. We include in this category
all activities that we cannot pay somebody else to do for us and that we
do not really have to do at all if we do not wish to. Television-watching,
attending religious services, reading a newspaper, chatting with friends, etc.,
should be included in leisure. Leisure, of course, is inherently satisfying;
but so is some (probably infra-marginal) secondary time, such as the first
minute spent mowing the lawn or the first time one reads a new book to
one’s three-year-old; so too clearly are the first few hours of sleep in day
(see Abraham and Mackie, 2005). What distinguishes leisure from the other
types of home activities is that one can function perfectly well (albeit not
happily) with no leisure whatsoever: None is necessary for survival.
We believe that this fourfold distinction is theoretically useful and can
be implemented empirically. Nonetheless, as with any accounting system,
many of the classifications can be debated. Some might argue that religious
activity should be viewed as a tertiary activity, since its ubiquity throughout
human history might suggest that it is as necessary as sex. Obversely, given
that most sex today is not for procreation, it might as well be classified as
leisure rather than as tertiary.1 While bathing is nearly universal, one could
argue that it is not a human need and should be viewed as leisure. All sec-
ondary activities contain at least some consumption component and might
be viewed at least partly as leisure; all tertiary activities have some leisure
component; and many leisure components, for example, exercise, might be
1The example that is often brought up by those concerned about national income ac-
counting is that of volunteer work (see Abraham and Mackie, 2005). We count it as leisure,
but one might argue that volunteer work could be performed by market substitutes and
should be included as a secondary activity; alternatively, one might point out that it is
mostly consumption and should be included as leisure.
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viewed as investments (e.g., in health) that could be classified as tertiary.
The main point is that one must choose a set of aggregates that can be con-
sistently implemented across time and space.
In what follows we examine how activities have been divided among
these four aggregates in Germany, the Netherlands and the United States,
and how that division has changed in the past two decades. We also examine
in less detail data on time use from three other countries, Spain, Australia
and Japan, at one point in time; and we present brief summaries of data
from nine other countries. Because one or two activities constitute the ma-
jor component(s) of these aggregates—e.g., sleep in tertiary activity, televi-
sion watching in leisure—we also focus attention on several sub-aggregates
for the four main countries that we study.
III. Data on time use—generally and in this study
A. General description. In this Section we describe time-use data gen-
erally and the main data sets we use specifically. We do this because these
data underlie both the evidence we provide in this and the subsequent chap-
ters and because such data are much less familiar to economists and the
general public than are the conventional labor-force data that obtain infor-
mation on time spent at work in some recent week or year.
An increasing number of national governments have conducted time-
diary surveys. While such surveys have been conducted for over 60 years
(Sorokin and Berger, 1939), it is only recently that they have been fielded
on regular bases in many industrialized countries. The general idea in a
time-diary study is to give each respondent a diary for one recent (typically
the previous) day and ask him/her to start at the day’s beginning with the
activity then underway and then indicate the time each new activity was un-
dertaken and what that activity was. The respondent either works from a set
of codes indicating specific activities, or the survey team codes the descrip-
tions into a pre-determined set of categories. No matter how extensive a set
of codes is, each survey will have a diVerent way of coding and aggregating
what might seem like the same activity to an observer. Time diaries have the
virtue of forcing respondents to provide a time allocation that adds to 24
hours in a day. Also, unlike retrospective data about last week’s or even last
year’s time spent working, while the time-diary information is necessarily
based on recall, the recall period is only one day.
In some time-diary studies only one day’s diary is collected from one
household member; in others, several days’ diaries and/or several house-
hold members will appear in the sample. The extent of demographic and
economic information available also varies across surveys, with economic
characteristics in most of the surveys being fairly sparsely reported. With
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one old and very minor exception, none of the time-diary studies provides
longitudinal information (except for the very short-term information gen-
erated because diaries are kept for two or more days within the same week).
B. The specific data. While many European countries have now gener-
ated time-diary surveys, in most cases these have been recent one-oV eVorts
to measure the allocation of time. Only a few countries have undertaken re-
peated surveys, albeit at irregular intervals, that have used identical or nearly
identical categorizations of activities and that thus allow us to compare how
non-market time use has changed over time. For that reason, although we
recognize they can in no sense be viewed as representative of how Europeans
use time, we concentrate most of our attention here on Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands. We do not argue that these countries are typical of the EU
in any way. Rather, all three have produced large nationally representative
time-diary surveys recently and around years earlier, and in all three the
surveys and coding mechanisms were nearly identical (in Germany and the
Netherlands) or fairly similar (Italy) over time.
The German data are from the 1991/92 and 2001/02 Zeitbudgeterhebun-
gen conducted by the German Statistiches Bundesamt (1999). Adult mem-
bers of each household were asked to complete time diaries on two consecu-
tive days. In 1991/92 nearly 16,000 individuals completed diaries, with nearly
all respondents completing diaries on two days (so that with minor dis-
crepancies the days are equally distributed across the week). In 2001/02 we
have diaries from 14,000 people, about half with diaries on two consecutive
days, half on three consecutive days, with the survey days disproportionately
recorded on weekends. The categorization of activities allowed for over 200
diVerent activities, with coding being almost identical in the two surveys;
and respondents could report their time use in five-minute intervals. Be-
cause the 1991 survey was undertaken immediately following re-unification,
we restrict almost all the discussion of the German data to the former West
Germany. We do, however, present a brief discussion of these major dimen-
sions of time use in the former East Germany.
The Italian household diaries Uso del Tempo were conducted over 12-
month periods in 1988/89 and 2002/03 by ISTAT (see ISTAT, 2005 for a
description of the recent survey). Roughly 36,000 individuals, each in a
separate household, completed a time diary for one day in 1988/89, as did
roughly 51,000 people in 2002/03. Diaries were collected in roughly equal
numbers in each case from among the five weekdays as a group, Saturdays
and Sundays. The possible categorizations of activities in 1988/89 totaled
around 150, while in 2002/03 250 categories were possible. There is no direct
mapping from the earlier to the later data, although the market work and
secondary time categorizations are very closely comparable.
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The Dutch Tijdbestedingsonderzoek (NIWI, 1993) is a quinquennial
cross-section time-budget study that has been conducted since 1970. In our
analyses we use the surveys conducted in October 1990 and October 2000.
The 1990 survey covered 3415 adults, the 2000 survey 1531 adults, with one
from each household, whose diary records were kept for seven consecutive
days (Sunday through Saturday). In each case half the sample produced di-
aries in one week, half in the next; but because one of the two weeks in 1990
included the Saturday/Sunday when Europe went oV Summer Time, we can
only use one week’s data from that survey. Each individual listed the activity
engaged in at each quarter-hour of the previous day. The range of possi-
ble activities encompasses over 200 usable activities, with the coding being
almost identical in the two surveys that we use here.2
Until 2003 the United States lagged much of the developed world in the
availability of time-diary information. There had been occasional small-
scale surveys, but no large-scale nationally-representative survey had been
conducted. We thus use the 1985 Time Use Survey (Robinson and Godbey,
1999), a university-conducted survey of 5000 individuals, including both
spouses in a married-couple household, each of whom kept a diary for one
day that covered activities on the previous day. A total of 87 activities was
possible, covering, as in the Dutch data, activities in each quarter-hour of
the previous day. The hebdomadal distribution of days is nearly uniform.
American backwardness in the production of time-diary data ended
with the introduction of the American Time Use Survey in 2003. The
ATUS for 2003 oVers one-day diaries from nearly 21,000 individuals (see
Hamermesh, Frazis, and Stewart, 2005). Because exact starting and stop-
ping times for each activity are listed in these computer-based telephone
surveys, the duration of activities is variable to the minute. The survey of-
fers 406 basic categories. The ATUS collected half the diaries on the two
weekend days, while the other half was spread across the five weekdays.3
The tables in the appendix to this chapter summarize, for each of the
eight surveys, the main categories (9 in the German data, 17, for example, in
the ATUS) that make up each of four aggregates on which we concentrate.
The descriptions are translated from the originals.
Throughout this chapter we restrict comparisons for Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and the US (and also for Spain, Australia and Japan) so that all
2Even this large number of activities results from combining time spent reading
each particular newspaper and magazine into one overall category, newspaper/magazine
reading.
3Although it is not relevant for our purposes, the ATUS is an on-going survey that will
be generating roughly 1100 time diaries each month into the foreseeable future. As such, it
is the first and only continuing time-diary study in the world.
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the data sets are based on individuals ages 20 through 74. This eliminates
only a few teenagers or much older citizens. The restriction is imposed to
ensure comparability across the data sets, as they diVer in the minimum
ages surveyed and, in a few cases, in the maximum age covered. More im-
portant, since we wish to obtain statistics describing a representative day of
the week, and some of the surveys over-weighted weekends, we weight all
calculations to adjust for this statistical problem and thus present data for a
representative day.
C. Pitfalls. There are a number of problems with time-diary data gen-
erally and with the particular data sets that we use. Unlike well-known
national longitudinal or cross-section household surveys, response rates in
time-diary surveys are quite low. Many more potential respondents in the
sampling frame must be contacted in order to obtain a reasonable size sam-
ple of diaries. In the ATUS, for example, the non-response rate was over
40 percent, and it was above 70 percent in the 2000 Dutch data. Whether
the respondents are a random sample of the population along observable
dimensions is not always clear, but there is some encouraging evidence on
this for the ATUS (Abraham, Maitland, and Bianchi, 2005). The more diY-
cult question is whether non-response is non-random along unobservable
dimensions that may be correlated with the distribution of activities and/or
with the observable demographic/economic variables used to describe pat-
terns of time use. We cannot infer the extent of biases from this source with
the available data; but their possible existence should make one more wary
about results using time-diary data than about inferences based on the more
commonly used household data sets.
Most people engage in more than one activity at the same time during
at least part of their waking hours. Unfortunately, the Dutch data allow the
respondent to list only one activity at a time, as does the American 1985
TUS. The 2003 ATUS does allow people to list childcare as a second activity,
but it is the only second activity that is recorded. The German and Italian
data sets do provide fully for the possibility of second activities. The general
absence of information on secondary activities means that, to the extent that
the amount of multi-tasking increases over time, as we would expect if full
incomes are rising and variety of activities is a superior good (as shown in
Gronau and Hamermesh, 2001), comparisons over time will automatically
be biased. All we can hope is that these biases are minor over the fairly
short periods (10 to 18 years) that we examine compared to any other secular
trends that we observe.
As we have noted, the diVerent countries’ time-diary data are based on
diVerent categorizations of activities. Even with the broad aggregations on
which we base our analyses, we cannot be certain that an activity that we
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classify in the United States as, for example, leisure would be classified as
leisure in Germany. Indeed, even if the same categorizations were used in all
four countries, cognitive diVerences due to language and culture could well
generate diVerent categorizations of what an outside observer would view
as the same activity. One must be very careful about making cross-country
comparisons of the amounts of time spent in diVerent specific activities, and
even of time spent in these broad aggregates.
The problem is much less acute if we merely compare changes in time
use over time within a country based on diaries using the same categoriza-
tions. Thus comparisons of changes in time allocation over a decade in the
Netherlands and Germany thus seem fairly safe. Even here, however, com-
parisons across time can pose some problems. The more recent Dutch and
German categorizations allow for the category of time spent on computers
at home for work or non-work purposes. Does time spent on such activities
take the place of what would have previously been leisure, such as play-
ing games? Or does it substitute for secondary activity, such as managing
household finances using pen and pencil? We cannot be sure how the cod-
ing of activities changes when new possibilities are provided; and there are
always wholly novel activities that did not even exist earlier. The problem
is more severe in the comparisons within Italy over time, as the number of
possible categories is much greater there, and time spent in travel cannot be
specifically linked to other activities in 1988/89, while it can in 2002/03.4 The
problem is still more severe in the US data, as there are many more cate-
gories in the ATUS than in the 1985 TUS and the surveys were conducted by
diVerent organizations.
We believe that, because we concentrate on broad aggregates, problems
with making comparisons over time within the Netherlands and Germany
are minimal. Even less problematic are comparisons at a point in time, such
as across demographic groups, within any of the countries that we examine.
Any cross-country comparisons of time use that we or anyone else makes
should, however, always be taken with several grains of salt, and those that
we do make here should be viewed as very tentative at best.
IV. Time Use in Germany, Italy the Netherlands and the United States,
-
A. Differences in time allocation. The first thing to examine is simple
aggregate information on how people in each of the four countries spent
their time and, more important, how their use of time changed within each
4In constructing the aggregates for 1988/89 we prorate travel time among the three
aggregates that are not necessarily mainly conducted at home—market work, secondary
activities and leisure.
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Table 1.1. Time Allocations (minutes), Averages and Their Standard Errors, All Individuals 
Ages 20-74* 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
Individuals in 
survey
6,928 7,239 25,490 37,882 1,531 1,586 3,567 17,668 
Days 
surveyed
2  2 or 3 1 1 7 7 1 1 
Market
work 
263.9
(2.0)
197.7
(1.7)
248.5
(1.8)
207.4
(1.4)
174.2
(2.4)
189.5
(2.5)
245.8
(4.6)
255.9
(2.1)
Secondary
time
220.5
(1.5)
242.7
(1.3)
236.1
(1.4)
237.3
(1.1)
221.0
(1.8)
206.0
(1.7)
200.5
(3.1)
218.0
(1.5)
Family care 22.6 
(0.5) 
29.8 
(0.5) 
32.1 
(0.4) 
29.6 
(0.4) 
37.0 
(0.8) 
34.0 
(0.8) 
30.0 
(1.2) 
44.5 
(0.7) 
Shopping 42.6 
(0.5) 
57.4 
()0.6 
38.4 
(0.3) 
43.3 
(0.3) 
41.0 
(0.7) 
44.2 
(0.7) 
50.1 
(1.4) 
51.4 
(0.6) 
All work 484.5 440.4 484.6 444.7 395.2 395.5 446.3 473.9
Tertiary
time
639.3
(1.1)
664.9
(1.0)
677.6
(0.7)
594.0
(0.6)
634.9
(1.3)
646.8
(1.3)
648.0
(2.4)
628.5
(1.1)
Sleep 501.2 
(0.9) 
503.9 
(0.8) 
515.0 
(0.6) 
497.9 
(0.5) 
500.1 
(1.0) 
513.7 
(1.1) 
481.2 
(2.0) 
503.3 
(1.0) 
Leisure 316.2
(1.5)
334.6
(1.2)
278.0
(1.3)
401.3
(1.0)
409.9
(2.0)
397.7
(2.0)
345.7
(3.5)
337.5
(1.7)
Radio/TV 114.3 
(0.9) 
117.7 
(0.7) 
102.4 
(0.5) 
101.1 
(0.5) 
107.9 
(1.0) 
108.8 
(1.0) 
140.8 
(2.3) 
147.1 
(1.2) 
Fraction 
working 
0.541 
(0.004) 
0.371 
(0.003) 
0.486 
(0.003) 
0.422 
(0.003) 
0.363 
(0.005) 
0.389 
(0.005) 
0.509 
(0.008) 
0.521 
(0.004) 
*Averages of the means in Tables 1.2 weighted by the sex ratio of the population ages 20-74 in each 
country at each time from http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbpyr.html 
Table 1.2M. Time Allocations (minutes), Averages and Their Standard Errors, Men Ages 
20-74
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
Individuals in 
survey
2,947 3,377 12,211 18,228 595 646 1,647 7,750 
Market
work 
296.9
(3.7)
262.5
(2.8)
361.7
(2.7)
290.2
(2.2)
256.9
(4.5)
254.1
(4.4)
308.4
(7.1)
312.6
(3.4)
Secondary
time
199.9
(2.3)
173.9
(1.6)
85.8
(1.1)
115.1
(1.0)
144.0
(2.3)
144.8
(2.2)
138.3
(3.8)
163.2
(2.0)
Family care 21.0 
(0.7) 
17.9 
(0.4) 
18.1 
(0.4) 
19.3 
(0.4) 
18.1 
(0.7) 
16.9 
(0.8) 
15.9 
(1.2) 
28.2 
(0.8) 
Shopping 39.2 
(0.8) 
49.0 
(0.8) 
24.1 
(0.4) 
32.8 
(0.5) 
32.1 
(1.1) 
35.6 
(0.9) 
41.6 
(1.8) 
43.3 
(0.9) 
All work 496.8 436.4 447.5 405.3 400.9 398.9 446.7 475.8
Tertiary
time
627.6
(1.7)
654.2
(1.5)
683.5
(1.1)
595.2
(1.0)
624.1
(2.1)
634.2
(2.1)
642.5
(3.7)
616.0
(1.7)
Sleep 494.2 
(1.4) 
498.6 
(1.2) 
517.1 
(1.0) 
496.7 
(0.8) 
491.9 
(1.6) 
503.7 
(1.7) 
480.0 
(3.1) 
495.5 
(1.5) 
Leisure 315.7
(2.4)
349.3
(1.9)
309.3
(1.9)
439.6
(1.6)
414.9
(3.5)
406.9
(3.4)
350.8
(5.5)
348.1
(2.7)
Radio/TV 115.0 
(1.4) 
135.0 
(1.2) 
110.1 
(0.8) 
114.5 
(0.8) 
123.8 
(1.8) 
118.9 
(1.7) 
148.5 
(3.5) 
160.4 
(1.9) 
Fraction 
working 
0.584 
(0.006) 
0.499 
(0.005) 
0.656 
(.004) 
0.547 
(0.004) 
0.487 
(0.008) 
0.472 
(0.007) 
0.608 
(0.012) 
0.601 
(0.006) 
survey. Thus Table 1.1 presents these averages for all individuals in each of
the four countries, while Tables 1.2M and 1.2F present them separately for
men and women. For each of the four main aggregates, and for four large
sub-aggregates, we present the averages and their standard errors. The data
in Table 1.1 are population weighted averages of the data that are presented in
Tables 1.2 by sex, since women are typically over-represented in time-diary
surveys.
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Table 1.2F. Time Allocations (minutes), Averages and Their Standard Errors, Women Ages 
20-74
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
Individuals in 
survey
4,001 3,862 13,279 19,654 936 940 1,920 9,918 
Market
work 
230.1
(3.0)
132.7
(1.9)
141.5 
(2.0)
133.1
(1.6)
91.5
(2.3)
124.5
(2.7)
182.7
(5.6)
200.7
(2.6)
Secondary
time
241.7
(2.0)
311.8
(1.7)
378.1 
(1.7)
346.9
(1.5)
298.0
(2.2)
267.6
(2.2)
263.2
(4.4)
271.3
(2.1)
Family care 24.3 
(0.7) 
41.8 
(0.8) 
45.4 
(0.6) 
38.8 
(0.6) 
55.8 
(1.1) 
51.2 
(1.2) 
44.2 
(2.0) 
60.4 
(1.5) 
Shopping 46.1 
(0.7) 
65.9 
(0.7) 
51.9 
(0.5) 
52.8 
(0.5) 
49.8 
(0.8) 
52.9 
(0.9) 
58.7 
(2.0) 
59.3 
(0.9) 
All work 471.8 444.5 519.6 480.0 389.5 392.1 445.9 472.0 
Tertiary
time
651.4
(1.5)
675.7
(1.3)
672.1
(0.9)
593.0
(0.8)
645.6
(1.6)
659.4
(1.6)
653.6
(3.1)
640.6
(1.5)
Sleep 508.3 
(1.2) 
509.2 
(1.0) 
513.0 
(0.8) 
499.0 
(0.7) 
508.2 
(1.3) 
523.8 
(1.4) 
482.4 
(2.5) 
510.7 
(1.3) 
Leisure 316.8
(1.9)
319.8
(1.6)
248.5
(1.5)
367.0
(1.3)
404.9
(2.4)
388.4
(2.4)
340.5
(4.4)
327.2
(2.1)
Radio/TV 113.6 
(1.1) 
100.4 
(0.9) 
95.2 
(0.7) 
89.1 
(0.6) 
91.9 
(1.1) 
98.7 
(1.2) 
133.0 
(3.0) 
134.1 
(1.5) 
Fraction 
working 
0.497 
(0.006) 
0.243 
(0.004) 
0.326 
(.004) 
0.310 
(0.003) 
0.239 
(0.005) 
0.305 
(0.006) 
0.409 
(0.011) 
0.443 
(0.005) 
a. Differences within country and by gender. As we noted, the most re-
liable comparisons are within countries. Looking first at the United States
in 1985 and 2003, it is quite clear and unsurprising that men spend more
time in market work than do women, and that women spend more time
in secondary activities. Women spend more time in tertiary activities in
the U.S, Germany and the Netherlands, partly because they sleep more
(Biddle and Hamermesh, 1990); but they spend less time in such activities
in Italy, even though they sleep about as much as men. In the three Anglo-
Saxon countries men spend somewhere between 10 and 25 minutes less time
in leisure, with the diVerence due entirely to their spending less time watch-
ing television. In Italy, however, they spend roughly one hour more than
women enjoying leisure, with less than half the diVerence arising from the
extra time that men spend in front of the television screen.
The diVerences across gender are almost the same in the two northern
European countries, but are much diVerent in Italy. As in all industrialized
countries, however, the European women work less in the market than their
male counterparts, and they do more household production (secondary ac-
tivities). Like American women, they spend as much or more time in ter-
tiary activities than their male fellow citizens, mostly because they sleep
more; and they spend less time than men at leisure, partly because they
spend less time watching television.
There has been a huge literature making cross-country comparisons of
gender inequality in labor-force participation and hours of market work
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(e.g., Bertola, Blau, and Kahn, 2002). We can go beyond that here to exam-
ine gender inequality in all aspects of time use across countries indepen-
dent of any problems in categorization. The cross-country comparisons are
free of problems as long as we are satisfied that diVerences in how men and
women’s activities are aggregated into the four aggregates do not vary across
countries.
For any of the four countries define an inequality index I as:
I =
∑
i
∣∣∣(CiM − CiF )/√CiM · CiF ∣∣∣ , (1.1)
where the subscripts i are the four main aggregates of activities, C—, the
averages of market work, secondary activities, tertiary activities and leisure,
and M denotes men and F women. If the average amounts of time spent in
the four aggregate activities are the same formen and women, this index will
equal zero. Calculating IUS for 2003 yields 1.06; for Germany in 2001/02 IG
= 1.40; for Italy in 2002/03 II = 3.49; and for the Netherlands in 2000 INL =
1.44. Part of the diVerence in this index between the US and the other three
countries is due to the greater gender similarity of time spent in the market
in the US But even if we restrict the calculation in (1.1) to the three aggre-
gates of non-market activities, we still find that male-female diVerences are
smaller in the US than in the EU countries (with the three-activity inequal-
ity index equaling 0.61 in the US and 0.71 in Germany and the Netherlands,
and 1.34 in Italy). The data show not only that the United States currently
approaches a unisex market for paid work more closely than these Euro-
pean countries, but also that gender inequality in the distributions of for
household production, tertiary time and leisure are greater in these three
particular EU economies than in the US.
While the genders are not equal within each country at each point in
time in terms of the allocation of time across these four main aggregates,
there is another, absolutely striking comparison that is apparent in these
data. Let us define “All Work,” or equivalently “Total Work,” as the sum of
time spent on the representative day on the total of market work and sec-
ondary activities. Given howwe defined the category of secondary activities,
All Work might be viewed as the sum of market and non-market produc-
tion.
Examining Tables 1.2M and 1.2F one sees that All Work totals between
390 minutes and 519 minutes (6-1/2 to 8-2/3 hours) in the 16 samples (four
countries, two years, two genders). Compare the value of All Work (again,
the sum of market work and secondary activities) within each country at
a point in time across genders (across Tables 1.2M and 1.2F). Among the
three Anglo-Saxon countries, except for Germany in 1991/92 the diVerence
in All Work across genders never exceeds 11 minutes; and even in Germany
IV. GERMANY, ITALY, NETHERLANDS AND US 18
in 1991/92 the excess of men’s All Work over women’s is only 25 minutes (less
than one-half hour on a total of over eight hours).5 In Italy, however, the dif-
ference was an excess of total work among women of 72 minutes in 1988/89;
while total work by both men and women decreased over the fourteen years
between the two surveys, the excess of total work among women remained
essentially unchanged at 75 minutes per day.
The remarkable stability of this relationship across time and space for
three of the four countries merits comparisons for yet more countries to
whose time-diary studies we have access. Are the three Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries typical of rich economies—is Italy an outlier? Or is the similarity
among the three merely a fluke? Accordingly, we examined All Work, the
total of market work and secondary activities, using time-diary data for
all adults 20-74 from the Basque Country Time Budget Survey of 1993 and
1998 (as used by Ahn, Jimeno, and Ugidos, 2005); from the Australian Time
Use Survey in 1992 (ABS, 1993); and from the Japanese Time Use Survey
of 2001 (Ministry of Internal AVairs and Communications of Japan, 2003),
to whose microeconomic data we lacked access but whose published tables
allowed calculations for this age group. These calculations are as compara-
ble to those presented for Germany, Italy the Netherlands and the US as is
possible given the inherent diVerences in the definitions of the underlying
categories. Table 1.3 presents the gender breakdowns of the four main time
use aggregates for these three countries, using the same age range (20-74) as
in Tables 1.2. Within both Australia and Japan we again find a remarkable
similarity of the total amount of work time (market and secondary time) by
gender. Even in Japan, where women’s market work is much further below
5To address one of the many necessary arbitrary aggregations using the diVerent cat-
egories, consider our classification of volunteer work as leisure. For the US in 2003 we
recalculated the means to include both volunteer work and non-household care activities.
Women performed 29 minutes of these activities, men 23, so that the 4-minute excess of
men’s All Work would be changed to a 2-minute excess of women’s All Work over men’s
if we had included these two categories as secondary activities. Making the same calcula-
tion for the German data for 2001/02, we find that men performed 11 minutes, women 8
minutes of volunteer work. If added to the totals in Tables 1.2, this would have reduced the
8-minute excess of female All Work to an excess of only 5 minutes. The same calculation
for the Italian data from 2002 shows that women performed 14 minutes, men 9 minutes of
volunteer work. Doing the same thing for the Dutch 2000 data shows that men performed
9 minutes, women 12 minutes of volunteer work, which if added to secondary time would
have reduced the 7-minute excess of male All Work to only 4 minutes. In all three recent
Anglo-Saxon data sets this slight expansion of the definition of All Work in fact equalizes
still further the gender distributions of All Work, while for Italy it exacerbates the excess of
female over male work.
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Table 1.3. Time Allocations (minutes), Other Countries, 
Averages and Their Standard Errors, People Ages 20-74 
  Spain 
1993/98 
Australia 
1992 
Japan
2001 
Market
Work M
257.2
(4.3)
300.9
(4.0) 404
 F 
121.8
(3.3)
143.5
(2.9) 204
Secondary
time M
125.0
(2.3)
154.3
(2.1) 33
 F 
278.8
(3.0)
310.0
(2.5) 248
All Work M 382.2 455.2 437 
 F 400.6 453.5 452 
Tertiary
Activities M
686.5
(1.9)
611.7
(1.8) 621
F
650
(1.8)
620.0
(1.6) 629
Leisure
M
371.3
(3.2)
373.1
(3.0) 382
 F 
345.4
(2.9)
366.6
(2.6) 359
men’s than elsewhere, the diVerence is made up by their much greater ex-
cess of household work. The diVerence in All Work in Spain is larger than
in most of the other countries (18 minutes per day), but still not that large.
Italy is the only outlier among the eleven data sets analyzed thus far. Ital-
ian men perform roughly 15 percent less total work than do Italian women.
Additional analyses show that this is not simply a matter of Italian women
engaged in childcare: The diVerence is only slightly smaller if one restricts
the sample to individuals without children. Nor is it due to geographic
diVerences—the shortfall in men’s total work is about the same south of
Rome as it is in the North. It is not that Italian men engage in so much less
total work than other Europeans or Americans; rather, Italian women, at
least between the late 1980s and the early 2000s, worked substantially more
in total than women inmost other rich nations, almost entirely because they
worked more in the home.
In these three data sets and the eight for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands
and the US we have restricted the age ranges to be identical; but would our
finding of gender equality in total work hold up if we account for diVerences
in the age structures by gender, diVerences in marital status, or diVerences
in the presence of children? To answer these questions we estimated equa-
tions describing All Work in each of these samples (except Japan’s) holding
constant for the respondents’ ages, marital status, spouse’s age (if married)
and presence of children by age. With the exception of Germany in 1991,
where the 25-minute excess of male total work turns into a two-minute ex-
cess once demographics are accounted for, and the Basque Country, where
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Table 1.4. Time Allocations (minutes per Representative Day), Still More Countries*  
  Belgium 
1998/ 
2000 
Denmark 
2001 
France
1998/ 
99
Finland
1999/ 
2000 
Sweden
2000/ 
01
U.K. 
2000/ 
01
Norway
2000/ 
01
Canada
1998 
Israel
1992 
Market
Work** M 232 302 248 252 282 278 283 306 382
 F 144 243 157 177 200 177 196 204 164 
Home
Work M 163 152 149 140 172 140 144 162 106
 F 267 222 273 235 251 251 216 264 315 
All Work M 395 454 397 392 454 418 427 468 488
 F 411 465 430 413 451 428 412 468 479 
Tertiary
Activities M 664 629 718 632 617 641 597   632 
  584 
F 683 650 731 648 642 659 621 656 624 
Leisure
M 381 357 325 416 369 381 416 340 368
 F 346 325 279 379 347 353 407 316 337 
SOURCE:  EU data are computed from Aliaga and Winqvist (2003); Canada data are from 
Statistics Canada (1999); Israeli data are reproduced from Gronau and Hamermesh (2001). 
*The age/demographic categories are:  Belgium, 12-95; Denmark, 16-74; France, 15+; Finland, 
10+; Sweden, 20-84; U.K., 8+; Norway, 10-79; Canada, 15+; Israel, married Jews.  For the seven 
EU countries total travel time (plus a small amount of unspecified time) is prorated among market 
work, home work and leisure activities.  In the Canadian and Israeli data the travel time is added to 
the activity for which it occurs. 
**Market work includes time spent in study/education.  
the diVerences grows to 41 minutes, the adjusted gender diVerence in All
Work are nearly identical to the unadjusted diVerences.6
To take this fact still further we use published tabulations from
time-use surveys from nine economically advanced countries, as re-
ported in Aliaga and Winqvist (2003), Statistics Canada (1999) and
Gronau and Hamermesh (2001). These tabulations, presented in Table 1.4,
are not comparable to those in the earlier Tables nor to each other, both be-
cause of the inherent problems of making cross-country comparisons that
we have already discussed and because the sample definitions vary among
these countries, particularly due to diVerences in the ages of the respon-
dents. Nonetheless, they appear to show the same result as implied by nine
of the eleven samples for which the data have already been summarized. Ex-
cept for France, the gender diVerences in All Work are minimal within each
country.7
“Iso-work” appears to be a remarkable constant within a country at a
point in time: We have found tremendous equality between the sexes in
6The adjusted diVerences are only slight more negative (less positive) if indicators of
the presence of young children are excluded.
7Taking data for the US from 1975-76 from (Juster, 1985, p. 316), one calculates that the
average man ages 25-64 engaged in 462 minutes of All Work on a representative day, the
average woman 456 minutes.
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Figure 1.  Scatter and Linear Regression of Male Total Work Against Female Total Work Non-
Mediterranean (Red Line), Mediterranean (Orange Line), Equality of Total Work (Blue Line) 20 
Samples from 16 Countries  
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most of the twenty samples, covering sixteen diVerent countries, which we
have examined, with only one country, Italy, being a distant outlier. Indeed,
in fourteen of the twenty the diVerence in total work by gender is less than
four percent; in the earlier German sample, the Basque Country data and
the Finnish and Norwegian data it is five percent. The largest diVerence
beyond the Italian case is the eight-percent discrepancy in the French data.
A simple average of the percentage diVerences in All Work by gender across
all twenty samples yields a diVerence between male and female total work of
-2.3 percent (and only -1.1 percent if Italy is excluded, and only -0.1 percent
if France, Italy and Spain are deleted).
With twenty diVerent samples covering sixteen countries, performing a
meta-analysis of gender diVerences in All Work time in these economically
advanced countries may be justified. The scatter of the twenty points show-
ing men’s and women’s total work is presented in Figure 1.1.
The figure also presents a red line showing what men’s total work would
be if it were identical to women’s total work in a country. Taking this meta-
analysis one step further, we then estimated a regression relating the amount
of total work among men to that among women. Recognizing that men in
the four European Mediterranean samples (Spain, France and Italy) appear
to work less in total than women, we included an indicator for Mediter-
ranean countries.
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Consider the following regression results (coeYcient estimates with
standard errors in parentheses):
Male Work = 73.1
(47.1)
+ 0.83
(0.11)
FemaleWork− 46.5
(8.9)
Mediterranean,
N = 20, R¯2 = .793.
(The regression line through the non-Mediterranean points is shown in
green in Figure 1.1, the line through the Mediterranean points is shown in
orange.) We cannot reject the hypothesis that the intercept is 0, nor can we
reject the hypothesis that the slope on FemaleWork is 1, nor the joint hy-
pothesis that the intercept is 0 and the slope is 1.8 This fact is visible from a
comparison of the scatter in Figure 1.1 to the red line of complete equality
that is also shown. Not only is total work time nearly equal by gender in
each sample in the non-Mediterranean countries; the diVerences over this
large part of the economically developed world are truly tiny. In the four
Mediterranean samples, however, women work significantly more in total
than men—the orange line lies far below the line of complete equality.
Remembering that the diVerences in the underlying categories of time
use across countries mean that the aggregates that we have used are neces-
sarily diVerent, the iso-work finding appears to be one of the most robust in
labor economics, and something that does not appear to have receivedmuch
attention generally or any attention from economists. It was noticed for the
US in the 1970s by Hill (1985), the 1980s and 1990s by Robinson and Godbey
(1999) and for Canada by Clark (2000). It was also commented on for
a number of countries in the 1980s by Bittman and Wacjman (2000), al-
though their data were not comparable across countries, and their main
focus was on the diVerence in the amounts of leisure that we have noticed
here too. The few sociologists who have noticed this fact and examined
one country’s data sets (Mattingly and Bianchi, 2003) have focused on the
diVerence in leisure time and on the possible extra burden of the mother’s
being “on call” when children are in the household. This latter distinction
does not seem important on our three current Anglo-Saxon data sets: In
the US 2003 the diVerence on All Work among people without children
was 2 extra minutes among women; the Netherlands in 2000 it was 9 ex-
tra minutes among men; and in Germany in 2001/02 it was 19 extra minutes
among women. These diVerences remain tiny: All Work is the same by gen-
der whether or not children are present. Similarly, the gender diVerences in
Italy are essentially unchanged if we restrict the sample to individuals with
none of their own children under 18 in the household.
8The statistic testing the joint hypothesis is F(2,17) = 1.22, p=.32.
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We do not claim that this remarkable gender equality in All Work holds
in all time and all economies. It most decidedly does not hold even to-
day in Italy, and it does not seem to characterize other southern European
countries very well. We believe that it arises in most economically advanced
countries, with the structure of household behavior and labor markets in
developing countries being suYciently diVerent that this basic fact need
not hold. Indeed, Apps (2003) presents evidence from time-budget surveys
from Nicaragua, 1998, and South Africa, 2000, showing a substantial excess
of total work among women over men 18 years of seventeen and eight per-
cent respectively in the two countries. Haddad, Brown, Richter, and Smith
(1995) suggest similar findings for developing African economies. Even the
calculations from Aliaga and Winqvist (2003) for the EU suggest that the
new member states Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia, exhibit excesses of fe-
male over male work of 15, 13 and 14 percent respectively. Results for a coun-
try with a similar middle-income status, Mexico in 2002, show a substantial
excess (9 percent) of female over male total work (calculations from INEGI,
2002). Economic development to the level of the most advanced economies
is accompanied by equalization of the total amount of time spent in market
and household work by gender within a country.
Of course the total amount of work varies across countries and over time
within a country. Macroeconomic conditions are important, as is shown
by the much higher totals for both genders in Germany in 1991/92 than in
2001/02; and market work diVers sharply by gender. Rather, if we look at
All Work instead than market work alone, we see that on a representative
day the average man between the ages of 20 and 75 in most wealthy coun-
tries spends nearly exactly as much time as his female counterpart in that
country.9
The iso-work fact contains an interesting additional implication for the
eVects of macroeconomic fluctuations by gender. Given that this fact holds
in diVerent countries at diVerent time periods, and in the same country at
diVerent times, it suggests that the impact of macroeconomic fluctuations
9A recent unpublished study (Aguiar and Hurst, 2006) calculates what the authors call
total market work plus non-market work using the same two US time-diary surveys plus
smaller ones for 1965 and 1975. A comparison of their tables shows that in 1985 this measure
was 55.7 hours per week for men, 49.6 hours per week among women (a diVerence of 6.1
weekly hours), while in 2003 it was 51.6 hours and 47.0 (a diVerence of 4.6 weekly hours).
The measure does not include time spent in family care, which diVered in the two samples
in our calculations by one-half hour per day, i.e., 3-1/2 hours per week. When one accounts
for that, the excess of male total work over female total work reduces in Aguiar and Hurst
to 1.1 hours per week (9 minutes per day) in 2003, 2.6 hours per week (20 minutes per day)
in 1985. Thus even though their combination of the basic categories (406 in 2003) could
not be the same as ours, the inference from their study is essentially identical to what we
have found in the various data sets used here.
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on All Work is the same for both sexes. Macro fluctuations may increase or
decrease the total amount of (market and non-market) work; but they do
so nearly identically for both men and women.
b. Comparisons over time and across countries. Comparisons over time
within the four countries for which we have detailed data at two points in
time are quite sensible for the Netherlands and Germany, but may be some-
what questionable in Italy and the US because the categorization of activities
diVers so sharply between the two surveys. Taking the Netherlands first, the
most striking change in the 1990s was the tremendous growth in the frac-
tion of women who report some market work during the survey week, a rise
from 24 percent to 31 percent of all the women ages 20 through 74 included
in the survey. This tremendous change was accompanied by a small increase
in time spent at work by women who worked, so that the average amount
of time Dutch women spent at work on a representative day increased by
33 minutes (35 percent) per representative day. This striking increase was
accompanied by a tiny and insignificant drop in male work time (and in
the propensity to work), so that the amount of market work by the average
male respondent increased by over 20 minutes per day (nearly 2-1/2 hours
per week).
Why this increase occurred is not the subject of our study (but see
Jacobsen and Kooreman, 2005 for an argument that more lenient retail-
hours laws were responsible). Perhaps too the large increase in women’s
part-time work in the Netherlands had this eVect, a possibility that is cor-
roborated by the observation that the percentage increase in minutes of
work is only slightly larger than the percentage increase in the fraction of
women working at all. What is of interest here, however, is how this change
aVected non-market time use in the Netherlands. Interestingly, looking at
Table 1.2F, we see that the increase was almost completely oVset by a decline
in secondary time use. Dependent care time did not change much, and
shopping time did not change at all; rather, other secondary activities, clean-
ing/cooking and other household activities (gardening, home repair, etc.)
decreased substantially. This “Dutch Revolution” was accompanied by a de-
crease in leisure (not due to decreased television-watching), but that decline
was oVset by an equal increase in tertiary time (due to increased time re-
ported sleeping). The shift toward market work and away from household
production reported by Dutch women was rapid and striking and provides
the best evidence for the substitutability of these two types of activity in the
aggregate and for the need to go beyond the work non-work distinction.
Over this decade West Germany saw a striking decline in the average
amount of market work, which dropped by nearly one hour per day (7
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hours per week).10 Most of this drop occurred among women, and most
of the change among women resulted from a large decline in the fraction of
women who reported that they were working on the diary day.11
Comparing the Italian data across the two years is somewhat diYcult,
so that any trends should be taken with some skepticism. This is more the
case for the categories of tertiary activities and leisure, as there were more
changes in the coding of these activities across the surveys. Market work
seems the most consistently defined in the two samples, with secondary ac-
tivities falling in between. There does appear to have been a decline in mar-
ket work of about 40 minutes per representative day over this period; and
it has not been accompanied by any change whatsoever in household pro-
ductive (secondary time). Rather, the entire drop has been included, along
with a shift out of tertiary time, in the large rise in measured leisure. While
the part of this increase leisure resulting from a shift away from tertiary time
may be a classification issue, the part resulting from the decline in All Work
seems real.
Comparisons over time in the US are still more problematic because
the classifications diVer greatly across the two surveys; but it does appear
that Americans were doing a bit more market work by 2003, mainly be-
cause of the continued increased in the propensity of women to work for
pay. The bigger changes, which underline the importance of distinguishing
among types of non-market time use, are within non-market time itself. In
particular, secondary activities increased substantially, mainly because de-
pendent care appears to have increased; while tertiary activities decreased,
even though time spent sleeping went up. Finally, women’s leisure activities
decreased, although this was not due at all to a change in the amount of
time spent watching television. The changes in men’s activities appear to be
in the same direction as women’s, and for them too non-television leisure
declined. Issues of comparability across the surveys make any of these com-
parisons for the US somewhat shaky. Probably the most reliable compar-
isons are of the activities sleeping and radio/TV, which are the most specific
of those listed here, so that it seems fair to conclude that Americans are now
sleeping more than in the mid-1980s and that American men are watching
even more television than before.
Over a longer time period we are doubtful whether the drop in leisure
that we have demonstrated for the US would be observed. Indeed, the point
of Aguiar and Hurst (2006), based on their attempts to make various diverse
time-diary data sets commensurable, is precisely that there was a rise in the
10The decline was also one hour per representative day in the former East Germany.
11The pattern of change was the same, although the levels diVered substantially, in the
former East Germany.
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total amount of leisure consumed by the average American between 1965
and 2003. Perhaps better evidence on this is from Norway, which has con-
ducted four time-diary surveys, 1971, 1980, 1990 and 2000 suing essentially
identical survey instruments. Among Norwegian men ages 16-74 the total
amount of work performed fell by 36 minutes between 1971 and 1980, then
stayed constant or even rose slightly.12 Among women ages 16-74 total work
fell nearly steadily, from 7 hours 42 minutes in 1971 to 6 hours 55 minutes in
2000. Without comparable data sets for other countries we cannot be sure
about trends; but there is at least a hint of declining total work on both sides
of the Atlantic.
Although the comparisons over time are problematic in some of these
cases, it is worth noting that the sums of market work and secondary
time are by no means constant over time the these four countries. While
the Netherlands does exhibit this constancy, with the rise in market work
perfectly oVset by the drop in household work, changes of more than 30
minutes per day in total work are exhibited in the other three countries.
We can calculate the gender inequality indexes in (1.1) for each of the
countries for the earlier years as well as for the later years presented above.
The index fell from 1.23 to 1.06 in the US, from 1.88 to 1.44 in the Nether-
lands, and from 4.69 to 3.49 in Italy, but it rose from 0.49 to 1.41 in Germany.
The degree of gender inequality in all activities has converged substantially
among the four countries. Of course, with only two observations on each,
and with a concern about the tremendous change in the macroeconomy in
Germany over this period, we cannot say anything about whether or not this
represents a trend.
The most problematic comparisons are across countries. It is absolutely
clear that Americans watch substantially more television than do Euro-
peans, at least the Dutch, Italians and Germans that we present (and see
also Corneo, 2005); much of the extra roughly 30 to 40 minutes per day (3
to 4-1/2 hours per week) comes from less time sleeping in the United States.
More important, however, Americans of both sexes spend substantially less
time in other, non-television forms of leisure than do Germans, Italians or
Dutch.
Going further than this is diYcult for all the reasons discussed in the
last section. These problems did not prevent Freeman and Schettkat (2005)
from advancing what they called the “marketization hypothesis,” namely
that the amount of what we have called All Work does not diVer between
the US and European countries. This may be the case for some comparisons,
but it certainly does not seem valid in the six possible comparisons one can
make using Table 1.1. Taking the earlier years for each country, we see from
12 Calculated from http://www.ssb.no/english/subjects/00/02/20/tidsbruk_en/.
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Table 1.1 that All Work in Germany was 36 minutes more than in the US at
that time, and 38 minutes more in Italy, while All Work in the Netherlands
was 52 minutes less. In the later period All Work in Germany was 33 minutes
less than in the US, while All Work in Italy was 29 minutes less and in the
Netherlands was 79 minutes less per day than in the US. In other words,
these comparisons suggest that there is no particular equality in total work
across countries at a point in time, nor is total work constant within coun-
tries over time. The “fact” cited by Freeman and Schettkat (2005) appears to
little more than a historical coincidence.13 They also suggest that total work
in the US currently exceeds that in these three European countries.
The international comparisons are only of behavior on the days when
diaries are recorded. Substantial research in the collection of time diaries
has made it abundantly clear that diaries are much less likely to be collected
on days when the individual is on vacation. Thus the cross-country compar-
isons based on Table 1.1 and Tables 1.2 ignored any international diVerences
across countries accounted for by vacation time. This is not just a matter
(Freeman and Schettkat, 2005) of diaries being collected only over part of
the year (i.e., as in the one or two weeks in the Netherlands or the eight
months in Germany). Rather, it is that respondents have been shown to be
unlikely to complete diaries while they are on vacation.
We know that annual vacation time is generally shorter in the United
States than in continental Europe (Altonji and Oldham, 2003). This diVer-
ence suggests that even the inference that more market work is conducted
in the US, and less leisure is taken there, is understated. Were we to obtain
diaries from days distributed randomly across the year and independent of
whether the respondent is at home or away from home, assuming that va-
cation days include little if any market work, we would observe a still larger
excess of market work in the US over the Netherlands and Germany, and
a still larger shortfall of leisure in the US. Whether the diVerences in sec-
ondary or tertiary time would be magnified or reduced cannot be inferred
a priori.
13An interesting question is why their apparent equality of All Work between the US
and a number of EU countries in the early 1990s seems so diVerent from our conclusion.
First, one should note that, based on a simple average of the measures of All Work in the
data in Tables 1.2 and 1.3 for the early 1990s for Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and the
Basque Country, one observes simple averages for the four countries of 412 minutes of total
work for both men and women, about one-half hour per day, or 3-1/2 hours less per week,
than in the US data for 1985. In Freeman and Schettkat’s comparison using an average
of more EU nations, the diVerences are a US excess of 3-1/4 hours per week among men
in the US, and a shortfall of 3-1/3 hours among women in the US compared to their EU
counterparts. Thus the only real diVerence between our results and theirs on this (side)
issue is among women. Second, of course, any such comparisons are highly speculative for
the wide array of reasons that we have discussed in the text.
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Table 1.5M. Predicted Time Use (minutes), Men, if All Samples Had U.S. 2003 
Demographic Characteristics 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991
2003
ˆ
USG
2001
2003
ˆ
USG
1988
2003
ˆ
USI
2002
2003
ˆ
USI
1990
2003
ˆ
USN
2000
2003
ˆ
USN
1985
2003
ˆ
USU
2003
2003
ˆ
USU
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
Market
work 
294.1 251.9 362.4 308.0 248.7 270.2 303.0 312.6
Secondary
time
193.8 182.7 91.8 120.0 151.9 149.2 142.3 163.2
All work 487.9 434.6 454.2 428.0 400.6 419.4 445.3 475.8
Tertiary
time
631.1 652.0 681.0 591.6 631.0 623.2 643.1 616.0
Leisure 321.0 353.4 304.9 420.4 408.3 397.3 351.6 348.1
Table 1.5F. Predicted Time Use (minutes), Women, if All Samples Had U.S. 2003 
Demographic Characteristics 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991
2003
ˆ
USG
2001
2003
ˆ
USG
1988
2003
ˆ
USI
2002
2003
ˆ
USI
1990
2003
ˆ
USN
2000
2003
ˆ
USN
1985
2003
ˆ
USU
2003
2003
ˆ
USU
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
Market
work 
246.8 130.9 149.8 133.2 83.8 121.2 189.5 200.7
Secondary
time
242.1 315.7 373.4 374.1 291.6 271.6 262.2 271.3
All work 488.9 446.6 523.2 507.3 375.4 392.8 451.7 472.0 
Tertiary
time
641.8 672.5 671.4 587.8 646.8 660.1 653.4 640.6
Leisure 309.2 320.9 245.4 344.9 417.7 387.0 335.0 327.2
B. Do these differences and changes stem from differences and
changes in demographic characteristics? Howmuch of the diVerences be-
tween the amounts of time allocated to the diVerent activities in each coun-
try and over time are due to cross-country and temporal diVerences in the
observable demographic characteristics of the sample respondents? In other
words, howmuch of the diVerences that we observe across countries are true
diVerences in behavior, and how much are due to diVerences in the hetero-
geneous characteristics of the populations? We thus ask what the allocation
of time would look like in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the US in
each year and for each sex if the sample respondents had the same char-
acteristics on average as did Americans of the same sex and ages in 2003.
Viewed obversely, we are asking how much of the diVerence between time
allocation in the other country/at another time and the US in 2003 results
from diVerences in underlying demographic characteristics.
In Tables 1.5 we present the means of each of the four aggregates for
the three European countries measured at the means of a number of demo-
graphic variables in the United States in 2003. The averages are adjusted
to account for diVerences in age (a quadratic relationship), marital status,
the age of one’s spouse if married (again a quadratic relationship), spouse’s
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hours of market work or work status (if married), and the presence of chil-
dren under age 6, and between ages 6 and 17. Calling this vector of control
variablesX , we are thusmaking the adjustment for, e.g., Germany in 1991/92
as:
Gˆ1991US2003 = β
G1991X∗US2003, (1.2)
where X∗ is the vector of means of the control variables X, measured for
the US in 2003.
Tables 1.5 make it clear that these adjustments to account for cross-
sectional diVerences in the underlying characteristics of the populations are
not what lead us to observe the diVerences that we have shown across coun-
tries or over time. Just as one example, comparing the Dutch data in Ta-
bles 1.2 and 1.5, we see that there are some diVerences (never more than
15 minutes per category) between the adjusted means and the unadjusted
means. These diVerences are not large, even though they are among the
larger of those in the tables, and in no way do they alter any of our con-
clusions about the sharp changes in time allocation in the Netherlands over
the decade. The Netherlands would have seen a sharp increase in market
work (among women) even if the Dutch had on average possessed the same
demographic characteristics in both 1990 and 2000 as the US had in 2003.
The inferences about Germany in Tables 1.1 and 1.2 would not be altered
if German demographics were the same as those in the United States in 2003.
West Germany experienced a tremendous economic boom in the early 1990s
as a result of the re-unification, which was followed by more than a decade
of very slow growth. The substantial drop in market work among women
and the rise in their secondary time would have occurred had the women’s
characteristics not changed. To the extent that one believes the classifica-
tions of activities that we have made, the diVerences implicit in Tables 1.1
and 1.2 are real, the result of changing behavior, and are not an artifact of
underlying diVerences in demographic characteristics among the countries.
The quantitative conclusions about the changes over time in Italy would
be somewhat aVected had the demographic structure remained the same
over time (and the same as in the US). In particular, the observed drop in
men’s market work would not have been so large, and the observed decline
in women’s secondary time would not have occurred, if the demographic
characteristics of the Italian sample had remained unchanged. Nonethe-
less, the comparisons to the US for the early part of this decade remain un-
changed: If Italy had the same demographic structure as the US we would
still observe less total work among Italian men and more among Italian
women than among their American counterparts.
Because of the lack of comparability of the data in the two surveys, the
decompositions for the US shown in Tables 1.5 are less reliable than those
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for the two European nations. Nonetheless, they are interesting too. Among
both men and women demographic change alone would have led us to ex-
pect only tiny changes in time allocation. In fact, leisure time and tertiary
time dropped, while market work and secondary activities increased.
Do these changes in the US represent a still more harried existence for
Americans? Perhaps; but, as noted above, issues of comparability may be
important here. Even if they are not important, it is quite possible that sec-
ondary activities took on new meaning over the nearly two decades covered
by the data. Shopping may have become more enjoyable—high-end shop-
ping may have replaced grocery shopping (and there is strong evidence that
the latter did decrease between these surveys; see Hamermesh, 2006a). The
unexpected drop in leisure time may have resulted from a shift at the mar-
gin toward enjoyable secondary activities and away from less pleasant leisure
activities. The lack of comparability of the detailed categories in the two sur-
veys in the US precludes distinguishing these possibilities and renders any
comparisons somewhat dubious.
V. Weekdays or weekends, days or hours, nights or days—does it
matter?
All of the comparisons thus far are for the representative day in the week.
We have made no distinctions among when the activities are performed.
But when people do things does matter: Doing an activity on the same
time each day reduces set-up costs, but generates boredom (Hamermesh,
2005); undertaking an activity when others, especially one’s spouse, are
doing it is more enjoyable in many types of tertiary activities and leisure;
and jointly undertaking an activity increases productivity in many kinds of
market and household production (Hamermesh, 2002; Jenkins and Osberg,
2005). While there are many possibilities for comparisons of diVerences and
changes in the timing of activities in these four economies, here we deal only
with three of the simplest: How do the amounts of the diVerent activities
performed diVer among the countries and between sexes on weekdays as
compared to weekends, and how did these diVerences change over the past
20 years? How does the pattern of activities vary across the days of the week
more generally? How does the timing of market work over the twenty-four
hours of the working day diVer among countries?
Unlike the cross-country comparisons in Section IV, where potential dif-
ferences in the underlying categorizations required us to exercise caution,
here such comparisons are less problematic. Most diVerences in categoriza-
tions will wash out when we compare weekday-weekend diVerences in time
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Table 1.6M. Time Allocations (minutes), Men, Averages and Their Standard Errors, 
Weekdays and Weekends Separately 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
 No. 
week-
day 
diaries 
4,369 6561 4238 6424 2975 3230 1177 3844 
 No. 
week-
end
diaries 
1,485 3546 7973 11,804 1190 1292 470 3906 
          
Week-
days 
385.4
(4.1)
340.4
(3.5)
438.4
(4.3)
357.1
(3.6)
340.3
(5.3)
332.8
(5.3)
373.0
(8.2)
392.0
(4.7)
Market
work 
Week-
ends
77.5
(4.6)
67.6
(2.8)
172.7
(2.8)
123.5
(2.1)
48.4
(4.2)
57.4
(4.5)
152.5
(11.2)
112.0
(3.6)
Week-
days 
194.6
(2.8)
172.1
(2.0)
80.1
(1.8)
110.1
(1.7)
137.4
(2.6)
138.3
(2.6)
132.7
(4.6)
146.0
(2.6)
Secondary
time
Week-
ends
213.0
(4.3)
178.4
(2.6)
 99.9 
(1.4)
127.3
(1.3)
160.7
(4.5)
159.6
(4.2)
152.0
(7.1)
206.5
(3.1)
Week-
days 
18.9 
(0.8) 
17.1 
(0.5) 
17.1 
(0.6) 
18.9 
(0.6) 
16.6 
(0.8) 
15.6 
(0.9) 
15.7 
(1.4) 
27.7 
(1.1) 
Family care 
Week-
ends
26.4 
(1.68) 
20.1 
(0.8) 
21.0 
(0.5) 
20.4 
(0.5) 
21.9 
(1.5) 
20.1 
(1.6) 
16.3 
(2.2) 
29.5 
(1.3) 
Week-
days 
40.6 
(0.9) 
52.5 
(1.0) 
23.0 
(0.7) 
31.6 
(0.8) 
32.1 
(1.2) 
34.9 
(1.1) 
40.5 
(2.1) 
39.5 
(1.2) 
Shopping 
Week-
ends
35.7 
(1.5) 
40.2 
(1.32) 
26.6 
(0.6) 
35.7 
(0.6) 
32.1 
(2.2) 
37.1 
(2.0) 
44.2 
(3.4) 
52.9 
(1.5) 
All work Week-
days 
580.0 512.5 518.4 467.2 477.7 471.1  505.7 538.0 
Week-
ends
290.5 246.0 272.6 250.8 209.1 217.0 304.5 318.5
Week-
days 
597.5
(1.4)
623.4
(1.6)
667.3
(1.8)
577.5
(1.5)
603.3
(2.3)
611.3
(2.3)
628.1
(4.2)
598.2
(2.4)
Tertiary
time
Week-
ends
702.3
(3.4)
731.7
(2.6)
723.2
(1.4)
639.3
(1.3)
676.2
(3.9)
691.5
(4.2)
677.0
(7.2)
661.4
(2.5)
Week-
days 
471.2 
(1.4) 
478.2 
(1.4) 
504.5 
(1.5) 
484.8 
(1.3) 
477.0 
(1.7) 
486.7 
(1.9) 
469.1 
(3.5) 
478.3 
(2.0) 
Sleeping
Week-
ends
551.1 
(3.0) 
549.8 
(2.1) 
548.1 
(1.3) 
526.6 
(1.1) 
529.1 
(3.1) 
546.2 
(3.4) 
506.2 
(6.1) 
538.9 
(2.2) 
Week-
days 
262.5
(2.3)
304.1
(2.1)
254.6
(3.1)
395.3
(2.5)
359.0
(3.8)
357.1
(3.7)
306.2
(5.9)
303.8
(3.6)
Leisure
Week-
ends
447.3
(5.1)
462.4
(3.2)
444.4
(2.5)
549.9
(1.92)
554.6
(5.7)
531.5
(5.8)
458.6
(10.4)
460.0
(3.8)
Week-
days 
104.7 
(1.4) 
122.7 
(1.3) 
104.8 
(1.3) 
108.4 
(1.2) 
113.2 
(2.0) 
105.0 
(1.8) 
134.8 
(3.8) 
142.8 
(2.5) 
Radio/TV 
Week-
ends
140.6 
(3.2) 
165.9 
(2.3) 
123.2 
(1.15) 
129.9 
(1.0) 
150.5 
(3.7) 
153.6 
(3.9) 
181.6 
(7.7) 
204.9 
(3.0) 
allocations in one country to weekday-weekend diVerences in time alloca-
tions in another. In this Section we thus start with these international com-
parisons, since they are striking. Tables 1.6M and 1.6F present the average
time allocations for the four major aggregates and the four sub-aggregates,
in the same four countries for the same two years as in Section IV. Here,
however, we present these averages separately for weekdays and weekend
days.
Unsurprisingly, there is less market work by both men and women in all
three countries on weekends than on weekdays. What is somewhat surpris-
ing is how much more work is performed in the United States on weekends
than in the two northern European countries, and how little Italy diVers
from theUS in this regard. In both theNetherlands andGermany the weekly
increase in leisure time on the weekends is much more pronounced than in
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Table 1.6F. Time Allocations (minutes), Women, Averages and Their Standard Errors, 
Weekdays and Weekends Separately 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003 
 No. week- 
day 
diaries 
5871 7494 4664 6879 4680 4700 1390 4869 
 No. week- 
end
diaries 
2131 4076 8615 12,775 1872 1880 530 5049 
Week-
days 
304.4
(3.6)
172.9
(2.6)
173.3
(3.5)
164.6
(2.8)
118.4
(3.0)
161.3
(3.4)
224.8
(6.8)
256.6
(3.9)
Market
work 
Week-
ends
58.6
(3.3)
32.7
(1.7)
61.6
(1.7)
55.2
(1.4)
24.4
(2.3)
32.6
(2.7)
76.5
(7.9)
62.5
(2.3)
Week-
days 
240.5
(2.4)
330.1
(2.2)
385.6
(3.0)
354.8
(2.5)
318.3
(2.7)
281.8
(2.7)
260.6
(5.2)
264.6
(3.0)
Secondary
time
Week-
ends
244.5
(3.5)
266.1
(2.5)
359.2
(2.0)
327.5
(1.7)
247.1
(3.6)
232.3
(3.8)
269.6
(8.2)
288.0
(2.8)
Week-
days 
22.5 
(0.7) 
46.0 
(1.0) 
45.9 
(1.0) 
42.1 
(1.0) 
60.1 
(1.4) 
55.7 
(1.4) 
47.0 
(2.5) 
66.0 
(1.6) 
Family care 
Week-
ends
28.0 
(1.4) 
31.3 
(1.1) 
54.4 
(0.8) 
30.9 
(0.7) 
45.2 
(1.8) 
40.1 
(1.9) 
37.1 
(3.2) 
46.5 
(1.4) 
Week-
days 
50.5 
(0.8) 
76.1 
(0.9) 
45.6 
(0.7) 
55.3 
(0.8) 
54.2 
(1.0) 
56.3 
(1.1) 
57.9 
(2.3) 
55.3 
(1.2) 
Shopping 
Week-
ends
36.0 
(1.2) 
40.5 
(1.0) 
33.2 
(0.7) 
46.8 
(0.7) 
38.6 
(1.6) 
44.4 
(1.8) 
60.7 
(4.1) 
69.4 
(1.4) 
All work Week-
days 
544.9 503.0 558.9 519.5 436.7  443.1  485.4 521.2
Week-
ends
303.1 298.8 420.9 382.8 271.5 264.9 346.1 350.5
Week-
days 
626.7
(1.6)
647.5
(1.4)
660.0
(1.5)
579.3
(1.3)
630.5
(1.8)
641.7
(1.8)
641.8
(3.6)
620.6
(2.0)
Tertiary
time
Week-
ends
708.5
(2.7)
745.9
(2.2)
702.5
(1.2)
626.8
(1.1)
683.1
(3.2)
703.8
(3.2)
683.5
(5.9)
689.9
(2.1)
Week-
days 
488.4 
(1.3) 
491.1 
(1.2) 
505.1 
(1.3) 
491.0 
(1.1) 
498.3 
(1.4) 
510.2 
(1.6) 
472.0 
(2.9) 
494.3 
(1.7) 
Sleeping
Week-
ends
554.5 
(2.3) 
554.1 
(1.7) 
532.7 
(1.1) 
518.6 
(1.0) 
533.0 
(2.4) 
557.8 
(2.8) 
508.6 
(4.8) 
551.3 
(1.8) 
Week-
days 
268.4
(1.9)
289.5
(1.8)
221.3
(2.4)
341.3
(2.1)
372.7
(2.7)
355.3
(2.7)
312.7
(5.1)
298.0
(3.0)
Leisure
Week-
ends
428.5
(3.8)
395.4
(2.7)
316.8
(1.9)
430.5
(1.6)
485.5
(4.4)
471.3
(4.5)
410.4
(8.2)
399.4
(3.0)
Week-
days 
138.4 
.2.4) 
93.7 
(1.0) 
94.4 
(1.1) 
87.9 
(1.0) 
85.6 
(1.3) 
93.9 
(1.3) 
130.8 
(3.6) 
128.5 
(2.0) 
Radio/TV 
Week-
ends
117.3 
(2.0) 
116.9 
(1.6) 
97.2 
(0.2) 
92.0 
(0.8) 
107.8 
(2.4) 
110.8 
(2.5) 
138.6 
(5.4) 
147.9 
(2.2) 
the US. Northern Europeans work in the market (less than Americans) dur-
ing the week, and concentrate their leisure (muchmore than Americans) on
weekends. No doubt some of this is due to diVerent rules on store-opening
hours that generate increased retail employment on weekends. Given the
size of the retail sector, however, themuch smaller diVerence inmarket work
between weekdays and weekends in the US than in northern Europe must
be due to diVerences in other industries, most likely services. Perhaps that
explains the similarity between the Italian and US results too.
International diVerences in the hebdomadal patterns of secondary and
tertiary activities are also fascinating. Tertiary activity is greater on week-
ends in all four countries, due almost entirely to the extra nearly one hour
of sleep that the typical adult gets each weekend day compared to each week-
day. The major cross-country diVerence is in the distribution of secondary
time over the week. In all three European countries women undertake more
secondary activities on weekdays than on weekends; the opposite is true
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among American women. We believe this result stems at least in part from
the diVerences in store-opening hours (Burda and Weil, 2006) between Eu-
rope and the US, since much of the diVerence we observe occurs in time
spent shopping. Evidently, the loosening of store-opening restrictions in the
Netherlands did not result in much of a convergence in time spent shopping
on weekdays and weekends there.
The much greater distinction between weekdays and weekends that we
have observed for market work carries over to the weekly distinction in All
Work—it is not simply due to diVerences in market behavior that are oVset
by household production. As the averages in Table 1.6M for All Work show,
in both the Netherlands and Germany men perform over twice as much to-
tal work on weekdays than on weekends, and Italian men perform nearly 90
percent more market work on weekdays than on weekends. In the US, men
perform only 60 percentmore work on weekdays than on weekends. The in-
ternational diVerences among women are somewhat smaller: German and
Dutch women perform roughly 60 percent more total work on weekdays
than on weekends, American women perform only 50 percent more total
work on weekdays. Italian women perform only 35 percent more work on
weekdays—their secondary activities decrease relatively little on weekends.
Is the huge diVerence in weekday/weekend patterns of All Work by men
between the United States on the one hand, and Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands a mere artifact of our focusing on three European countries
(albeit at two distinct times)? The answer is negative: In Spain in 1993/98,
All Work accounts for 450 minutes among men on weekdays, 217 minutes
on weekends. Spanish women spent 457 minutes per day on All Work (mar-
ket and household) on weekdays, 291 minutes per day on weekends. Very
clearly, the European norm, at least among men, is to perform on week-
days a much greater fraction of the total work (both in the market and at
home) than is performed on weekends, leaving weekends especially free for
personal care and leisure. Americans—especially men—mix their work and
non-work (tertiary activities and leisure) muchmore between weekdays and
weekends than do Europeans.
Interestingly, the only available evidence suggests this homogenization
of the week among Americans was not always the case. Using the data in
(Szalai, 1972, 1972, Tables III.4 and III.5), one can calculate that among em-
ployed men in the US in 1965 the ratio of total work time on weekdays
to that on weekends was 3.4; among working women it was 2.1; and even
among housewives it was 1.7 times weekend work. While the data are not
entirely comparable to those in the Table, it does seem likely that the weekly
allocation of time in the US nearly one-half century ago was much more
concentrated than it is now.
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Table 1.7. Indexes of Similarity, Weekday and Weekend Activities 
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S. 
1991/
92
2001/
02
1988/
89
2002/
03
1990 2000 1985 2003 
Men  2.57 2.42 1.83 1.69 2.98 2.66 1.54 2.20
Women  2.45 2.53 1.58 1.54 2.35 2.34 1.50 2.02
Table 1.7 calculates indexes similar to those based on (1.1), but instead
of measuring the extent of similarity in time allocations across gender, for
each gender and within each country and year we are inferring the degree to
which the allocation of time on weekdays across the four aggregates is like
that on weekends. A lower value of the index implies that the representative
individual’s time allocations on weekdays and weekends are more similar.
The calculation of this index reinforces our inference from Tables 1.6 that
Americans do not distinguish between weekdays and weekends nearly so
much as northern Europeans—that the distribution of activities on diVerent
days of the week is more similar in the US than in northern Europe. Italians,
on the other hand, distinguish even less in their weekly distribution of all
activities.
Despite the lower degree of temporal specialization of activities in the
US than in northern Europe, clear-cut changes have occurred in the recent
past. The index rose substantially in the US over the eighteen years 1985
to 2003, especially among men. Among Dutch men, on the other hand, it
fell during the 1990s, but there was no change among Dutch women. The
changes in Germany were small for both genders, as they were in Italy. While
there has been convergence across the Atlantic Ocean, the change has re-
sulted from changed behavior in the US alone.
There is no reason for the optima to be the same in the two areas. While
technologies are undoubtedly similar, or at least approximate each other
rapidly in response to technological shocks, the optima that result from the
interactions of diVering preferences (including those expressed in govern-
mental mandates) and technology will surely diVer. Thus while the sharp
decline in weekend work in the US is consistent with the observation that
work at unusual times is undesirable (Hamermesh, 1999) and will dimin-
ish in a growing economy with unchanging preferences and time-neutral
technologies, the increase in weekend work in the Netherlands cannot be
explained without reference to changes outside the workplace that have af-
fected the timing of other activities and work too. Drawing inferences about
changes in welfare from even such clear-cut changes as are shown in the ta-
bles in this Section is very tricky.
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Table 1.8. Percent of Difference from U.S. in Average Daily Minutes of Market 
Work Due to Difference in Fraction of Adults Working
Germany Italy The Netherlands 
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 
All
adults
86.2 137.3 435.6 100.3 97.8 96.8 
Men  104.2 107.3 129.5 49.6 124.0 118.8
Women  85.8 160.6 84.1 88.2 71.4 74.0
Comparisons of weekday-weekend diVerences in the timing of activi-
ties by gender yield fairly unsurprising results. Because there is much less
market work in the European countries on weekends which is dispropor-
tionately performed by men, the gender inequality indexes there are lower
on weekends than on weekdays. In the US, where gender diVerences in time
devoted tomarket work, are less, the inequality indexes are roughly the same
on weekdays and weekends.
There is also no reason to expect the iso-work fact—the same amount
of All Work by men and women—to hold on a particular day (any more
than one might expect it to hold at a particular point in time during any
day). In fact, it does not: On weekdays in each country at each point in time
All Work among men exceeds that among women; on weekends All Work
among women exceeds that among men (except in Italy, by almost exactly
the amount that balances oV the male excess during the week).
The comparisons show that weekends and weekdays are more distinct
in Europe than in the US. But is that true for all days across the week? More
generally, how much of the diVerences in the number of minutes worked in
the market on a representative day in the US and the European countries is
due to diVerences in the probabilities that people work in the market and,
given that they do, that they work on a particular day? We are thus asking
how much of the gap between minutes worked on a representative day is
attributable to diVerences in the fraction of adults working on that day.
For the two German, Italian and Dutch samples Table 1.8 shows how
much of the diVerence between the US in the year closest to the survey in the
average amount of time worked per adult is due to diVerences in the proba-
bility of working on the day between the US and the particular country. The
percentages cluster around 100, with Italian men in the recent survey being
the only exception. These results suggest that the major diVerence across
the Atlantic is in the probability that the representative adult is working in
the market on a particular day, not in the amount of time spent on a day
when that person is working. Since in the recent surveys that we have used
the average minutes of market work are greater in the US than in Germany,
Italy or the Netherlands, the table implies that the result is due entirely to
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Figure 1.2.   Percent of Working Time Spent at Each Half-Hour of the Day, Germany, 
Netherlands, U.S. and Australia 
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Germans and Dutch, and to Italian women being less likely to work on a
particular day (and less likely to work in the market at all during the week).
When they do work in the market they work just as long as Americans. This
corroborates the weekend/weekday diVerence that we demonstrated earlier
in this Section, since it implies more concentration of work activities across
days of the week in Europe than in the US.
Having seen that Americans tend to mix market work and non-market
activities more evenly over the week, one wonders whether they also mix
them more evenly over the day. To examine this issue we considered the
timing of work at each minute of the day among those who work on the
particular day. We again consider Germany in 2001/02, the Netherlands in
2000 and the US in 2003. For purposes of comparison to another English-
speaking country, we also examine how Australians spread their work time
over the day, using data from 1992.14 We examine the allocations of work-
ing timing on Wednesdays, the weekday on which the largest fractions of
workers in these data perform at least some work. (The international com-
parisons are essentially identical on other weekdays.)
Figure 1.2 presents the results for every half-hour interval on the hour
over the day between midnight and the subsequent midnight.
The Figure shows the percent of the day’s work done at each half-hour; it
thus abstracts from cross-national diVerences in the amount of time the av-
erage worker spends on the job during the day. Until 6AM, and after 10PM,
14Because the activities are coded in 15-minute intervals in the Dutch data, and to avoid
masses of repetitive information, we aggregate the time intervals to half-hour periods in this
analysis.
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a higher fraction of those who work at all on the day are at work in the US
than in the other three countries. Workers in Germany and the Netherlands
are at work disproportionately only during prime daylight hours—very few
are working between midnight and 4AM, and not very many are working
after 8PM. The timing of work in Australia is somewhere between that in
the US and northern Europe.15 The main conclusion from these results is
that, just as with their timing of work over the week, so too do Americans
mix their market work and non-work over the day. Unlike northern Europe,
where most workers are either at work or not, in the US many workers are
working at non-standard times of the day.
VI. What do we now know?
As noted in the Introduction, EU-US diVerences in patterns of market
work have been studied nearly ad nauseam; we thus refrain from repeating
those findings that simply reproduce what others in that vast literature have
shown. Instead, we can divide our novel, or at least somewhat novel results
into two categories.
A. EU vs. US.
(1) Americans enjoy less leisure (not merely less time away from market
work) than Europeans. The diVerence in non-television leisure
time is even greater, since Americans watch TV over one-half hour
more per day than Europeans.
(2) Americans work more than Europeans—the American excess of mar-
ket work is not fully offset by less home work.
(3) Americans mix their activities over the week more than Europeans.
Their weekends look more like their weekdays than do those in
northern Europe.
(4) Market work is more spread out over the twenty-four hours of the day
in the US than in Europe.
B. Gender differences.
(1) Women spend less time in leisure than men in each of the  countries
we examined. They spend much more time in household produc-
tion, slightly more time in tertiary activities.
(2) Gender differences in how people spend time are smaller in the US
than in the European countries studied here. This diVerence is partly
due to the lesser diVerence in market work time in the US, partly to
15A similar calculation by Callister and Dixon (2001) using the New Zealand Time
Use Survey shows a pattern that is more tilted toward standard business hours than is
Australia’s.
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a greater similarity across genders in the US in the distribution of
time spent outside the market.
(3) The sums of market work and secondary activities are almost identical
by gender within a country at a point in time over the week. Men’s
excess of market work is almost perfectly balanced by their shortfall
of household work. Only in theMediterranean countries, with Italy
being a particularly severe outlier, does men’s excess market work
fail to match women’s excess home production.
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Appendix: classification of basic activities into the main aggregates in
the eight samples
Note: Inmany of the survey a very small part of the day was not classified
or truly miscellaneous. In each case those totals were prorated across the
four main aggregates.
Activity Description
Market work Employment and job search
Secondary Home work activities; handicraft/gardening; care and sitting
Tertiary Personal activities; physiological regeneration
Leisure Volunteer and other social help; education; con-
tacts/conversation/friendship; media usage/free-time activities
Table .. Germany: 1991/92, 2001/02
Activity Description
Market work Professional activities; training
Secondary Domestic activities; family care; purchasing goods and services
Tertiary Sleeping eating, including at work
Leisure Nonwork-related education; religious/civic/political activities;
free time. Travel time is prorated across market work, sec-
ondary time and leisure in 1988/89, and is specifically assignable
in 2002/03
Table .. Italy: 1988/89, 2002/03
Activity Description
Market work Occupational work and related travel
Secondary Household work, do-it yourself, gardening, etc; childcare; shop-
ping
Tertiary Personal needs
Leisure All else
Table .. Netherlands: 1990, 2000
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Activity Description
Market work All working and work-related activities; travel related to work
Secondary Cooking, cleaning, child care, shopping; travel related to these
Tertiary Personal care outside the house; eating and drinking; sleeping,
sex; travel related to these
Leisure Schooling and training; organized activities; entertainment;
sports; reading, writing; travel related to these
Table .. US: 1985
Activity Description
Market work All working and work-related activities; travel related to work
Secondary All household activities; caring for and helping household
members; consumer purchases; professional and personal care
services; household services; government services; travel related
to these
Tertiary Sleeping, other personal activities; eating and drinking; travel
related to these
Leisure Non-household care activities; education; socializing-relaxing-
leisure; sport; religious; etc.; volunteering; travel related to these
Table .. US: 2003
CHAPTER 2
Iso-work and social norms
I. Time allocation: the iso-work fact
In the previous chapter, we have established a fundamental feature of
time use: total work, defined as the sum of time spent on market work and
on secondary activity (or, to use a somewhat more common terminology,
the total time spent onmarket and home production) is almost invariant, in
most economically advanced countries, at a given point in time, to gender.
This is what we called the iso-work fact.
This invariance is striking: as shown in the previous chapter, in fourteen
of the twenty samples we have examined the diVerence in total work by
gender is less than four percent, with only one country, Italy, being a distant
outlier.1
To understand the economic content of the equal work fact, it is best to
point out what it does not mean:
• It does not mean that total work is the same across countries.
This is simply not true. There is little support in the data for the
Freeman and Schettkat (2005) “marketization hypothesis.”
• It does not mean that total work is constant over time in a given
country. Quite on the contrary, there is some evidence in our data
that total work might be sensitive to the state of the business cy-
cle, and it stands to reason that it should have a downward secular
trend.
• It does not mean that all individuals choose, in a given country and
at a given date, the same allocation of time between market and
home production. Time use does depends on gender, but the point
is that, in the aggregate, total work does not: gender only aVects the
division of total work between market work and secondary activity,
not its level.
The invariance of total work to gender means that there is a mechanism
at work, at a given date and in a given country, that on average leads both
1Our total work fact is thus much stronger the Freeman and Schettkat (2005) “marke-
tization hypothesis.”
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Table 2.1M. Time Allocations (minutes), Married People, Means and Their Standard
Errors, Men and Women Separately
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S.
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003
Men 340.9
(4.8)
269.8
(3.3)
373.5
(3.1)
228.2
(2.9)
266.5
(5.1)
258.6
(5.3)
314.8
(8.7)
329.1
(4.4)
Market
work
Women 253.3
(3.8)
111.1
(2.1)
124.9
(2.2)
95.6
(1.9)
87.0
(2.6)
111.0
(3.1)
159.9
(16.9)
182.4
(3.4)
Men 174.0
(2.6)
175.1
(1.8)
94.5
(1.3)
133.7
(1.5)
152.7
(2.7)
155.0
(2.7)
149.9
(4.8)
179.0
(2.6)
Secondary
time
Women 222.0
(2.3)
336.3
(2.0)
435.5
(1.8)
391.2
(1.9)
321.9
(2.5)
302.3
(2.7)
305.0
(5.8)
313.8
(2.8)
Male Total
Work -
Female
Total Work
39.6 -2.5 -92.2 -123.9 10.3 0.3 -0.2 11.9
Men 624.1
(2.1)
655.9
(1.7)
685.2
(1.3)
611.3
(1.4)
623.7
(2.3)
633.6
(2.5)
645.3
(4.3)
609.3
(2.0)
Tertiary
time
Women 652.4
(1.8)
680.9
(1.5)
663.0
(1.0)
592.3
(1.1)
642.8
(1.8)
660.2
(1.9)
653.3
(3.8)
635.5
(1.8)
Men 300.9
(2.9)
339.1
(2.1)
287.0
(2.2)
466.8
(2.2)
397.1
(3.8)
392.8
(3.8)
329.9
(6.4)
322.5
(3.2)
Leisure
Women 312.4
(2.4)
311.7
(1.8)
216.9
(1.5)
360.9
(1.6)
388.4
(2.7)
366.5
(2.8)
322.6
(5.2)
308.1
(2.7)
Spain Aus-
tralia
1993/98 1992
Men 268.1
(5.2)
306.7
(4.9)
Market
work
Women 117.2
(4.3)
125.8
(3.4)
Men 135.0
(2.9)
169.6
(2.6)
Secondary
time
Women 317.4
(3.9)
347.3
(2.9)
Male Total
Work -
Female
Total Work
-31.5 3.1
gender groups to choose the same amount of total work. What could this
mechanism be?
A. Specialization and fairness within the household. A first possibil-
ity is that the equality of male and female total work results from the in-
teraction between optimal specialization and a desire for fairness within the
household, as suggested by Table 2.1M.
Imagine, for instance, that John might has a comparative advantage in
home production over his lawyer wife Helen. As a result, they have decided
that he would be a househusband while she would practice law in a firm.
The implicit contract between them stipulates that while John spends his
days taking care of the kids and cleaning up the house, Helen should really
work, and not spend her afternoon playing golf with her partners. In return,
John has promised Helen, who comes back exhausted from a full day at the
oYce, that the kids will be clean, the house tidy and dinner ready when she
returns home from the oYce in the evening. John starts his day of home
work when Helen leaves the house, and is done by the time she comes back
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Table 2.1U. Time Allocations (minutes), Unmarried People, Means and Their Standard
Errors, Men and Women Separately
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S.
1991/92 2001/02 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003
Men 226.6
(5.7)
241.1
(5.5)
324.9
(5.5)
348.3
(3.1)
222.6
(9.2)
243.6
(8.0)
294.80
(12.5)
283.8
(5.5)
Market
work
Women 182.9
(4.8)
175.0
(3.8)
182.4
(4.2)
171.1
(2.5)
105.2
(5.1)
152.2
(5.2)
217.4
(19.3)
223.5
(4.1)
Men 241.1
(4.3)
170.4
(3.5)
58.5
(1.9)
97.6
(1.4)
113.0
(4.1)
120.5
(3.7)
113.7
(4.1)
135.6
(3.0)
Secondary
time
Women 281.9
(3.5)
263.9
(2.9)
237.3
(3.0)
302.0
(2.1)
226.3
(4.1)
196.9
(3.5
202.1
(6.0)
218.5
(2.8)
Male Total
Work -
Female
Total
Work
2.9 -27.4 -36.3 -27.3 -4.1 15.0 -11.0 -22.6
Men 633.1
(2.8)
649.3
(3.2)
678.2
(2.2)
580.0
(1.4)
625.7
(4.7)
635.6
(4.2)
636.4
(6.9)
627.8
(3.1)
Tertiary
time
Women 649.5
(2.4)
665.4
(2.3)
694.6
(1.8)
593.7
(1.3)
653.9
(3.2)
657.8
(3.1)
654.1
(5.3)
646.9
(2.4)
Men 339.2
(4.2)
379.3
(4.0)
378.9
(4.5)
414.1
(2.3)
478.7
(7.8)
440.3
(6.7)
395.0
(10.1)
392.6
(4.7)
Leisure
Women 325.7
(3.9)
335.6
(1.6)
326.0
(3.2)
373.2
(2.0)
454.7
(4.9)
433.2
(4.7)
366.5
(7.8)
351.0
(2.5)
Spain Aus-
tralia
1993/98 1992
Men 225.5
(7.3)
288.4
(7.0)
Market
work
Women 127.6
(5.3)
180.1
(5.7)
Men 95.8
(3.5)
121.3
(3.2)
Secondary
time
Women 229.5
(4.4)
232.6
(4.1)
Male Total
Work -
Female
Total
Work
 -35.9 -3.0
in the evening. As a result, total work is identical for both spouses in the
Helen and John household, but its is allocated diVerently for each across
market and secondary activities. If Helen and John both worked in the mar-
ket and split housework, they would arrange their working days so that, in
the end, they enjoy the same total amount tertiary and leisure activities, i.e.,
the same amount of total work in the market and at home.
B. Unmarried agents. However seductive and intuitive this explana-
tion might sound, it however does not account for another feature of the
data, exhibited in Table 2.1U: total work is also invariant across gender for
the unmarried.
Thus, while the unmarried specialize less than the married, the amount
of total work that unmarriedmen perform is very close to that of unmarried
women in a given country and in a given year. This implies that we cannot
invoke the interaction of specialization and fairness within the household to
explain the equal work fact. There must be a mechanism that coordinates
II. SOCIAL NORMS FOR LEISURE 44
the total time spent on market work and secondary activities across males
and females, whether they are married or unmarried.
The simplest coordination device that equalizes total work across agents
is a social norm for leisure that serves as focal point for the determination of
total work. Peer pressure or a strong desire to conform to social norm for
time allocationmute market incentives and weaken the impact of individual
tastes. As a result, time use becomes more similar across individuals.2
If the social norm is strong enough to drive the agent to fully conform,
we obtain the equal work result we have observed in the data. For that to
occur, the cost of deviating from the social leisure norm must be high.3
II. Social norms for leisure
To illustrate the eVect of social leisure norms on individual behavior,
we consider two models of social norms. We neglect in this chapter the
distinction between market and home work4 to concentrate on the eVect of
social norms on the allocation of time between work and leisure.
A. One norm for all, no within-gender heterogeneity. Imagine that,
in the absence of a social norm, the demand for leisure of an agent depends
negatively (and linearly) on the wage rate:5
L = 1− ǫw.
The amount of time available (say, in a week) is normalized to 1, and ǫ > 0
measures the sensitivity of leisure to the wage rate w.6 We call this outcome
the agent’s intrinsic optimum.
Now suppose that there is a social norm that influences, but does not
mandate, individual leisure. We mean by this that agents have the choice of
2For a survey of social norms and economic theory, see Elster (1989). Social norms have
been studied, among others, by Akerlof (1980), Jones (1984), Cole, Mailath, and Postlewaite
(1992), Kandori (1992), Young (1996), Lindbeck (1997), and Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull
(1999).
3In this simple story, total conformity only occurs in this first model in the limit when
the desire to conform is infinitely strong. The literature (Bernheim, 1994) has sought ways
to obtain full conformity without assuming an infinite cost of deviance. We examine these
issues below.
4This issue will be taken up in chapter 3.
5This would result from the case in which consumers maximize in each period the
utility function C − (1/2ǫ)(1− L)2 subject to the budget constraint C = Ω+ w(1− L),
where Ω is non-labor income.
6By assuming ǫ > 0, we rule out for simplicity cases in which the labor supply curve is
backward-bending. Leisure demand, and labor supply, become wage-inelastic when ǫ→ 0.
In that case, our specification implies, somewhat unpleasantly, that L = 1 so that agents
do not work. This could be fixed by writing instead L = L0 − ǫw with L0 ∈ (0, 1). We
keep the formulation L0 = 1 in order to lighten the notational burden.
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the extent to which they stick to the norm, and optimally balance the mar-
ginal costs and benefits of deviating from the norm. The cost of deviating
may stem from guilt (an internal psychological process) or shame (an exter-
nal peer pressure mechanism or reputational mechanism). The benefit of
deviating results from the joy of following one’s own unbridled inclinations
that in general diVer from the norm.
Formally, let us measure the strength of the social norm by a coeYcient
φ ≥ 0.7 When φ = 0, there is no social norm, and agents choose L = 1 −
ǫw. When φ = +∞, the hold of norm on the agent’s behavior is infinitely
powerful so that, if we callL∗ the social norm for leisure, agents pickL = L∗
regardless of their w and ǫ. For φ between zero and infinity, the social norm
pulls optimal leisure choice away from 1− ǫw and towards L∗:8 Hence
L = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)L∗ ≡ L(w),
with the weight α, between 0 and 1, given by
α =
1
1 + φǫ.
The coeYcient α is large, and optimal leisure is far from the norm, if the
social norm is weak (φ small) or leisure is not very elastic (ǫ small). Higher
wages, keeping α constant, increase the distance between L and L∗.
Now assume that male (M) and female (F ) wages diVer, but that the
wage sensitivity of leisure (α) is identical across sexes.9 The resulting leisure
gap between man and women is
Lm − Lf = L(wm)− L(wf )
= −αǫ(wm − wf ).
Explaining the iso-work fact requires examining under which circum-
stances the leisure gap Lm − Lf may be zero (or indeed very small). Since
α collapses to zero as φ goes to infinity, this requires that the strength of the
norm be infinitely (or very) strong, for
lim
φ→∞
(Lm − Lf ) = 0.
In words, a very strong normmutes the eVect of wages on leisure, and equal-
izes male and female leisure.
7The strength of the norm for an individual may depend on the number of people who
have adopted it. We examine this possibility below.
8This linear formulation follows from assuming that a deviation from the norm entails
a quadratic utility loss, i.e., from maximizing C − (1/2ǫ)(1−L)2 − (φ/2)(L−L∗)2 with
respect to L.
9This last assumption, which is of course at odds with estimates of labor supply elas-
ticities for males and females, can easily be relaxed.
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While this result may appear trivial, its derivation reveals what is per-
haps the most crucial ingredient of a norm-based explanation of the to-
tal work fact: the assumption that men and women share a gender-neutral
norm. It is because the leisure norm of males and females is gender-neutral
that a larger φ wipes out the diVerences between male and female leisure.
Were the norm correlated with gender, we would in general observe, ceteris
paribus, diVerent male and female leisure even when φ = +∞. Hence the
fact that total work is relatively invariant to gender in high-income coun-
tries (but less so in poorer economies) suggests, if the social norm story
is correct, that a fundamental change of norms takes place in the process
of economic development: gender-neutral, or gender-blind norms replace
gender-specific references for leisure (and more generally for consump-
tion).10 We will return below to the theme of gender-neutral norms.
B. One norm for all, within-gender heterogeneity. The toy model we
have just outlined, even though it provides us with an important insight,
is not suYcient to rationalize all the facts in our possession. The empirical
diYculty we are facing is that the iso-work fact coexists with widespread
within-gender (and more generally within-group) heterogeneity of leisure.
This is inconsistent with the simple story told above because as φ → +∞,
the labor supply of each individual, whether male or female, converges to
the common, gender-neutral norm L∗ regardless of the wage.11 As a result,
while a strong norm bridges the gap between male and female leisure, it also
eliminates any within-gender heterogeneity of leisure that would otherwise
arise from heterogenous wages.
To make this point more precisely, amend the model of the previous
section by relaxing the assumption that all men, and all women, have the
same wage. Call F i(·), i = m, f , the cumulative distribution of wages in
the population of gender i. Average leisure for agents of gender i = m, f is
L¯i =
∫
w
L(w) dF i(w)
= α(1− ǫw¯i) + (1− α)L∗,
where w¯i is the mean wage of agents of gender i. Hence, the gap between
average male and female leisure is simply
L¯m − L¯f = −αǫ(w¯m − w¯f ).
10Note that no causal statement is being made here. One can easily write models in
which gender-specific norms cause economic backwardness, and models in which compe-
tition and development causes gender-equality.
11This is also true if ǫ, the sensitivity of leisure to the wage, diVers across sexes.
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We conclude that, regardless of the distribution functions F i(·), the leisure
gap goes to zero, and the iso-work holds precisely, if the social norm for
leisure is gender-neutral and infinitely strong (φ → ∞). This conclusion is
qualitatively identical to that of the previous section.
The diYculty with this model, however, is that within-group hetero-
geneity also gets wiped out when φ → ∞. To see this, let us compute the
variance of leisure across the population of males, and across the population
of females:
Var(Li) =
∫
w
[L(w)− L¯i]2 dF i(w)
= (αǫ)2
∫
w
[w − w¯i]2 dF i(w).
The term under the second integral sign is the variance of wages across indi-
viduals of gender i. Thus, as φ rises and α falls to zero, the variance of leisure
shrinks quadratically to zero. Hence, the very same mechanism that pulls
leisure together across gender (a strong gender neutral norm) also wipes
within group heterogeneity.
We now show that this unpleasant feature of our model can be avoided
by introducing non-gender based social clusters, or several social norms.12
C. Social clusters. Imagine now that men and women are stratified
into two categories: high wage and low wage earners. Note that the names
of the categories are just illustrative: we could just as well be splitting agents
according to the color of their eyes, or the month in which they are born.
The question is of course why one might want to develop such an exten-
sion of our basic model. The answer, beyond the need that was evoked above
to generate within-gender heterogeneity of leisure, is simple: it is reasonable
to hypothesize that diVerent agents may have diVerent reference groups for
leisure (a region, a family, co-workers, a church etc.).
Remember, however, the point we made above: in order to explain the
iso-work fact by social norms, we must assume that the norms adopted by
agents are uncorrelated with gender. This would happen, for instance, in a
world in which individuals want to keep up with the leisure of Joneses. Since
the Joneses are our neighbors, social norms will depend on neighborhood.
But while there are rich and poor neighborhoods, there are no predomi-
nantly male or female neighborhoods. As a result, a neighborhood-based
norm would create social clusters that are uncorrelated with sex, and would
deliver the iso-work fact.
How do we translate this requirement that normative clusters be uncor-
related with gender in a simple model in which the only diVerence between
12We thank Georg Kirchsteiger for a very helpful discussion on this topic.
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agents, besides sex, is the wage? Suppose we defined “rich,” or highly pro-
ductive agents, as those whose wage is above the mean wage of people of
their gender, and that rich agents, whether male or female, adopt one norm,
and poor agents, whether male or female, adopt another. If the wage dis-
tributions of males and females are diVerent and asymmetric,13 we will in
general find diVerent proportions of male and females in each social group.
For instance, if the distribution of male wages is more skewed to the right
(to the top) than the distribution of female wages, there will be proportion-
ately more males adopting the high wage norm (and of course more females
adopting the low wage norm). As a result, a high/low wage social norm
defined in terms of position relative to the mean will deliver norms whose
adoption is correlated with gender. Any model based on such a specification
will not be able to replicate the iso-work fact.
To match the data, we need to define the high- and low-wage categories
in terms of quantile position in the wage distribution. Suppose, to be spe-
cific, that a high-wage individual is defined as one whose wage is the upper
decile of the wage distribution of her/his sex. By construction, 10 percent of
the men and 10 percent of women are then in the high-wage category, and
90 percent of the men and 90 percent of women in the low-wage category.
As a result, each category is gender-balanced, and comprises equal propor-
tions of men and women even though there are, in this example, manymore
individuals in the low-wage category. The categories could be defined in
terms of any other quantile, or there could be more than two categories:
the iso-work fact would still hold. If thee gender-specific wage distributions
were symmetric, picking the mean would also do but only because it would
equal the median. We have seen above, however, that the mean is not an
appropriate choice for asymmetric distributions.
Let us briefly take stock formally of this discussion. Suppose we adopt
quantile q, 0 < q < 1, as the watershed between what we call high and
low wages. This means that individuals of gender i will be in the high-wage
category if their wage is above the minimum level wi defined by
1− F i(wi) = q.
Call L∗j , j = h, l, the leisure norm for high (h) and low (l) wage earners.
Assume that the strength of the two norms is the same (i.e, that the same φ
applies to the high and low wage norms).14 Leisure of an agent of wage type
j is simply
Lj(w) = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)L∗j .
13If they are identical, males and females are identical, and the whole discussion is moot
as the iso-work fact holds trivially. See below for the symmetric case.
14This assumption would be problematic in a model in which the strength of the norm
depends on the number of individuals who have adopted it.
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As a result, average leisure of agents of gender i is
L¯i =
∫
w<wi
Ll(w) dF
i(w) +
∫
w>wi
Lh(w) dF
i(w)
= α(1− ǫw¯i) + (1− α)[(1− q)L∗l + qL∗h].
We immediately conclude that the leisure gap between men and women
is
L¯m − L¯f = −αǫ(w¯m − w¯f ).
This is the exact same formula as when there is a single social norm. We
thus conclude that the leisure gap goes to zero and the iso-work fact holds
asymptotically (when φ→ +∞ and α→ 0) in the presence of many social
norms — provided the categories defined by the norms are uncorrelated
with gender.
The existence of social clusters (delineated by the high and low wage
categories) ensures that within-gender heterogeneity of leisure does not get
shrink to zero when φ becomes very large.
D. Even more heterogeneity. Although the previous model of social
clusters maintains within-gender heterogeneity, one might be worried that
it does not preserve within-category variance: within each (high, low) wage
category, leisure indeed becomes identical for agents of the two sexes as the
corresponding leisure norm becomes infinitely compelling (φ→∞).
One way to avoid this problem is to define yet more dimensions of clus-
tering based on other characteristics of agents, and to repeat the reasoning
of this section for this finer partitioning of the population. By doing so —
provided of course the resulting categories are uncorrelated with sex — we
could again replicate the iso-work fact yet generate as much within-gender
heterogeneity as desired by making each social norm infinitely compelling.
Of course, we would still find that within-category heterogeneity would go
to zero, but this would not be much of a problem anymore as the categories
would be finely grained.
Another way to maintain within-category heterogeneity as norms be-
come more and more binding would be to introduce a dimension of idio-
syncratic heterogeneity in the population. This heterogeneity could stem
from diVerent tastes, or from a noisy individual observation of the societal
leisure norm.15 To illustrate how this line of reasoning would play out in
our setup, let us go back to the first of our models with one norm L∗ for
all, identical wages for all members of a given sex, and a diVerent wage for
male and female workers. Imagine that individual k observes the norm with
15As we do not wish to transform the quest for a theoretical explanation of the iso-
work fact into a futile data-fitting exercise, we prefer the second interpretation, which is
potentially falsifiable, to the first, which multiplies unobservable parameters.
III. ACCOUNTING FOR VARIATIONS IN TOTAL WORK 50
some measurement error λk, in the sense that he thinks the desirable norm
is L∗ + λk instead of L∗.
16 As a result, optimal leisure for that individual
becomes
Lk = α(1− ǫw) + (1− α)(L∗ + λk),
with α defined exactly as above. Hence Lk → L∗ + λk as φ → ∞ (and
α → 0) regardless of the wage, i.e. regardless of whether one is male or
female. Now suppose measurement errors are idiosyncratic in the sense that
the λ’ average to zero for each sex.17 Then it is straightforward to show the
leisure gap is zero, and the iso-work fact holds exactly when φ → ∞—in
spite of the fact that each agent ends up consuming a diVerent amount of
leisure due to her/his idiosyncratic perception of the norm.
III. Accounting for variations in total work
The data presented in Chapter 1 make it abundantly clear that although
total work is strikingly equal across men and women, it does vary, some-
times substantially, across countries and over time. Since we have attempted
in the previous section to rationalize the iso-work fact by social norms by
arguing that they serve as a coordination device between males and females
total work, we must now undertake the task of explaining why norms may
vary across countries and dates.
We take as our starting point the fact that we have so far treated so-
cial norms as exogenous. One could of course argue that this is appropri-
ate because norms reflect moral or religious imperatives that have little or
nothing to do with economics. We could then conclude that total work is
not the same in all places and at all times because norms vary as a func-
tion of culture or circumstances. This would be akin to the account given
by Solow (1956) of the secular improvement of GDP per capita: standards of
living keep improving, and capital remains productive enough at themargin
to justify investment, because technical progress exogenously shifts up the
production function over time. This explanation, like Solow’s, would not
be trivial: it would focus our attention on norms as the engine of change
of total work (changing norms) in very the same way that Solow made us
realize that ideas could be the engine of long-run growth.
However, in the same way that bringing back the determination of
technological progress within the fold of economics has been a significant
16I.e., an individual of type k has utility function C − (1/2ǫ)(1 − L)2 − (φ/2)[L −
(L∗ + λk)]
2.
17This leaves open the possibility that females and males perceive the social norm with
diVerent precision.
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milestone for endogenous growth theory, we believe that endogenizing the
norms that explain the iso-work fact is the right tack to take.18
To that eVect, let us return yet again to our simplest model of social
norms: men and women have the same preferences but a diVerent wage,
there are no within-gender wage diVerences, and men and women adopt a
common leisure norm L∗. Remember that in that model male and female
leisure are given by
Lm = α(1− ǫwm) + (1− α)L∗,
Lf = α(1− ǫwf ) + (1− α)L∗.
Now if we view the gender-neutral norm L∗ as reflecting average leisure
across males and females in society, and there are equal proportions of men
and women in the economy, it must be the case that, in equilibrium,
1
2
(Lm + Lf ) = L∗
Combining the last three equations and solving for L∗, we conclude that
the equilibrium social norm for leisure is simply
L∗ = 1− ǫw∗,
where
w∗ =
wm + wf
2
is the average wage in the whole (male and female) population.
The story we are telling is very simple:
• The equilibrium social norm for leisure is independent of its impact
on the agent’s tastes (φ), but it depends on the sensitivity of indi-
vidual leisure to the wage (ǫ) and on the average wage rate in the
economy (w¯). Whenever these magnitudes change, across coun-
tries or over time, the social norm for leisure varies.
• The extent to which individual leisure ends up in equilibrium close
to the social norm depends on the parameter φ. In the limit, when
φ → +∞, the iso-work fact hold exactly (the leisure gap between
men and women is zero).
IV. Fixed costs
A drawback of the linear-quadratic formalization adopted in the pre-
vious section is that social norms only mute individual leisure diVerences:
exact conformity between men and women (possibly with a specific social
18This endogenization of norms is at the heart of the recent literature on conformity.
See Bernheim (1994).
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cluster) occurs only if the penalty attached to even minute deviations from
the norm is infinite (φ→∞).
Fortunately, it is easy to remedy this defect by introducing fixed utility
costs of deviating from the social norm, which are meant to capture the idea
that reputation constitutes, at least to some extent, an all-or-nothing phe-
nomenon: one is, or one is not, a male chauvinist pig. If the cost of deviance
includes a fixed element, it generates, as fixed costs always do, optimal in-
action (here conformity) bands in which the benefit of deviating from the
norm to follow the intrinsic optimum falls short of the cost of deviance. As
a result, an individual will conform to the norm whenever it is not “too far”
from the intrinsic optimum— for the cost of deviating from the intrinsic
optimum is then small relative to the cost of losing one’s reputation. Con-
trariwise, consumers ignore the norm in favor of the intrinsic optimum if
the former is not too distant from the latter.19
To formalize this straightforward cost-benefit argument, suppose that
the cost of deviating from the norm L∗ takes the form of a fixed utility cost
ψ, with ψ positive and finite. Define, as above, w∗ as the wage rate at which
the intrinsic optimum and the norm coincide, i.e., the wage rate that would
make our consumer choose leisure L∗ if there were no norm. Letting ǫ = 1
for simplicity in what follows, we have
L∗ = 1− w∗.
Since the cost of deviance is fixed, an agent with wage w who does not
conform to the leisure norm L∗ always picks a level of leisure that coincides
with his/her intrinsic optimum L = 1 − w.20 If we stick to the linear-
quadratic framework of the previous section, we can easily calculate the
utility of a non-conformist:
UN = Ω+ w(1− L)− 1
2
(1− L)2 − ψ
2
= Ω +
1
2
w2 − ψ
2
.
A conformist can avoid the cost of losing his/her reputation but this
requires adopting the norm L∗. This entails a utility level
UC = Ω+ w(1− L∗)− 1
2
(1− L∗)2 = Ω+ ww∗ − 1
2
w∗2.
19The reasoning extends to the hybrid case in which the cost of deviance comprises
both a fixed cost and a variable cost (for instance, the sum of a constant and of the quadratic
term (L − L∗)2). The only diVerence is that, outside of the inaction band, consumers
choose a level of leisure intermediate between their intrinsic optimum and the norm.
20Any other level (except for the norm itself) would entail the same reputation loss but
lower intrinsic utility.
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Conformity is the optimal strategy if and only if UC > UN . From the
last two equations, we conclude (after some elementary algebraic manipu-
lations) that this occurs whenever
ψ >
1
2
(w − w∗)2.
This condition holds if and only if the wage rate is within the conformity
band
[w∗ −
√
2ψ,w∗ +
√
2ψ]
that surrounds w∗. Inside this band, it is optimal to stick to the norm L∗,
and to completely ignore intrinsic preferences.
To close the model as we did earlier, imagine that all men have wagewm,
and all women wagewf . Furthermore, assume the social norm corresponds
to the mean of male and female intrinsic leisure, so that
w∗ =
wm + wf
2
.
Then men and women adopt the norm provided that
ψ >
1
2
(
wm − wf
2
)2
.
This inequality is more likely to be violated, given ψ, in economies, or
in social clusters, in which the wage gap between genders is high. This result
might contribute to rationalize the evidence gathered in chapter 1 that the
iso-work fact holds less strongly in middle-income countries.
V. Strategic complementarities: a model of Stakhanov
We have so far assumed that the cost of being non-conformist does not
depend on how many people conform. One could argue that this is not rea-
sonable, as the stigma attached to deviating from a social norm (or the very
existence of a social norm) plausibly depends on how widely accepted the
norm is. For instance, being a male chauvinist pig in a society composed of
male chauvinist pigs presumably entails less of a reputation loss than being
the sole sexist male in a metrosexual environment. Similarly, the produc-
tivity norm established by Stakhanov, the legendary and probably mythical
Soviet coal miner who in 1935 extracted fourteen times his quota, was com-
pelling to individuals because his example was emulated, under the pressure
of Soviet propaganda, by a large number of workers.21
This consideration opens the possibility of multiple equilibria through
the existence of strategic complementarities: if the reputation loss that we
experience when we deviate from the norm depends on how widely the
21For more on Stakhanov, see Schmemann (1985).
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Figure .. Stakhanov (cover of Time Magazine, 12/16/1935)
norm is followed, whether or not we choose to conform depends on our
perception of the prevalence of the norm among our fellow citizens. If we
expect them to conform, we have an incentive to act as they do, for the cost
of deviance is then high. If we anticipate that others will disregard the norm,
however, the cost of deviance is small, and it is more likely that we will find it
optimal to follow our intrinsic optimum. The question then arises whether
conformism, or deviance is the stable outcome that will emerge endoge-
nously from a population of self-interested individuals. The answer, as we
now establish, depends crucially on the shape of the wage distribution.22
This easiest way to formalize this argument is to amend the fixed cost
model of the previous sections. Let us assume, as before, that the cost of
deviance is fixed from the point of view of individuals. However, imagine
that it depends, socially, on the fraction π ∈ (0, 1) of conformists in the
population:
ψ = π2/2.
22This section is inspired by the work of Cartwright (2005) and
Wooders, Cartwright, and Selten (2003) on the emergence of social conformity.
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If no one in society conforms, there is no cost of being deviant. The cost of
deviance is increasing in π, and thus maximal when everyone else conforms
(π = 1).23
From the results of the previous section, we know that an individual
with wage w chooses to conform if and only if
ψ =
1
2
π2 >
1
2
(w − w∗)2,
that is, if and only if his/her wage is in the conformity band
[w∗ − π,w∗ + π].
Crucially, the more widely adopted the norm is, the wider is the conformity
band, and the more likely it is that an individual with an arbitrary wage will
conform. Conversely, when fewer people conform, the narrower is the band,
and the more likely is individual deviance. This strategic complementarity
opens the door to multiple equilibria, very much as in Cooper and John
(1988).
To prove this is the case, suppose male and females have the same cu-
mulative wage distribution F (w) over the interval [0, 1]. The fraction of the
population with wages in the conformity band is then
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π).
Since this fraction must coincide with π in equilibrium, the fraction of con-
formists in the population solves
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π) = π.
Regardless of the exact shape of F (·), this equation always has (at least)
two solutions, π = 0 and π = 1. The former corresponds to a non-
conformist equilibrium in which no one conforms, and a conformist equi-
librium in which everybody adheres to the norm.24
Which of these equilibria is stable depends on the shape of the cumu-
lative distribution function F (·). To illustrate this point, assume wages are
distributed uniformly over [0, 1], so that F (z) = z for 0 < z < 1, and
F (z) = 1 for z > 1. In addition, assume for the moment being that the
norm is the mean of intrinsic leisures, so that w∗ = 1/2 (i.e., the mean of
the individual w’s). Then
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π) =
{
2π, for 0 ≤ π ≤ 1/2;
1, for 1/2 < π ≤ 1.
23These two properties are crucial. The quadratic specification is adopted for simplicity
but it is not innocuous, as the number and stability of equilibria depend jointly, as we will
see below, on the shape of the cost function and on the distribution of wages.
24If π = 1,w∗+π > 1 so thatF (w∗+π) = 1, whilew∗−π < 0 so thatF (w∗−π) = 0.
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π0
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
1/2 1
1
Figure .. Multiple equilibria (w∗ = 1/2; uniform distribution of wages over [0, 1])
Figure 2.2 shows that for a uniform distribution of wages there are ex-
actly two equilibria, π = 0 and π = 1. Crucially, only the conformist equi-
librium is stable as F (w∗+ π)−F (w∗− π) > π for all π strictly between 0
and 1.25 Hence full conformity to L∗ = 1− w∗ = 1/2 will emerge endoge-
nously in this economy, and the iso-work fact will hold in its strictest form
even though agents have diVerent wages and the cost of deviating from the
norm is finite.
Remarkably, this reasoning holds regardless of the value of the norm.
Suppose w∗ is diVerent from 1/2. Then, if we maintain the assumption that
the distribution of male and female wages is identical and uniform over the
interval [0, 1], one can easily show that
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
=
 2π, for 0 ≤ π ≤ min(w
∗, 1− w∗);
w∗ + π, formin(w∗, 1− w∗) < π ≤ max(w∗, 1− w∗);
1, formax(w∗, 1− w∗) < π ≤ 1.
As before, there are two equilibria, illustrated in Figure 2.3: a stable one
in which everybody conforms, and an unstable one in which nobody con-
forms. Remarkably, nothing pins down the norm: w∗, and thus L∗, can take
any value in the interval [0, 1]. Hence there is a continuum of equilibria with
full conformity over [0, 1], indexed by the social norm L∗.26
25The easiest way to see this is to observe that the diVerence equation F (w∗ + πt) −
F (w∗ − πt) = πt+1 converges to π = 1 as t→∞ for any 0 < π0 < 1.
26Note, however, that for other distributions (for instance, distributions with mass
concentrated on extreme values), the non-conformist equilibrium might emerge as the
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π0
F (w∗ + π)− F (w∗ − π)
min(w∗, 1− w∗) 1
1
max(w∗, 1− w∗)
Figure .. Multiple equilibria (w∗ arbitrary; uniform distribution of wages over [0, 1])
What can we say about the welfare properties of these conformist equi-
libria? Can they be Pareto-ranked? To answer that question, we need only
look at the welfare of an agent with wage w in the conformist equilibrium
indexed by w∗, and examine how it depends on w∗. We established earlier
that
UC = Ω+ ww∗ − 1
2
w∗2,
so that
∂UC
∂w∗
= w − w∗.
Since L∗ = 1− w∗, this implies that
∂UC
∂L∗
= w∗ − w.
Hence low-wage agents (w∗ − w > 0) are better oV in an economy in
which social pressure dictates high leisure. Conversely, high-wage individ-
uals (w∗ − w < 0) are better oV in a “stakhanovist” society in which L∗
is high. This diVerence in welfare stems only, in our model, from the fact
that agents prefer norms that are congruent with their intrinsic tastes. Dif-
fering social norms may thus contribute, beyond the existence of a welfare
state, to the rationalization of the commonly held perception that Europe
stable one. In addition, one can construct examples in which π = 0 and π = 1 are not
the only possible solutions, and in which the equilibrium fraction of conformists is strictly
between zero and one, and stable. We do not explore these refinements here, but theymight
help us explain why some groups or countries experience less conformism than others.
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is more congenial than the US to low-productivity individuals. At any rate,
these results establish that the continuum of conformist equilibria cannot
be Pareto-ranked.
VI. US vs. Europe: Amodel of coordinated leisure
Chapter 1 has documented that Americans work more than Europeans,
and that, in addition, the hebdomadal pattern of work diVers substantially
between the two continents: in contrast with Europe, weekends look a lot
like weekdays in the US.
One could of course argue that this is due to diVering tastes, but as usual
explanations based on unobservable variables are not very persuasive—
especially since Europeans actually workedmore than Americans as recently
as the 1960s, as noted by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005). Instead, we
wish to show that wide divergence in leisure is possible across two otherwise
identical economies if one is willing to entertain the possibility that there
are leisure externalities across agents.27
Imagine that consumers prefer, at the margin, spending their free time
in the company of others rather than alone, i.e., that individuals have a pref-
erence for coordinated leisure.28 This preference for social leisure introduces
an additional dimension of strategic complementarity between agents. If a
consumer expects others to be working a lot, she prefers to also work (and
consume) a lot, as most of the leisure she so foregoes so is solitary and not
very valuable. Conversely, a consumer who expects others to rest a lot finds
leisure more attractive, as it is more likely that it will be taken in its most
valuable, i.e., common, form.
This strategic complementarity leads, under conditions that we will out-
line below, to multiple Pareto-ranked competitive equilibria. In the pres-
ence of a preference for social activities, the economy might end up either
in a low-leisure, high-consumption equilibrium, or in high leisure, low-
consumption equilibrium. Crucially, welfare is lower in the former equi-
librium than in the latter outcome.
To make these points formally, we first examine optimal labor supply
and consumption choice of households in the presence of a preference for
27In this section, we abandon for simplicity considerations related to social norms.
28Weiss (1996) has studied related issues in the context of production exter-
nalities. Implications of the desire for coordinated leisure for the regulation of
working hours is explored in Burda and Weil (2006). Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote
(2005) analyze the macroeconomic implications of “social multiplier,” á la
Glaeser, Scheinkman, and Sacerdote (2003), that stems from leisure externalities.
Hamermesh (2002) has shown the role of leisure externalities within the household,
and Jenkins and Osberg (2005) demonstrate their existence within regions.
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common over solitary leisure. Second, we determine under which condi-
tions multiple competitive equilibria arise in our economy, and we show
how they can be Pareto-ranked. Finally, we characterize the economic ra-
tionale and eVects of blue laws.
A. Household preferences and the structure of time. The economy
consists of a continuum of identical agents distributed over the interval
[0, 1]. The utility function of a typical consumer is
u(C) + v(ℓ), (2.1)
whereC denotes consumption and ℓ is an index of total leisure to be defined
below. We assume that
u(C) =
{ −∞, c = 0;
C, c > 0,
and that v(.) is increasing and concave, with v(0) finite.29 This specification
would yield, in a traditional model of consumption and leisure choices, an
upward-sloping labor supply curve. It rules out uninteresting corner solu-
tions with zero consumption, as no finite amount of leisure can compensate
the consumer for the infinite negative utility felt when C = 0. Since v(0)
is finite, our model does not exclude, however, solutions with zero leisure.
This means that we are only discussing here non-essential leisure, and that
time that must be devoted to vital activities (say, sleep) is left outside of the
model for simplicity.
The total leisure index ℓ depends linearly on solitary leisure ℓs (idle time
spent alone) and common leisure ℓc (idle time spent with others):
30
ℓ = ℓs + σℓc. (2.2)
We assume that the parameter σ is greater than 1, i.e., that agents find a unit
of common leisure more pleasurable than one unit of solitary leisure. Thus,
σ measures the desire for conviviality. Without the assumption that σ > 1,
it would be impossible to plausibly explain why we observe that consumers
voluntarily coordinate their leisure activities (husband with wife, parents
with children, friends, etc.).31 The case where σ = 1, in which agents do
not distinguish between solitary and common leisure, is the one studied in
standard models of consumption-leisure choice.
29The model could be generalized, without significantly aVecting the results, to more
general utility functions.
30The assumption of linearity is only made for analytical convenience. All that matters
for our results is that neither form of leisure be essential in utility.
31An alternative, but implausible explanation, would be that there are large economies
of scale in leisure.
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Assume that the day (or the week) is divided into two shifts: day and
night (or weekdays and weekend). The length of each day is normalized
to 2, and we assume the two shifts are of equal unit length. Individuals
can choose to work in either or both of the shifts.32 Furthermore, assume
that shifts are indivisible: an individual either works, or not, during a shift.
Labor supply in shift t = 1, 2 is thus an indicator variable xt that takes value
1 if the individual works in shift t, 0 otherwise. Hence, total labor supply is
x1 + x2, and the consumer’s budget constraint is accordingly
C = w(x1 + x2), (2.3)
where we have assumed, for simplicity, the wage rate w to be the same in
both shifts. In words, consumption is w or 2w depending on whether the
consumer works one or two shifts.
LetXt denote the average labor supply of other agents during shift t. In
a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium,33 Xt = 1 if other agents work is thus
ℓs = (1− x1)X1 + (1− x2)X2, (2.4)
while common leisure equals
ℓs = (1− x1)(1−X1) + (1− x2)(1−X2). (2.5)
Obviously, the sum of solitary and coordinated leisure equals 2− (x1+x2),
the diVerence between the time endowment and labor supply.
B. Multiple equilibria. We now show that there is a range of wage rates
w and of conviviality parameters σ for which there are two possible equilib-
rium outcomes. In one equilibrium, consumers work both shifts and con-
sume a lot. In the other, they work only one shift, consume less and but
enjoy coordinated leisure.34
If a consumer expects other consumers to work two shifts (i.e., she an-
ticipates X1 = X2 = 1), she gets utility 2w + v(0) if she also decides to
also work two shifts, since this results in high consumption but no leisure.
Under the same expectation that other will be working non-stop, she gets
utility w + v(1) if she decides to only work one shift, as she receives a low
labor income and has no choice but to enjoy her one unit of leisure alone
(the others being at work all the time).35 As a result, working two shifts if
others work two shifts is an equilibrium if 2w + v(0) > w + v(1), that is,
when the wage rate is high enough:
w > v(1)− v(0). (2.6)
32We assume for simplicity that sleep is not necessary.
33We do not discuss mixed strategy equilibria here.
34Remember that, because of the way we specified the utility function, it is always op-
timal to work at least one shift.
35In that case, ℓs = 1 regardless of whether x1 or x2 equals 1.
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If a consumer expects others to work one shift, say the first shift, and
rest during the second, she gets utility 2w + v(0) if she breaks ranks with
the rest of the population, works both shifts, and accordingly enjoys high
consumption at the cost of no leisure whatsoever. If she chooses instead
work for only one shift, like the others, she will always pick the same shift
as the others because the desire for conviviality (σ > 1) makes common
leisure more pleasurable than solitary leisure. She will thus end up with
low consumption but with one unit of common leisure, which yields utility
w + v(σ). As a result, working only one shift (and synchronizing leisure
with the others) when others are only working one shift is an equilibrium if
w + v(σ) > 2w + v(0), that is, when the wage rate is low enough:
w < v(σ)− v(0). (2.7)
We conclude from inequalities (2.6) and (2.7) that both high consump-
tion with no leisure, and low consumption with common leisure are equi-
libria if and only if
v(1)− v(0) < w < v(σ)− v(0). (2.8)
This is a “Goldilocks inequality:” multiple equilibria are possible if and
only if the wage rate is neither so low that it leads consumers to work one
period regardless of what the others are doing, nor so high that it encour-
ages them to work both shifts independently of the actions of their fellow
citizens.36
What is at work here is again a strategic complementarity. Were solitary
leisure less pleasurable than, or as pleasurable as, common leisure (σ ≤ 1),
multiplicity would never arise, as inequality (2.8) could never be satisfied.
But as soon as the desire for conviviality makes common leisure more plea-
surable than solitary leisure (σ > 1; i.e., as soon as the common leisure
externality is strong enough), and provided the wage is not to extreme, con-
sumers wish to follow each other’s actions. As a result, society might end
up coordinating on either an equilibrium with high consumption with no
leisure, or on one with low consumption with common leisure.
Figure 2.4 illustrates these results in the space (σ,w). In region I, a re-
gion with high wages in the sense of inequality (2.8), the only equilibrium
is one in which everyone works two shifts and consumes a lot, while low
36When multiplicity condition (2.8) is satisfied, there is also a third equilibrium in
which a fraction of the population works two shifts, a fraction works the first shift only,
and the remainder works the second shift only. Given these proportions, consumers are
indiVerent between working full-time, or in one of the two shifts only. We do not study
this equilibrium here, since it is unstable: the deviation of a single individual makes the
equilibrium collapse to one of the two fully-coordinated equilibria studied in the text.
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σ
0
1
v(1)− v(0)
w
v(σ)− v(0)
I
II
III
Figure .. Multiple equilibria
w0 v(1)− v(0)
v(σ)
C + v(ℓ)
2w + v(0)
w + v(σ)
v(σ)− v(0)
v(0)
Figure .. Welfare
consumption with one period of common leisure is the only equilibrium in
the low-wage region III. Multiplicity arises in the “intermediate” region II.
C. Coordination failure. We can Pareto-rank the two equilibria that
can arise when the multiplicity condition (2.8) is satisfied. Welfare in the
equilibrium with high consumption and no leisure is
2w + v(0),
while utility in the low consumption, common leisure, equilibrium is
w + v(σ).
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But, when inequality (2.8) is satisfied, the latter is larger than the former.
Accordingly, the low consumption, common leisure, equilibrium Pareto-
dominates the high consumption, no leisure, equilibrium when both are
equilibria. We therefore conclude that, when the desire for conviviality is
strong (σ > 1) and the wage is intermediate (condition 2.8), consumers
just might end up working and consuming too much for their own good—
simply because of the high valuation they place on communal leisure ac-
tivities! Paraphrasing Schor (1993), we can say that people might truly be
“overworked” in equilibrium. Unlike Schor, however, this results from their
own preferences and the nature of the externalities. As such, it is more like
Akerlof ’s (1976) rat-race equilibrium.
Figure 2.5 shows, for a given σ > 1, how welfare changes as a function
of the wage rate.
D. Summary. We have shown that preference for coordinated leisure
gives rise to multiple, Pareto-ranked equilibria. In the “US” equilibrium,
individuals work a lot, consume a lot, and have little time for communal ac-
tivities. In the “European” equilibrium, consumers work less and consume
less, but enjoy more common leisure. The European equilibrium Pareto-
dominates the US outcome.
Hence, the reason why Americans today work more than Europeans
may not be that Europeans are lazier than Americans. History (e.g., the
first oil shock) and institutions (labor-market regulations) might have sim-
ply led otherwise identical Americans and Europeans to coordinate on dif-
ferent equilibria—as emphasized by Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote (2005).
Americans might nevertheless be crazy, as the low-activity equilibrium with
coordinated leisure Pareto-dominates the high-activity outcome in which
individuals “bowl alone,” as deplored by Putnam (2000).
CHAPTER 3
Home production, setup costs and welfare
I. The link betweenmarket and secondary work
In the first chapter, we identified several stylized facts about work and
leisure in the US and the EU. Three of these have figured most promi-
nently in our discussion. The first was the iso-work fact, the remarkable
tendency of both genders to work the same number of minutes per day, on
average, in developed economies. The second, the “overworked American”
fact, showed that despite inherent problems in comparing data sets inter-
nationally, Americans seem to work more both in the market and at home.
Third, Americans tend to bunch their work less than Europeans, prefer-
ring instead to work all the time, including weekends and at odd hours of
the day and night (and do so in a more gender-neutral fashion than Eu-
ropeans). Chapter 2 proposed a series of explanations of the stylized facts
gathered in Chapter 1. One finding was a social norm which holds sway over
individuals, whether married couples or single households, represents the
most promising and coherent explanation for the iso-work fact. In this fi-
nal chapter, we examine how home production (secondary work) interacts
with social norms and fixed costs, and explore the welfare implications of
secondary work for households in the EU and US.
The iso-work fact implies a central role for secondary work, or home
production, in total work.1 It is thus appropriate to begin by reviewing and
extending the theory of home production. Since the seminal contribution of
Gronau (1977), home production has been recognized as a potential source
of valuable, if not always well-appreciated, non-marketed output. The em-
pirical evidence presented in Chapter 1 confirms both that secondary work
is a significant component of AllWork, and that it varies considerably across
households and across persons within households. By sex, average time in
secondary work as a fraction of All Work in a given country and year ranges
in our data from 31 percent (US men in 1985) to 76 percent (Dutch women
in 1990). Moreover, variation in total hours work and their distribution turn
out to be important features characterizing the US versus EU experiences.
1The iso-work regularity holds at diVerent points in the business cycle. For the eight
major time use surveys we consider, six were conducted in a context of high growth, while
two were taken in periods of economic slump.
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The iso-work hypothesis implies that at a point in time, the sum of vari-
ation in market and secondary work individually in our data will be signifi-
cantly larger than the variation of their sum (total work): within a country
and in a period, market and secondary work will tend to be negatively cor-
related across individuals and especially across individuals within families.2
The iso-work fact forces these two types of work to oVset each other. Sec-
ondary work is not only a productive use of time, but can be used as a buVer
for labor which is not employable in a market with incomplete information
and search frictions. Evidently, an assessment of cross-country diVerences
in market work is incomplete without considering the substitution margin
between market and secondary work.
While we have cautioned against comparing US and European time-
use data, EU-US diVerences in total work are significantly smaller than for
market hours. For example, Germanmen averaged 436 minutes of All Work
in 2001/2, usually considered a slump period, compared with 476 minutes in
the US in 2003, a period of strong growth. Moreover, Germanmales actually
worked more minutes per day in secondary activities (174) than their US
counterparts (163). Generally, European time-use data reveal a much larger
share of secondary work in total work than in the United States. Explicit
consideration of incentives which determine the division of labor within
household is necessary to account for this variation. Comparative statics
analysis suggests that labor taxation should play an role in explaining cross
country diVerences in this division. We confirm this suspicion. Secondary
labor responds to taxation and can account for cross country diVerences, at
least for the G-7 countries considered by Prescott (2004).
Secondary work not only represents an important source of slack in the
economy which has important implications for welfare assessments of the
costs of business cycles and unemployment. After considering the econom-
ics of secondary work in the household, we turn finally to welfare impli-
cations of secondary work and the role of non-convexities in the work de-
cision. In particular, there are good theoretical reasons to suspect that the
decision to move from no market work (and thus all secondary work) to
some market work involves the expenditure of time and material resources.
This suggests a natural econometric test, namely to see whether the decision
to work changes the allocation of time in a smooth fashion or in fact ”dis-
rupts” the allocation time andmaterial resources to other activities. We then
conclude with some speculation as to what we can say about these EU-US
diVerences in work and time use.
2For example, the correlation coeYcient between daily market and secondary work
across all individuals in the German 2001/2 time use survey was -0.41, and -0.57 in the
1991/2 survey. In a sample pooling the two years, the correlation was -0.40 for unmarried
women, -0.42 for unmarried men, -0.51 for married women, and -0.49 for married men.
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II. Household labor supply with home production
A. A graphical treatment. In this section, we oVer a review of the the-
ory of home production and propose some more general implications of
home production for total labor supply (”All Work”).3 The central objective
is to account more completely for total labor supply and understand how
expanding the range of choices taken by the household aVect the results of
the previous section. It follows that the iso-work fact restricts the models
which can account for the fact.
We begin by thinking about a household as a single decision-making
unit; in subsequent sections we discuss the implications of specialization in a
household, whichmay ormay not be a couple with eachmember specialized
in one type of labor. We begin the analysis with a household oriented on an
exogenous leisure norm. In the spirit of the previous chapter, we continue
to use a “toy model” with simple functional forms to give a flavor of the
principle economic eVects under consideration.
A diagrammatic presentation of the model is the best place to start. Fig-
ure 3.1 reproduces the standard labor supply analysis as a choice between
consumption (C) and leisure (L). Consumption is equal to the sum (more
generally, a separable function) of goods and services obtained from the
market (CM ) and home (CH) production. Market goods are purchased at
a price of unity, while home goods are produced with time H with a con-
cave production technology. The household, with preferences summarized
by the indiVerence curves in the figure, has three alternative uses of time: it
can supplyH hours for secondary work (home production), workM hours
in the market, and takes L hours of leisure, which is understood here as a
combination of true leisure and tertiary time. For convenience, H , M and
L are measured as a fraction of the fundamental unit of time, i.e. a day or
week, soH+M +L = 1. Households receive non-labor incomeΩ and can
work at a real after-tax wage real wage (1− τ)w, where τ is the rate of labor
taxation.4
The household’s interior optimum—with strictly positive values of M ,
H , and L—is shown in Figure 3.1 and can be summarized as follows: Given
the availability of market work at after-tax wage (1 − τ)w, the household
works secondary hours to equate the marginal productivity of that work to
the net after tax wage. This results in a tangential ”pasting” of the market
budget line with the home production function at the point where the slope
of the latter is equal to −(1 − τ)w . Home production, to the extent that
3The classic references are Becker (1965) and Gronau (1977, 1986).
Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) show conditions under which the model with
home production can be replicated by the standard neoclassical growth model.
4Tax revenue is not rebated to the household.
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Figure .. The Gronau Model of Home Production with TaxesFigure 1. Gronau Model w/taxes
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for some values is more productive than the market wage, leads to an ex-
pansion of the budget set for the household and an increase in its welfare.
In general, the higher the marginal product of household work, the more
household time will be devoted to home production. On the other hand, an
increase in the marginal productivity of secondary work might be accom-
panied by more or less total output, so that one must distinguish between
labor augmenting and labor-saving technical progress (Gronau, 1986). Con-
sumption and leisure are then chosen on the basis of this new augmented
budget set. Note that in this particular setup, there is a separation of the
decision to work in the market and the consumption bundle chosen.
B. Some general comparative statics propositions. The model with
home production is generally more complex than the impression con-
veyed by Figure 3.1. Comparative static analysis of market, secondary
and total work to changes in market prices, productivity, wealth and
other determinants does not always yield unambiguous results (Gronau,
1986). This is especially true if market and home consumption are not
highly substitutable. Nevertheless, the case of perfect substitutability is
a good starting point for analysis and finds some support in the data
(Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright, 1991). Using general functional forms
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under the assumptions of perfect substitution of consumption and sepa-
rability of consumption with leisure, it is possible to show a number of in-
teresting propositions about secondary work. This section reports briefly
on those propositions, which are derived formally in appendix A.5
a. Secondary work. Using the notation x̂ ≡ dx/x to denote percentage
deviations from equilibrium values, we can characterize the most important
results for secondary work as follows:
S1. The supply elasticity of secondary work (H) with respect to the gross-
of-tax market wage (w) is unambiguously negative: Ĥ/ŵ < 0.
S2. The (uncompensated) supply elasticity of secondary work (H) with
respect to labor taxation (τ) is unambiguously positive: Ĥ/τ̂ > 0.
S3. The elasticity of secondary work (H) with respect to its productivity (θ)
is unambiguously positive (negative) if that productivity is labor augmenting
(saving): Ĥ/θ̂ > 0 (Ĥ/θ̂ < 0).
S4. When market and household production are close substitutes, non-
labor income (Ω) and the leisure norm (L∗) have no effect on secondary em-
ployment: Ĥ/Ω̂ = Ĥ/L̂∗ = 0.
The economic mechanisms behind these propositions are straightfor-
ward. One interesting and representative case, depicted in Figure 3.2, is an
increase in the rate of labor taxation (which is qualitatively equivalent to
a decrease in the gross wage, ceteris paribus). An increase in the tax rate
(or, holding the wage constant, a decrease in the net wage) increases incen-
tives to move hours back to household production, while decreasing market
work unambiguously. Conversely, a cut in taxes (an increase in the gross
market wage given taxes) increases incentives to work in the market at the
expense of secondary work, and makes the household better oV. An in-
crease in home productivity also increases secondary hours worked. Since
non-labor income/wealth and the social norm aVecting tastes for leisure do
not aVect the pure eYciency condition for home production, they do not
aVect the household’s choice of work at home.
5The elasticities are derived from log-linearized versions of the first-order conditions
of the formal problem. For simplicity, we consider here only interior solutions in which
positive amounts of market, household and leisure time are observed. This is entirely con-
sistent when the model is viewed as a stand-in for the representative or average household
in the economy. Later we will consider corner solutions explicitly.
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Figure .. EVect of a Labor Tax Increase in the Gronau Model
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b. Market work. The determinants of secondary work also aVect the
household’s decision to work in the market. The eVects of various exoge-
nous variables on market hoursM can be summarized as follows:
M1. The uncompensated elasticity of market work with respect to the gross-
of-tax wage w is ambiguous, but larger than in the absence of secondary work:(
M̂
ŵ
)
H>0
>
(
M̂
ŵ
)
H=0
.
M2. The uncompensated elasticity of market work with respect to labor
taxation is also ambiguous, but smaller (algebraically) than when secondary
work is absent:
(
M̂
τ̂
)
H>0
<
(
M̂
τ̂
)
H=0
.
M3. The elasticity of market work with respect to wealth is unambiguously
negative: M̂/Ω̂ < 0.
M4. The elasticity of market work with respect to the leisure norm is un-
ambiguously negative: M̂/L̂∗ < 0.
M5. The elasticity of market work with respect to secondary work produc-
tivity is negative: M̂/θ̂ < 0.
The central results thus far can be summarized as follows:
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• Secondary work (home production) is an unambiguously positive
function of the tax rate and secondary work productivity. It is
an unambiguously negative function of the real before-tax wage.
For interior solutions, secondary work is independent of both non-
earned income/wealth and the leisure norm.
• Market work depends unambiguously negatively on non-labor in-
come/wealth, on the leisure norm, and on productivity in sec-
ondary work.
• For interior solutions, the eVect of the gross market wage and of la-
bor taxation on market work is ambiguous, as would be expected;
an increase in the wage induces incentives to workmore (the substi-
tution eVect) but also to work less (the income eVect). The presence
of secondary work, however, unambiguously increases the supply
elasticity of market hours.
c. All work. We now turn to the comparative statics eVects on All Work
and leisure of changes in the market wage, in labor taxation, in productivity
of home production, and of wealth. The elasticity of total work with respect
to some variable x is a weighted average of the elasticities of market and
secondary work:
1̂− L
x̂
=
M
1− L
M̂
x̂
+
H
1− L
Ĥ
x̂
=
M
M +H
M̂
x̂
+
H
M +H
Ĥ
x̂
.
It follows that the elasticity of leisure (L) is simply a rescaling of 1̂−L
x̂
:
L̂
x̂
= −1− L
L
1̂− L
x̂
..
Given the ambiguity for market work and the unambiguous results for sec-
ondary work, it would be surprising if the reaction of total work to the wage
and to taxation yielded unambiguous answers. In fact, it is convenient to
use the results of the previous section6 to summarize the influences on total
work and leisure as follows:
1̂− L = − L
1− L
[
α1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
− α2Ω̂− α3 θ̂ − α4L̂
]
and
L̂ = α1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
+ α2Ω̂ + α3 θ̂ + α4L̂
where α1 ≶ 0, α2 > 0, α3 > 0, and α4 > 0.
6For details, see Appendix A.
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Comparison with the formal results of the previous section in Appen-
dix A shows that total work elasticities are values for the market work elas-
ticities “shrunk” by a factor M/L.7 Surprisingly, many results are unam-
biguous. An increase in non-labor wealth, in home productivity and in the
norm unambiguously increase leisure and decrease total labor supply (total
work). As expected, total work is an ambiguous function of the net wage—
depending on whether the income or substitution eVect dominates.
The negative elasticity of total work with respect to wealth is consistent
with evidence over longer periods presented by Aguiar and Hurst (2006),
who document a secular increase in leisure when measured as the comple-
ment of total work, since the 1960s. They associate this with a dramatic
drop in household work in the US, due both to increases in after-tax, real
wages as well as to labor-saving technical progress in home production (see
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu, 2005).
C. A simple model. To capture the most important aspects of the
household’s decision when secondary work is possible and there is a leisure
norm, we now present a simple extension of the linear-quadratic model of
section 2.II.A. The utility of the household is given by the following sepa-
rable function of consumption of market goods CM , home production CH ,
and leisure L:8
CM + CH − 1
2ǫ
(1− L)2 − φ
2ǫ
(L− L∗)2 (3.1)
The utility function has the standard properties and notation is as in the
previous chapter. If the household works M hours in the market at a real,
gross-of-tax hourly wage w, and τ is the rate of labor taxation including
social contributions, then market goods obey the budget constraint
CM = (1− τ)wM + Ω (3.2)
where Ω stands for non-labor income or wealth. Household production
occurs using secondary work input according to
CH = θ lnH (3.3)
7It should be stressed that we have restricted our attention to interior solutions.
8Separability is an important assumption, and is not innocuous in models of home
production. Greenwood and Hercowitz (1991) replace leisure with “home produced”
goods and services which enter utility non-separably with market-purchased commodi-
ties. In contrast, we will treat secondary time as an input to a production function for
home consumption goods. Separability of utility over goods and leisure is necessary
(but not suYcient) for stationary steady states in environments with economic growth
(King, Plosser, and Rebelo, 1988).
II. HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY WITH HOME PRODUCTION 72
where θ > 0 is a productivity shifter. Note that after substitution of (3.3), the
utility function (3.1) is indistinguishable fromCM+lnCH , with production
function CH ≡ Hθ.9
Restricting attention to an interior solution, we can write first- order
conditions as:
θ
H
=
1
ǫ
(H +M)− φ
ǫ
(1− L∗ −H −M) (3.4)
(1− τ)w = 1
ǫ
(H +M)− φ
ǫ
(1− L∗ −H −M) (3.5)
It follows immediately that secondary work is given by:
H =
θ
(1− τ)w. (3.6)
As in themore general case, home production is separable from the total and
market work decisions; the household’s optimal use of time in secondary
work is a function of the opportunity cost of labor in eYciency units. Here,
separability follows from the fact that market and household goods are per-
fect substitutes.10 Note that ∂H
∂w
< 0 and ∂
2H
∂w2
> 0. At the margin, the house-
hold equates the output an hour of secondary work to the opportunity cost
of that time in the market, the net-of-tax wage. High-wage households will
tend to cut back on household production and purchase substitutes in the
market, so that the higher income is “eaten up” to some extent by a higher
eVective cost of living. Households with lower opportunity costs of time in
the market will tend to substitute home production for market goods and
services, such as meals, laundry, child-care, and house-cleaning.
All work is given by:
H +M =
ǫ
1 + φ
(1− τ)w + φ
1 + φ
(1− L∗) (3.7)
and market hours by
M =
ǫ
1 + φ
(1− τ)w + φ
1 + φ
(1− L∗)− α
(1− τ)w. (3.8)
9Up to a constant, this is equivalent to writing utility as CM + lnCH − 12ǫ (1− L)2 −
φ
2ǫ (L − L∗)2 with CH = AHθ. The central aspect to be captured is declining marginal
utility or declining eYciency of home production. While most of us find too much home
production unpleasant, most are willing to do some of it in some amount, and the first few
units of home production are usually cheaper than those purchased in the market. Note
that in the special case of inelastic production, labor augmenting and labor saving technical
progress are formally identical,CH = AHθ =
(
A˜H
)θ
with A˜ = A1/θ . See Gronau (1986)
for more details.
10For a thorough discussion of other implications of imperfect substitutability of mar-
ket and home production, see Gronau (1986).
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As before, All Work and market work are influenced by the norm, while the
home production is independent of it.
D. Empirical evidence: Labor taxation and secondarywork. Both the
verbal analysis in the text as well as the two models presented in the preced-
ing sections contain a simple empirical prediction: the reaction of secondary
work to market incentives—here, wages and labor taxes—should be much
stronger and unambiguous than that of All Work or market work. This is
because, plausibly, while oVsetting income and substitution eVects are op-
erative for total work (and thus for leisure), only the eYciency driven sub-
stitution eVect is relevant for the household production decision (as long as
market goods and home production are highly substitutable and the indi-
vidual is not at a corner). The literature has generally confirmed predictions
of this type using micro data (see Gronau, 1986 for examples), but to our
knowledge this test has not been confronted with cross-country data.
This line of thinking is suggestive of the following empirical specifi-
cation for observations in country i for gender grouping j ∈ {m, f, all}
(male, female, all pooled):
ln(H/M)ij = a+ b lnwi + c ln τi + uij.
This relation can be derived from a more general version of the model pre-
sented in Appendix A, in which market and home-produced goods are not
perfect substitutes.11 The prediction of the model is that b and c have inde-
terminate signs, but that c is more likely to be negative due to the existence
of home production.
For a number of reasons, especially given by the recent discussion about
“lazy Europeans” initiated by Prescott (2004), it seemed reasonable to start
with the G7 countries, which have similar economic sizes, wealth levels,
etc.so that other determinants are relegated to the constant. Table 3.1 dis-
plays the data. Estimates of the model presented for each j ∈ {m, f, all}
are presented in Table 3.2. The elasticity with respect to the tax rate is pos-
itive and ranges between 1.25 and 1.70; moreover it is highly significant for
women and insignificant for men. At the same time, an indicator of the
11Consider the following special case of CES preferences over market goods and home
production given by ln[α
(
CM
)ρ
+ (1 − α) (CH)ρ] − v(M + H), where v() is some
convex function of All Work, subject to a budget restriction (3.2) and with linear household
production CH = θH , and let Ω = 0. Then it is straightforward to show that optimal
choice implies
ln(H/M) =
1
1− ρ
[
ln
(
αθρ
1− α
)]
+
ρ
1− ρ lnw +
ρ
1− ρ ln (1− τ)
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Table 3.1. Labor Taxation, Manufacturing wages, and average market and secondary work, G-7 countries 
Country Labor tax 
rate
Avg. gross 
mfg. earnings 
($/hr), 2000 
Avg. minutes 
of market 
work (M) 
Avg. minutes 
of secondary 
work (M) 
Avg. minutes 
of market 
work (F) 
Avg. minutes 
of secondary 
work (F) 
Canada 0.52 16.5 270 162 168 264
      
France 0.59 15.5 227 136 145 253
      
Germany 0.59 23.7 263 174 133 312
      
Italy 0.64 13.8 327 80 131 365
      
Japan 0.37 22.0 404 33 204 248
      
UK 0.44 16.7 245 123 156 221
      
US 0.40 19.7 313 163 201 271 
       
Note: Labor tax rate is taken from Prescott (2004, Table 2). Wage is total compensation per hour in 2000 in manufacturing industry, in US 
dollars, published by the US BLS  ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/ichccsuppt02.txt. Minutes of market and secondary 
work are taken from the constituent country studies taken used in the paper. Data and dates of relevant survey are described in the appendix 
to Chapter 1. 
Table 3.2. Secondary-Market Work Ratios and Labor Taxation in the G-7
  (standard errors in parentheses)
Dep.variable: Const. ln(w) ln(τPrescott) R
2
ln(H/M)m 0.1465
 (1.03)
1.579
(1.43)
0.037
ln(H/M) m -0.5412
(5.23)
0.2661
(1.97)
1.695
 (1.81)
-0.199
ln(H/M)f 1.430
(0.196)
1.284
(0.270)
0.782
ln(H/M)f 0.8289
(0.946)
0.2324
(0.357)
1.386
(0.328)
0.754
ln(H/M)all 0.6809
(0.284)
1.159
(0.391)
0.565
ln(H/M)all 0.1220
(1.410)
0.2162
 (0.532)
1.254
(0.487)
0.478
Note: OLS cross-sectional regressions, n=7. For details on data, see Table 3.1.
hourly wage was never significant. Despite the modest data set, these re-
sults are consistent with the theory presented and suggest a role for taxa-
tion beyond that suggested by the conventional neoclassical growth model
(Prescott, 2004).
E. Fixed cost of deviance and secondary work. As was noted in Chap-
ter 2, the convex cost of deviation from the norm has one notable theo-
retical drawback: it suppresses all individual level heterogeneity. Since we
observe considerable heterogeneity in the data, a credible theory must allow
for individual-level heterogeneity while inducing equality of gender aver-
ages. Although the consideration of multiple norms would help account for
idiosyncratic variance, it still does not solve the problem that within-group
heterogeneity is eliminated as the strength of the norm increases. Chapter 2
concluded that a fixed cost of deviation in the sense of the last chapter has
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the best chance of replicating the data by creating a “band of compliance”
or “band of conformity” around which households congregate.
How does the addition of secondary work change the conclusions of
Chapter 2? Modify the model of section 2.IV in the following fashion: Let
utility of agents now be
CM + CH − 1
2ǫ
(1− L)2 (3.9)
if the norm is adhered to (L = L∗), or
CM + CH − 1
2ǫ
(1− L)2 − ψ (3.10)
if L 6= L∗, i.e. if leisure (and thus All Work) is chosen freely; there is,
however, a fixed penalty or cost φ associated with violating the norm. Now
the optimization problem is somewhat more involved than before, since a
discrete choice as well as the possibility of corner solutions is relevant. As
before, the budget restriction (3.2), the time constraint (M +H + L = 1),
and the home production function (3.3) are binding. We now consider the
solutions to first order conditions under all cases and then compare utility
under those options.
a. Work in the market and at home (M > 0, H > 0), nonconformity
(L 6= L∗). This is the first of two cases in which there is an interior solution.
The solution to the unrestricted option dictates:
H =
θ
(1− τ)w
M = ǫ(1− τ)w − θ
(1− τ)w
H +M = ǫ(1− τ)w
Utility under this option is then:
Ω +
ǫ
2
(1− τ)2w2 + θ
(
ln
θ
(1− τ)w − 1
)
− ψ
b. Work in the market (M > 0, H > 0) and at home, conformity (L =
L∗). Now the household is further restricted to chooseH andM subject to
the additional constraint thatH +M = 1− L∗. The result is:
H =
θ
(1− τ)w
M = 1− L∗ − θ
(1− τ)w
H +M = 1− L∗
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and utility is
Ω + (1− τ)w (1− L∗) + θ ln θ
(1− τ)w − θ −
1
2ǫ
(1− L∗)2
In one important respect the introduction of home production does not
matter at all. For interior solutions, it is evident that all that matters is All
Work (M+H); the secondary work decision is taken independently to fulfill
the marginal product condition. Comparing utility under the two options
reveals that for the household to abrogate the norm, it must be that
ǫ
2
(1− τ)2w2 − (1− τ)w (1− L∗) + 1
2ǫ
(1− L∗)2 > ψ
which can be manipulated in a straightforward way to read
1
2ǫ
(1− L∗ −M −H)2 > ψ
or that the absolute value of the diVerence between unconstrained All Work
(1 −M − H) and the leisure norm L∗ exceeds a critical value √2ǫψ. This
result is similar to that of the previous chapter: Gains to nonconformity are
increasing in labor supply responsiveness ǫ, the wagew and the leisure norm
L∗, while decreasing in the labor tax rate τ and the penalty for nonconfor-
mity φ.
c. Work only at home (M = 0, H > 0), nonconformity (L 6= L∗). What
about corner solutions? For the individual or household who works only in
the market with H = 0, nothing changes; this case will not be discussed
further. On the other hand, for households at the “stay at home” corner
(M = 0), the optimal choice without obeying the norm is
H =
√
θǫ.
Household production is now no longer linked to the after-tax market wage.
In fact, the wage level in the economy as well as the tax rate become irrele-
vant. Home production is a type of tax-free activity like leisure (not neces-
sarily but naturally also including the underground economy!). Thus, gross
wages and taxes do not matter.
Utility is given by
Ω +
θ
2
(ln(θǫ)− 1)− ψ (3.11)
d. Work only at home (M = 0, H > 0), conformity (L = L∗). Now the
household works only at home:
H∗ = 1− L∗.
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Utility is now simply
Ω + θ ln(H∗)− 1
2ǫ
(H∗)2
The household violates the leisure norm when(
θ ln(H)− 1
2ǫ
(H)2
)
−
(
θ ln(H∗)− 1
2ǫ
(H∗)2
)
> ψ
or
θ ln(
√
θǫ
1− L∗ )−
θ
2
+
1
2ǫ
(1− L∗)2 > ψ, (3.12)
whereH is the notional household work when the norm is violated. When
H > H∗ (that is, if
√
θǫ > 1 − L∗), the condition is more likely to be met,
for households with high labor productivity θ, greater insensitivity of utility
to work ǫ, or when the norm value of leisure L∗ is large.12
III. Household labor supply with setup costs of work
A. Motivation. The response of a household to a fixed cost of disre-
garding a norm was analyzed in Chapter 2 and again in this chapter, in the
presence of an option of home production. The analysis of decision-making
in the presence of fixed costs can be applied fruitfully to the participation
decision in general, especially when the utility gain from additional em-
ployment in secondary activities is non-negligible. We have seen in Chapter
1 that Europeans tend to be work more at home than in the market. Could
it not be the case that they concentrate their nonemployment on a smaller
number of individuals or households as a rational response to relative prices
and institutions in their respective countries, preferring secondary work? In
the previous section, we showed that labor taxation, which is only imposed
on market hours, is more likely to aVect the distribution than the overall
level of hours worked (“All Work”). This is because standard theory predicts
that given that one is already working positive hours, the home production
decision is likely to be governed by eYciency considerations, so the elasticity
of substituting secondary for market work should be high. Evidence from
the G-7 countries supports this conclusion.
In this section we will explore a related aspect of the home production
decision. In general, the decision to work in the market entails discrete,
one-time setup costs or costs of “reorganizing one’s life” which must be ex-
pended regardless of whether that work is part-time or full-time.13 Most
12If we call Υ the lefthand side of inequality (3.12), then ∂Υ/∂θ = ln(H/H∗),
∂Υ/∂ǫ = (H2 − H∗2)/(2ǫ2), and ∂Υ/∂L∗ = [(H/H∗)2 − 1]H∗/ǫ. All of these ex-
pressions are positive ifH > H∗.
13See for example Cogan (1981). These costs lead to non-convexities in the budget con-
straint which have received considerable attention in the macro literature (Hansen, 1985;
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obviously, going to work an increase in tertiary time dedicated to taking
better care of one’s appearance and health, getting more (or less) sleep, and
possibly less time eating. Less obviously but equally relevant is an absolute
shift in the time devoted to secondary work. Going to work often means
skipping or economizing on cooking, house-cleaning, gardening and child-
care that would have occurred in constant amounts in any event. It could
however, mean more secondary work, however: certain types of shopping
might be necessary, or more production of certain personal services which,
for any number of reasons, are unavailable or too expensive to purchase in
the market. Going to an oYce job usually requires wearing well-pressed
shirts and blouses; in many continental European countries with high min-
imum wages, product market regulations and environmental restrictions,
these services are expensive and border on being a luxury.
In the following sections, we sketch a model with such setup costs, first
graphically, then formally using an extension of the toy model of previous
sections. Then we estimate the impact of going to work in the four data sets
we have examined. In the concluding section we summarize the implica-
tion of home production, fixed costs of going to work and more generally
external eVects for welfare.
B. Amodel of household labor supplywith fixed setup costs: A graph-
ical representation. Setup costs that must be paid when households work
positive hours can introduce non-convexities in the budget constraint rel-
evant for the labor supply decision (Cogan, 1981). These costs can take the
form of material resources or time. In Figure 3.1 this means shifting the
market budget line of down or to the left or both, previous consumption
possibilities at zero market labor supply (M = 0) are maintained. When
home production is possible, the attractiveness of not working in the mar-
ket is further enhanced, especially for households with two ormore workers,
with potential for specialization (Cho and Rogerson, 1988)). In general, the
first hours spent in home production are productive, so this option is likely
to enable many agents to achieve high levels of utility without working in
the market at all.
The eVect of fixed costs on the labor supply decision is summarized in
Figures 3.3 and 3.4. We have drawn the figures such that the household’s
preferences are identical in both cases—the diVerence arises entirely from
the opportunity costs of time, summarized by the net real wage available
Rogerson, 1988; Cho and Rogerson, 1988). A non-convex budget set is one which does not
necessarily contain all linear combinations of its elements. For example, working overtime
only pays extra for the last hours worked, or going to work requires the expenditure of time
and money from the first minute on.
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Figure .. Fixed costs and budget set non-convexity: positive market hours
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from working in the market, which in turn depends positively on the nom-
inal real wage (w) and the tax rate (τ ), but also on shifts in the budget set
induced by “setup costs.” In the first case depicted in Figure 3.3 the returns
to market work time are high and the individual chooses to work positive
hours in the market, works relatively little in home production, and uses
market income to purchase these goods and services. The circled tangency
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point of consumption-leisure indiVerence curves with the linear segment of
the budget set yields higher utility, despite the shift downward and inward
of the budget set implied by any positive value of market workM.
In Figure 3.4, the net returns frommarket work are low.14 The household
opts for no market work at all, working exclusively at homeM = 0, H > 0.
Even though an hour of work—as secondary work—is relatively unproduc-
tive at the margin, the household achieves a level welfare which is higher
than that attainable in the market, as seen by the higher level of utility at the
circled tangency point.
Under which conditions are agents likely to exclude market work en-
tirely? In the next section we formalize, in a fashion analogous to the norm
model elaborated in Chapter 2, the household’s decision as a choice between
maximizing utility working positive market hours (M > 0, H > 0) versus
not working at all (M = 0, H > 0).
C. A formalmodel of fixed setup costs. As before, the household is the
decision-making unit, but we introduce a richer structure of costs.15 Utility
is given by the linear-quadratic function
CM + CH − 1
2ǫ
(1− L)2. (3.13)
Now consider the following modifications: First, market work implies a
one-oV, fixed shift in time allocation ΨL which comes at the expense of
some other use of time (leisure (L) , secondary work (H) or market work
(M)). In the language of the first chapter, this might be thought of as a
fixed loss of leisure or tertiary time necessary for work (ΨL > 0), or the
time actually freed up by working (ΨL < 0).
16
Second, working in the market implies a one-oV input of secondary
time ΨH , which also comes at the expense of leisure enjoyed (or must be
thought of as work eVort in the general sense. For a given home produc-
tion technology, this is equivalent to a fixed expenditure of home produc-
tion (think of the very first shirts that need to be ironed). In addition, we
assume the existence of a “barrier to home production”—to use the lan-
guage of Parente, Rogerson, and Wright (2000)—a relative price µH with
14It is important to stress that the net real return from market work is not only de-
termined by the gross wage and taxes, also by the relative price of market goods to home
production.
15This could be extended to a multiple-person household with specialization
(Cho and Rogerson, 1988), with some members working exclusively in the market and oth-
ers specializing in home production.
16For simplicty, we have grouped leisure and tertiary time together. AllowingΨ to take
negative or positive valuesmay be interpreted as deviations from a fixed “base” requirement
of tertiary time.
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0 < µH ≤ 1 which captures the reduced eVectiveness of home produc-
tion when working at all in the market. Now the home production function
reads
CH = θ ln(µHH −ΨH).
There is no reason to assume that ΨH is always positive. In any case, how-
ever, the time restriction holds with equality:
M +H + L+ΨH +ΨL = 1.
We show in Appendix B that indirect utility for an interior solution with
M > 0 is
Ω +
ǫ
2µ2L
(1− τ)2w2 + θ − ΨH
µ2L
(1− τ)w, (3.14)
where µL, analogous to µH , captures changes in eVectiveness or relative
price that obtain when market hours are positive.
Utility whenM = 0 andH =
√
θǫ is:17
Ω +
θ
2
(ln(θǫ)− 1) . (3.15)
Hence, it is optimal for the household to work in the market when
ǫ
2
(1− τ)2w2 −ΨH(1− τ)w > θµ
2
L
2
(
ln(θǫ)− 3
2
)
By inspection, greater home productivity18, higher labor taxation, fixed sec-
ondary time costs of workΨH and the leisure-loss parameter µL all depress
the propensity to work positive hours, while the wage itself increases the
propensity to work. Neither the fixed leisure parameter ΨL, which works
like a lump-sum tax, nor the secondary time loss parameter µH , which is
neutral, have an eVect on the decision to work positive market hours. The
model also implies that ΨH and µL both reduce welfare of those in work.
D. Empirical evidence: Estimating costs of market work. In this sec-
tion, the four principal countries time-use data sets—for Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands and the US—are employed to study “where working time
comes from” as well as the issue of setup costs arising from market work.
This is potentially important for welfare analysis. It could be argued, for
example, that Europeans rationally concentrate their unemployment by re-
stricting labor force participation, and economize on fixed costs associated
with working. If these costs are significant, there may be welfare gains to
concentrating unemployment on the young and less skilled, who are likely
17The computations are the same as those leading to equation (3.11) but with ψ = 0
instead.
18For this result θ and/or ǫ must be suYciently large; in particular, θǫ > e1.5 ≈ 4.48.
This in itself implies that the household is at the corner, sinceH ≤ 1.
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to be more productive at home anyway. In particular, the model of the last
section suggested thatΨH and µL not only reduce the attractiveness of work,
but they actually reduce welfare of those in work.
We proceed in the spirt of themodel, but follow a general, agnostic spec-
ification suggested by Hamermesh (2006a), who has examined issues related
to fixed costs of work in a similar framework for the eVect of ageing on the
labor supply decision. The model in the last section considered three dif-
ferent uses of time, while the data sets present us with a fourth—tertiary
time—which might be considered “partially unavoidable” leisure (eating,
personal hygiene, sex, and sleep fall into this category). In the empirical
work that follows, we allow for separate consideration of both conceptual-
izations of leisure. As might be expected, there are diVerences, and these are
sometimes significant and merit additional analysis and interpretation.
The econometric model is a system of three equations relating the
minutes allocated by an individual to each of secondary, tertiary and leisure
activities, as defined in Chapter 1, to (i) minutes spent in market work, (ii)
a dummy variable indicating whether any time was worked in the market,
as well as a number of controls that are as similar as possible across the
data sets.19 By construction—and by nature of the survey, which leaves few
minutes unaccounted for—the estimated coeYcients on (i) across the three
equations will sum to -1, while the fixed cost/setup cost coeYcients associ-
ated with (ii) will sum to zero. Because the equations are based on weighted
observations, the estimates reflect the relevant eVects on a representative day
of the week. The results are presented in Table 3.3.
Turning first to the question “where does the working time come from?”
we find that all coeYcients on market time are negative, just as in Hamer-
mesh’s (2006a) analysis of US data, and are all highly significant and signif-
icantly diVerent from each other, strongly suggesting qualitative diVerences
in taking time from leisure than from secondary or tertiary activities. Re-
markably, the rank ordering of the coeYcients is the same for all data sets
except Germany 1991: the “cost” of an extra minute of market work is great-
est in leisure, followed by secondary time, with the smallest sacrifice coming
19Controls for the US regression: age, age squared, race, children 0-2, children 3-5,
children 6-13, children 14-17, gender, marital status, spouse’s work hours. Controls for Ger-
many: age, age squared, spouse’s age squared, marital status, gender, marital status x gen-
der, children in the household younger than 5, children in household between 5 and 17 .
Controls for Italy: age, age squared, marital status, sex, marital status x gender, children in
household younger than 5, children in household between 5 and 17, and spuworkm. Con-
trols for Netherlands: age, age squared, spuhrs, age of spouse, age of spouse squared, marital
status, gender, marital status x gender, children in household younger than 5, children in
household between 5 and 17.
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Table 3.3. Estimates of the Effect of Working and the Amount of Market Work
Time on Time Aggregates
Germany Italy The Netherlands U.S.
1991 2001 1988/89 2002/03 1990 2000 1985 2003
Dep. var. Ind. Var.
Whether
worked
16.10
(4.43)
22.60
(4.14)
-28.98
(3.71)
-34.44
(3.53)
11.58
(7.74)
26.99
(7.22)
-14.82
(10.09)
2.74
(5.13)
Secondary
Minutes
worked
-0.396
(0.0079)
-0.337
(0.0083)
-0.222
(0.007)
-0.251
(0.007)
-0.299
(0.014)
-0.312
(0.013)
-0.288
(0.016)
-0.324
(0.0081)
Whether
worked
-0.401
(3.30)
-18.44
(3.38)
17.26
(2.75)
-24.34
(2.78)
-3.68
(6.30)
-5.33
(5.64)
37.27
(9.65)
14.48
(4.58)
Tertiary
Minutes
worked
-0.259
(0.0059)
-0.277
(0.0068)
-0.219
(0.005)
-0.160
(0.005)
-0.211
(0.011)
-0.233
(0.010)
-0.264
(0.017)
-0.228
(0.0078)
Whether
worked
-15.70
(4.47)
-4.16
(4.12)
11.81
(3.75)
59.45
(3.57)
-7.89
(8.84)
-21.66
(7.86)
-22.44
(10.70)
-17.29
(5.37)
Leisure
Minutes
worked
-0.344
(0.0079)
-0.386
(0.0083)
-0.559
(0.007)
-0.590
(0.007)
-0.490
(0.016)
-0.455
(0.014)
-0.448
(0.018)
-0.448
(0.0085)
Test )2(2χ
0=== Lei
worl
Ter
worl
Sec
worl
βββ
(p-value in parentheses)
14.84
0.001
42.00
<0.001
75.16
<0.001
275.61
<0.001
2.31
0.316
13.97
<0.001
14.94
<0.001
46.97
<0.001
in terms of tertiary time. It is interesting to note that the absolute value of
the leisure-cost coeYcient is the largest in Italy (-0.56 to -0.59), followed by
the Netherlands (-0.46 to -0.49), then the US (-0.45 to -0.45), and Germany
(-0.34 to -0.39).
Now we turn to the fixed-cost parameters, which originate fromΨH and
ΨL in the setup cost model. The model predicts that positive values of these
fixed costs would generate shifts in the time allocated to the other major cat-
egories of activity whenever a person begins market work. In contrast to the
coeYcients on the volume of market work described above, the estimates of
the discrete shifts due to market work do not exhibit a simple pattern. In
continental Europe, the fixed cost of work tends to be paid for by lost ter-
tiary time (sleep). For example, in Italy on an average day, working in 2002/3
meant a sacrifice of 24 minutes tertiary time (bathing, sleeping, eating, etc.).
It also meant a reduction of one half-hour of secondary work. The gain of
work was an increase in leisure of almost one hour! We cannot help sus-
pecting that this reflects in part the increased propensity of working Italian
women to stop or defer cleaning and other chores, to delegate them to other
household members, or to purchase these services in the market. In the
US, market work comes primarily at the expense of leisure (between 17 and
22 minutes and statistically significant) while tertiary time use increases and
secondary time falls or remains constant. In the Netherlands and Germany,
in contrast, working in the market is associated with a significant increase in
secondary time at the expense of tertiary time plus leisure time. In practice
this might take the form of ironing one’s clothes more often and forsaking
the daily shower and shave or makeup session. Interestingly, in the later data
set for the Netherlands, this country appears more like the United States in
terms of fixed leisure loss of work, and more like Germany in terms of the
increase in secondary time. Again, these estimates should be seen in the
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context of country-specific institutions such as market regulations, public
provision of work-related services, subsidies (including mass transit).
There are a number of issues that arise in the econometrics of estimat-
ing such an system, which we are glossing over. In the first instance, the
wage, taxes, productivity in the household and measures of preferences are
important theoretical determinants of the allocation of time in its various
uses and are not included at all. Treating the decision to work in the market,
and given that, the number of hours to work as predetermined is a heroic
simplification. Yet, re-estimating our specification on various sub-samples
of the data, especially those individuals with positive but low hours in the
market does not result in significantly diVerent estimates. As Hamermesh
(2006b) finds for the US, very modest involvement with the labor market
implies significant reallocations of time for individuals which are likely to
be associated with welfare costs. Without knowing much more about pref-
erences, however, it is diYcult to quantify those costs. In the next section
we take some modest steps in that direction.
E. Summary. This chapter has examined secondary work and home
production. In Chapter 1, we saw that such unremunerated work takes up
a significant fraction of an average individual’s day, both in Europe and
the US. While women tend to perform more secondary work than men,
this asymmetry is shrinking in most countries—with the possible exception
of Germany—as more women enter the labor market. By definition, sec-
ondary work does not involve a formal market, and therefore represents a
degree of freedom facilitating the All Work/leisure norm studied in Chapter
2. It is likely that in societies with a strong operative leisure norm, household
production may appear excessive or ineYcient, deviating from optimality
conditions implied by the Gronau model in the absence of social norms.
Can the existence of the secondary work option explain why Americans
work more in total than Europeans? Not really. As long as market goods
and secondary output are readily substitutable at the margin, theory does
not yield such a prediction for All Work. Overall labor supply is determined
by the net market price of labor, non-labor income and wealth, plus norms
which can condition labor supply at any given set of incentives. The theory
can however, tell us why Europeans tend to spend more a greater fraction of
their time in secondary work as a fraction of all work. In the first instance,
all factors aVecting the real, take-home wage for market work will aVect the
choice of secondary versus market work. These include labor taxes and the
relative price of commodities most easily substituted using home produc-
tion: child care, gardening, home cleaning, food preparation and cooking.
Ourmodest cross country analysis of the G-7 countries does suggest a strong
III. HOUSEHOLD LABOR SUPPLY WITH SETUP COSTS OF WORK 85
association of the fraction of secondary work in all work with the rate of la-
bor taxation used by Prescott (2004) to study the determinants of market
hours. A more thorough investigation would need to examine international
diVerences in product market regulation and governmental subsidies of ser-
vices.
A skeptic might argue that this is not remarkable, given that Europeans
are more likely to be unemployed and have lower overall employment and
labor force participation rates.20 While unemployment is likely to be one
determinant of secondary work in the short run, it cannot explain cer-
tain patterns in the countries we examine. It cannot explain, for example,
why German men in 1991/2 worked a mere 11 minutes less in the market
than US-American men in 1985, both periods when real growth in both
economies was virtually identical (3.5-4 percent per annum), while German
men worked one full hour more than American men in home production.
Labor taxation is one plausible explanation that has been invoked else-
where to explain the low absolute level of market time in OECD economies
(Daveri and Tabellini, 2000). Yet the high taxation is only one possible dis-
tortion against market work that might distinguish Europe from the US. It
is well-known that growth of the European service sector has been lacklus-
ter compared with the US, andmany have cited labor and especially product
market regulations as a cause. It is interesting to note that the Scandinavian
countries do not fit the pattern of the G-7, and this is likely due to the high
level of subsidy of child care for working parents and public services, de-
spite high income taxation, which eVectively raise the real net return from
working in the market relative to the European continent.21
The data from Chapter 1 suggest not only that Americans work more
hours and have higher levels of labor force participation than most EU cit-
izens, but they also work more odd hours and more on weekends. If so, is
that necessarily eYcient? It could be, if fixed costs associated with market
work are significantly lower in the US than in Europe. Estimated fixed costs
20For example, Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright (1991) show that home production is
countercyclical.
21Schneider and Enste (2000) have argued that the underground economy can explain
a large component of the EU-US labor and product market divide. Davis and Henrekson
(2005) link the size of the underground economy in rich countries to the overall level of
taxation. To the extent that survey respondents declare time in their diaries as secondary
when in fact it is primary could also account for the secondary-heavy European orienta-
tion. In fact, the especially large underground economy in Italy (estimated at 15-20 percent)
oVers yet another explanation for their lone violation of the iso-work fact: Italian men are
reluctant to admit to this activity for fear of detection by the fiscal authorities.
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of starting market work suggest that these costs are high in Europe, espe-
cially the additional burden of secondary work in Germany and the Nether-
lands, as compared with the US (Italy is, as usual, sui generis). Moreover,
lower gasoline and automobile taxation in the US mean lower transporta-
tion costs and probably also tilt the decision at the extensive margin to work
in the market there. Tax and social insurance systems in EU countries often
introduce significant fiscal costs of secondary worker’s market participation.
The real issue is whether Europeans bear significant welfare costs for
working so much in secondary activities as opposed to the market. Answer-
ing this question requires us to revisit issues raised in Chapter 2 as well as in
this chapter. We will return to this in our concluding remarks and resume
of the report. Indeed, both serious and not-so-serious research has valued
home production at a significant fraction of total national income.22 If these
estimates are valid, home production certainly mitigates the lost value of the
European slump, as well as the business cycle in general. Home production
may not be as eYcient in Europe as it could be if delivered by the market,
yet the problem may indeed be, to quote Tobin, more an issue of Harberger
triangles than Okun’s rectangles.
Appendix A: Household labor supply with market work and home
production
The household is assumed to maximize utility which is separable in ar-
guments relating to a single consumption aggregateC goods and leisureL:23
u(C) + v(L,L)
where the utility function has the standard properties. In particular, we re-
quire that u(.) and v(.) are increasing and concave in consumption and own
leisure:u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, vL > 0, and vLL < 0. The “leisure norm” argument
22In an early NBER study, King (1923) assessed the value of services performed by in the
United States at the beginning of the 20th century at one-quarter to one-third of national
income. In a frequently cited estimate, Gronau (1980) estimates that the value of home
production represents roughly two-thirds of total household income. More recently, the
internet website salary.com estimates that the market value of services provided by “stay at
home moms” was $134,121 annually, an increase from $131,471 in 2005. “Working moms”
would earn $85,876 for the home production component of their work.
23Separability is an important assumption, and is not innocuous for its treatment of
time in home production. Rather than considering secondary time as leisure, we treat it
as an input to a production function for home consumption goods, and assume perfect
substitutability of market goods and home production. Benhabib, Rogerson, and Wright
(1991) adduce arguments for perfect substitutability of market and home-produced con-
sumption goods. Moreover, separability of utility over goods and leisure is necessary (but
not suYcient) for stationary steady state property in environments with economic growth.
See King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988).
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L is taken as parametric, and is an anchor for the utility of leisure. Several
assumptions with respect to L are possible. In general vLL > 0 implies that
the marginal utility of leisure is always increasing in the norm, regardless of
whether diVerence between the two (L − L) is positive or negative. This
is contrasted with the treatment in the previous chapter, which considered
symmetric losses from departures from the norm.24 Note that among all
the conditions, the one called into question is that marginal utility is every-
where positive. If the deviation from the norm is significant, vL could be
negative.
The household chooses labor supply to the market and to secondary
activities subject to the budget restriction that consumption be obtained
either on the market (CM) or by home production (CH):
C = CM + CH
If our household works M hours at real, gross-of-tax hourly market wage
w, and τ is the rate of labor taxation including social contributions, then
market goods obey the budget constraint
CM = (1− τ)wM + Ω
where Ω stands for non-labor income or wealth. Household production
requires secondary work input according to
CH = θf(H),
where θ > 0 is a productivity shifter and f ′(H) > 0, f ′′(H) < 0.25 Finally,
the overall time restriction implies 1 = M + H + L. Focusing on interior
solutions, the problem reduces to:
max
M,H
u [(1− τ)wM + θf(H) + Ω] + v(1−M −H,L).
First-order conditions are given by:
(1− τ)wu′ (C) = vL(L,L) (3.16)
u′ (C) θf ′(H) = vL(L,L) (3.17)
with total consumption C defined as the sum of expenditure on market
goods (1−τ)wM+Ω and home production θf(H). It follows immediately
that
(1− τ)w = θf ′(H) (3.18)
24For example, consider the version v(L,L) = −0.5(1 − L)2 − 0.5φ(L − L)2. Now
vL = (1− L)− φ(L− L) and vLL = φ and vLL = − (1 + φ) .
25This is one way of expressing the increasing disutility as well as declining eYciency
of home production. While most of us find too much home production unpleasant, most
are willing to do some of it in some amount. It should be noted that this is one special case
of labor augmenting technical progress: productivity can also be labor saving, for example
in the form CH = f(θH). See Gronau (1986) for more details.
APPENDIX A: LABOR SUPPLY 88
In words, the household should equate, at the margin, the output an hour
of secondary work to the opportunity cost of that time in the market, mea-
sured at its opportunity cost, the net wage. High wage households will tend
to cut back on household production and purchase these goods in the mar-
ket, meaning that high income to some extent is “eaten up” by a higher
eVective cost of living. Lower income households will tend to economize
on services that can be produced at home, such as meals, laundry, child-
care, and house-cleaning. The decision of the household to supply labor to
secondary activities is separable from the decision of total labor and leisure
and follows from the fact that goods produced in the household are perfect
substitutes for market goods.26 We can thus write the household’s optimal
use of time in secondary work as a function of the opportunity cost of labor
in eYciency units, that is,H = H
(
(1−τ)w
θ
)
withH ′ < 0, H ′′ > 0.
Using the notation x̂ ≡ dx/x to denote percentage deviations from
equilibrium values, we derive elasticities from log-linearized versions of the
first-order conditions (3.4) and (3.5), which are solved for M̂ and Ĥ , the
percentage responses of market and secondary work to changes in the fol-
lowing exogenous variables: non-labor income or wealth Ω̂, the social norm
L̂, productivity in secondary work θ̂, labor taxation τ̂ , and the market wage
ŵ.
Log-linearize the first-order conditions and arrange these to obtain the
following system of equations expressing Ĥ and M̂ as a function of exoge-
nous influences ŵ, τ̂ , Ω̂, θ̂, and L̂ :
[
η 0
γ C
H
C
+ νH
ρL
(1−τ)wM
C
+ νM
ρL
] [
Ĥ
M̂
]
=
[
θ̂ − ŵ + τ
1−τ
τ̂(
ρ−1 − (1−τ)wM
C
) (
ŵ − τ
1−τ
τ̂
)− Ω
C
Ω̂ + C
H
C
θ̂ − ζ
ρ
L̂
]
where:
η ≡ −Hf ′′(H)
f ′(H)
, the curvature of the home production function
γ ≡ Hf ′(H)
f(H)
is the elasticity of home production to employment;
ρ ≡ −u ′′(C)C
u ′(C)
is the curvature of utility derived from consumption;
26For a thorough discussion of other implications of imperfect substitutability of mar-
ket and home production, see Gronau (1986, 1997).
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ν ≡ −vLLL
vL
is the curvature of utility derived from leisure;
ζ ≡ vLLL
vL
is the elasticity of the marginal utility of leisure with respect
to the leisure norm.
The solution is given by
Ĥ = η−1
(
θ̂ − ŵ + τ
1− τ τ̂
)
M̂ = ∆−1η
[(
ρ−1 − (1− τ)wM
C
)(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
− Ω
C
Ω̂ +
CH
C
θ̂ − ζ
ρ
L̂
]
−∆−1
(
θ̂ − ŵ + τ
1− τ τ̂
)(
γ
CH
C
+
νH
ρL
)
where
∆ ≡ η
(
(1− τ)wM
C
+
νM
ρL
)
> 0.
It follows from these expressions that:
1. The elasticity of secondary work with respect to secondary productivity is
unambiguously positive
Ĥ
θ̂
= η−1 > 0
2. The elasticity of secondary work with respect to the gross-of-tax market
wage is unambiguously negative:
Ĥ
ŵ
= −η−1 < 0
3. The elasticity of secondary work with respect to labor taxation is positive:
Ĥ
τ̂
=
(
τ
1−τ
)
η−1 > 0.
Elasticity of market work with respect to the gross-of-tax wage:
M̂
ŵ
=
η(ρ−1− (1−τ)wMC )
∆
+
γ C
H
C
+ νH
ρL
∆
=
(
M̂
ŵ
)
H=0
− γ
CH
C
+ νH
ρL
(1−τ)wM
C
+ νM
ρH
(
Ĥ
ŵ
)
≶ 0 simplify
5. The elasticity of market work with respect to wealth is unambiguously
negative:
M̂
Ω̂
= −Ω
C
η
∆
< 0
6. Elasticity of market work with respect to the norm is negative:
M̂
L̂
= − ζ
ρ
η
∆
< 0
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Elasticity of market work with respect to secondary work productivity is
negative:
M̂
θ̂
= −
CH
C
(η+γ)+ νH
ρL
∆
= ηC
H
Ω
(
M̂
Ω̂
)
− γ
CH
C
+ νH
ρL
∆
< 0 simplify
Elasticity of market work with respect to labor taxation:
M̂
τ̂
= − ( τ
1−τ
) [η(ρ−1− (1−τ)wMC )
∆
+
γ C
H
C
+ νH
ρL
∆
]
≶ 0
Note that the All Work elasticities can be derived from
1̂− L ≡ MM̂ +HĤ
1− L .
Similarly, the elasticity of leisure is defined as:
L̂ ≡ −
(
M
L
M̂ +
H
L
Ĥ
)
= −1− L
L
1̂− L.
Using the results of the previous section27, we can summarize the influences
on total work as follows:
1̂− L = α1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
− α2Ω̂− α3θ̂ − α4L̂
27In particular,
Ĥ = η−1
(
θ̂ − ŵ + τ1−τ τ̂
)
M̂ =
η
[
(ρ−1− (1−τ)wMC )(ŵ−
τ
1−τ τ̂)−
Ω
C
Ω̂−C
H
C
θ̂− ζ
ρ
L̂
]
−(θ̂−ŵ+ τ1−τ τ̂)
(
γ C
H
C
+ νH
ρL
)
∆
where∆ ≡ η
(
(1−τ)wM
C +
νM
ρL
)
> 0.
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where
α1 =
ρ−1 − (1−τ)wM
C
ν
ρ
1−L
L
+ (1−τ)w(1−L)
C
≷ 0
α2 = − Ω/Cν
ρ
1−L
L
+ (1−τ)w(1−L)
C
< 0
α3 = − C
H/C
ν(1−L)
ρL
+ (1−τ)w(1−L)
C
< 0
α4 = − ζ/ρν(1−L)
ρL
+ (1−τ)w(1−L)
C
< 0
For leisure, we have:
L̂ = β1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
+ β2Ω̂ + β3 θ̂ + β4L̂
where
β1 = −
ρ−1 − (1−τ)wM
C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
≶ 0
β2 =
Ω/C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0
β3 =
CH/C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0
β4 =
ζ/ρ
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0
1̂− L = − L
1− L
[
α1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
− α2Ω̂− α3 θ̂ − α4L̂
]
and
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L̂ = α1
(
ŵ − τ
1− τ τ̂
)
+ α2Ω̂ + α3 θ̂ + α4L̂
where
α1 = −ρ
−1
−
(1−τ)wM
C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
≶ 0
α2 =
Ω/C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0
α3 =
CH/C
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0
α4 =
ζ/ρ
ν
ρ
+ (1−τ)wL
C
> 0.
Appendix B: Utility with fixed setup costs
Utility for an interior solution withM > 0 can be written as
Ω + (1− τ)wM + θ ln(µHH −ΨH)
− 1
2ǫ
{1− µL [1− (M +H +ΨH +ΨL)]}2 . (3.19)
The first-order conditions yield the following optimal supplies of total work,
market time, secondary time and leisure, whenM > 0:
M +H =
1
µ2L
ǫ(1− τ)w − ( 1
µL
− 1)−ΨL −ΨH
M =
1
µ2L
ǫ(1− τ)w − ( 1
µL
− 1)−ΨL −ΨH − θ
(1− τ)w −
ΨH
µH
H =
θ
(1− τ)w +
ΨH
µH
L =
1
µL
− 1
µ2L
ǫ(1− τ)w
First, this simple model implies that total work M + H is a negative func-
tion of the fixed cost given that the household is working in the market. Those
who work will work fewer hours. Second, All Work is a positive function of
the eVectiveness of leisure when market work is positive; as µL approaches
unity, All Work approaches ǫ(1 − τ)w − ΨL. The all-work decision, how-
ever, is independent of the parameters aVecting eYciency of secondary la-
bor ΨH and µH . As might be expected, these do aVect secondary work and
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home production. The fixed-cost element increases it, while its eVective-
ness reduces it. In this model, these two parameters are not independently
identified.
General conclusion
The rise in unemployment in Europe has attracted the attention of con-
tinuing generations of economists since the 1970s.28 Even as a number of
European countries—Ireland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom in particular—have brought unemployment rates back to levels
of the 1960s and early 1970s, most major continental countries, including
France, Germany, Italy and Spain, seem to have capitulated, accepting per-
manent high unemployment as inevitable. In response to this development,
some economists have argued that Europeans have diVerent tastes for leisure
than Americans. Others have blamed high, almost punitive rates of la-
bor taxation and the welfare state. Still others have pointed to equilibria
which, while unambiguously inferior, are the outcome of political processes
in which a majority of political actors or voters can block any eVort to re-
form.
The emphasis on unemployment as an indicator of well-being may be
misplaced, since it represents only an absence from the labor market, which
is a modest time commitment in most modern economies. In 2003, the
average man in the US spent about 22 percent of the average day in market
work, compared with 35 percent in sleep, 24 percent in leisure and 11 percent
in secondary labor activities; for women, these proportions were 14 percent
in paid work, 35 percent in sleep, 23 percent in leisure and 19 percent in
secondary (home production) activities.
It thus seemed useful to gather systematically more general stylized facts
about time use in a number of countries. In one respect, the data confirm
what we already knew: US-Americans do work more than Europeans, and
tend to work at odd hours of the day and on weekends more often than
Europeans do. Our detective work turned up an even more interesting ag-
gregate regularity in high-income countries which had gone generally un-
noticed and, by economists, uninvestigated: the iso-work fact. The sum of
market and secondary work for men and women tends to be equal at a point
in time, even while this may change over time and diVer across countries. In
the US example above, both men and women in 2003 spent a third of their
28For recent contributions to this debate, see for instance Blanchard (2006) and
Nickell, Nunziata, and Ochel (2005).
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time on All Work. In Germany, men and women spent about 30 percent of
their average day in All Work.
The iso-work fact is challenging for economic theory for a number of
reasons. First, economic theory should be able to explain why total work
diVers so little at the aggregate level between genders, when there is so much
variation within-gender. Since the market oVers little hint at the rationale
for such a coordination mechanism, we propose social norms in Chapter
2 and investigate the power of this theory to explain the facts. Second,
All Work is the sum of two diVerent types of labor with sharply diVerent
productivities—why should their sum be equal across gender, without re-
gard to the mix? In Chapter 3, we examine the theory of home production
and adapt it to allow for both norms as well as fixed costs of market work.
These fixed costs have a significant impact on the labor supply of house-
holds. Indeed, the most commonly invoked models of home production
imply a high elasticity of substitution between market and secondary work
for those households in which both market and home work are performed.
We are able to validate this sensitivity in our finding of a high elasticity of
response of female home work to labor taxation in the G-7 countries. This
fact makes secondary work a useful “sink” that enables members of society
tomeet the norm. Yet under certain conditions, the normmay be diYcult to
adhere to. If market work is not very productive ormarket wages are low rel-
ative to home production, or if fixed costs are high, households may choose
to perform only secondary-work. In this case, only very costly norms will
lead to iso-work, especially across genders. Indeed our meta-analysis of data
sets around the world suggest that the iso-work fact does not hold in less-
developed countries. Evidently, iso-work is a fact for developed countries
only.
We hope that the data that we have assembled and analyzed, the styl-
ized facts on time use we have established, and the theoretical vistas we have
opened will prove valuable to labor economists and macroeconomists alike.
Our claim that social eVects are a crucial and heretofore little noticed deter-
minant of labor supply and time use, for both single andmarried agents, will
certainly awaken the interest of labor economists.29 The theory and empir-
ics of home production have already attracted the attention of macroecono-
mists, who have recognized that they are vital to understanding the prop-
agation and the cost of business cycles. The reason is that non-convexities
in household budget sets increase the relative importance of the extensive
29Norms in labor supply represent a logical solution to one of the most uncomfortable
challenges to labor economics: explaining why the standard workweek appears to enforce
itself, even in European countries without explicitly legislated standard workweeks.
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margin for labor supply in cyclical fluctuations, which accounts for three-
fourths of total fluctuations in hours in the US (Cho and Rogerson, 1988).
Note that we have said nothing about the thorny issue of the “double
burden” of market and home production by working women. Even though
men and women perform the same total work in the aggregate, the types
of market and secondary activities that they perform do diVer, sometimes
considerably. It would seem unwarranted, then, to draw welfare inferences
from the iso-work fact at this stage. We have no choice, however, to re-
iterate the central importance of secondary work for an economy and the
role of labor taxation in shaping that importance. Secondary work—be it
child care, garden work or house-cleaning—probably represents the largest
labor tax loophole granted to households. Furthermore, it is largest in pre-
cisely those countries which tax labor most heavily. It is noteworthy that in
economies in which bothmales and females are heavily involved in the labor
market—Denmark and Sweden for example—the government has actively
intervened to oVset the negative incentives created by high labor taxation by
providing day care and related services for working mothers.
Overall, the issue of whether Europeans are lazy or Americans are crazy
seems of second-order importance relative to understanding the determi-
nants of individual behavior. Amore useful, scientific approach is to assume
that underlying tastes are common to both continents, while technologies,
institutions, or interpersonal influences like norms or externalities may dif-
fer and evolve diVerently. The fact that Americans work on weekends or
more often at odd hours of the day may simply represent a bad equilib-
rium that no individual agent can improve upon—and would certainly not
wish to deviate from, given what all others are doing. Especially if norms
and other externalities are important (recall the model of common leisure
in Chapter 2), one should recognize that the invisible hand may lead agents
to places like this. If our claim that social eVects play a central role in the
determination of economic activity is confirmed by new data and/or fur-
ther work, policy makers and economists alike will have to remember that
multiple equilibria, and social multipliers, determine the impact of labor
market policies and taxes rather than simple-minded applications of more
traditional models.
Bibliography
Abraham, K., and C. Mackie (2005): Market: Designing Nonmarket Ac-
counts for the United States. National Academies Press, Washington.
Abraham, K. G., A. Maitland, and S. Bianchi (2005): “Nonresponse in
the American Time Use Survey: Who Is Missing from the Data, and How
much Does It Matter?,” Unpublished paper, University of Maryland.
ABS (1993): “1992 Time Use Survey,” Australian Bureau of Statistics, Can-
berra.
Aguiar, M., and E. Hurst (2006): “Measuring Trends in Leisure: The Al-
location of Time over Five Decades,” NBER Working Paper No. 12082.
Ahn, N., J. F. Jimeno, and A. Ugidos (2005): “’Mondays in the Sun:’ Un-
employment, Time Use and Consumption patterns in Spain,” in The Eco-
nomics of Time Use, ed. by D. Hamermesh, and G. Pfann. North-Holland,
Amsterdam.
Akerlof, G. (1976): “The Economics of Caste and of the Rat Race andOther
Woeful Tales,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 599–617.
Akerlof, G. A. (1980): “A Theory of Social Custom, of Which Unemploy-
mentMay BeOne Consequence,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 94, 749–
775.
Alesina, A., E. L. Glaeser, and B. Sacerdote (2005): “Work and Leisure
in the US and Europe: Why SoDiVerent?,” Harvard Institute of Economic
Research Discussion Paper No. 2068.
Aliaga, C., and K. Winqvist (2003): “How Women and Men Spend Their
Time,” in Statistics in Focus: Population and Social Conditions. Eurostat.
Altonji, J., and J. Oldham (2003): “Vacation Laws and Annual Work
Hours,” Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 19–
29.
Apps, P. (2003): “Models of the Household,” IZA Discussion Paper No. 796.
Becker, G. (1965): “A Theory of the Allocation of Time,” Economic Journal,
75, 493–517.
Benhabib, J., R. Rogerson, and R. Wright (1991): “Homework in Macro-
economics: Household Production and Aggregate Preferences,” Journal
of Political Economy, 99, 1166–1187.
97
Bibliography 98
Bernheim, B. D. (1994): “The Economics of Conformity,” Journal of Politi-
cal Economy, 102(5), 841–877.
Bertola, G., F. Blau, and L. Kahn (2002): “Labor Market Institutions and
Demographic Employment Patterns,” NBERWorking Paper No. 9043.
Biddle, J., and D. Hamermesh (1990): “Sleep and the Allocation of Time,”
Journal of Political Economy, 98, 922–943.
Bittman, M., and J. Wacjman (2000): “The Rush Hour: The Character of
Leisure Time and Gender Equity,” Social Forces, 79, 165–189.
Blanchard, O. (2006): “European Unemployment: The Evolution of Facts
and Ideas,” Economic Policy, 21(45), 5–59.
Burda, M. C., and P. Weil (2006): “Blue Laws,” unpublished, Humboldt-
Universität zu Berlin and Université Libre de Bruxelles.
Callister, P., and S. Dixon (2001): “New Zealanders’ Working Time and
Home Work Patterns: Evidence from the Time Use Survey,” Occasional
Paper No 2001/5, Department of Labour, Wellington, NZ.
Cartwright, E. (2005): “On the Emergence of Social Conformity,” unpub-
lished, University of Kent.
Cho, J.-O., and R. Rogerson (1988): “Family Labor Supply and Aggregate
Fluctuations,” Journal of Monetary Economics, 21, 233–245.
Clark, W. (2000): “Economic Gender Equality Indicators 2000,” Statistics
Canada, http://www.gov.mb.ca/wd/pdf_files/egei-eng.pdf.
Cogan, J. F. (1981): “Fixed Costs and Labor Supply,” Journal of Political
Economy, 49, 945–963.
Cole, H. L., G. J. Mailath, and A. Postlewaite (1992): “Social Norms,
Savings Behavior and Growth,” Journal of Political Economy, 100(6), 1092–
1125.
Cooper, R., and A. John (1988): “Coordinating Coordination Failures in
Keynesian Models,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIII, 441–464.
Corneo, G. (2005): “Work and Television,” European Journal of Political
Economy, 21, 99–113.
Daveri, F., and G. Tabellini (2000): “Unemployment, Growth and Taxa-
tion in Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy, 30(47-104).
Davis, S. J., and M. Henrekson (2005): “Tax EVects on Work Activity,
Industry Mix and Shadow Economy Size: Evidence from Rich-Country
Comparisons,” in Labour Supply and Incentives to Work in Europe, ed. by
R. G. Salvador, A. Lamo, B. Petrongolo, M. Ward, and E. Wasmer. Edward
Elgar Press, Also published as NBER Working Paper 10059, 2004.
Elster, J. (1989): “Social Norms and Economic Theory,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Perspectives, 3, 99–117.
Freeman, R., and R. Schettkat (2005): “Marketization of Household Pro-
duction and the EU-US Gap in Work,” Economic Policy, 41, 5–39.
Bibliography 99
Glaeser, E. L., J. A. Scheinkman, and B. I. Sacerdote (2003): “The Social
Multiplier,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2), 345–353.
Greenwood, J., and Z. Hercowitz (1991): “The Allocation of Capital and
Time over the Business Cycle,” Journal of Political Economy, 99, 1188–1214.
Greenwood, J., A. Seshadri, and M. Yorukoglu (2005): “Engines of Lib-
eration,” Review of Economic Studies, 72, 109–133.
Gronau, R. (1977): “Leisure, Home Production and Work: the Theory of
Allocation of Time Revisited,” Journal of Political Economy, 85(6), 1099–
1123.
(1980): “Home Production: A Forgotten Industry,” Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 62.
(1986): “Home Production: A Survey,” in Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and R. Layard, pp. 273–304. Elsevier Science
Publishing, Amsterdam.
(1997): “The Theory of Home Production: The Past Ten Years,”
Journal of Labor Economics, 15(2), 197–205.
Gronau, R., and D. S. Hamermesh (2001): “The Demand for Variety: A
Household Production Perspective,” Working Paper 8509, National Bu-
reau of Economic Research.
Haddad, L., L. R. Brown, A. Richter, and L. Smith (1995): “The gender
dimensions of economic adjustment policies: Potential interactions and
evidence to date,”World Development, 23(6), 881–896.
Hamermesh, D. S. (1999): “Changing Inequality in Markets for Workplace
Amenities,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1085–1123.
(2002): “Timing, Togetherness and TimeWindfalls,” Journal of Pop-
ulation Economics, 15, 601–623.
(2005): “Routine,” European Economic Review, 49, 29–53.
(2006a): “The Time and Timing Costs of Market Work, and their
Implications for Retirement,” IZA Discussion Papers 2030, Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA).
(2006b): “Time to Eat: Household Production Under Increasing
Income Inequality,” Working Paper 12002, National Bureau of Economic
Research.
Hamermesh, D. S., H. Frazis, and J. Stewart (2005): “Data Watch: The
American Time Use Survey,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(1), 221–
232.
Hansen, G. D. (1985): “Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle,” Journal of
Monetary Economics, 16(3), 309–27.
Hill, M. (1985): “Patterns of Time Use,” in Time, Goods and Well-Being, ed.
by F. T. Juster, and F. StaVord. Survey Research Center, Ann Arbor, MI.
INEGI (2002): “Encuesta Nacional Sobre Uso del Tiempo,” Instituto Na-
cional de Estadistica Geografia e Informática, Mexico City.
Bibliography 100
ISTAT (2005): “Indagine Multiscopo sulle Famiglie Uso del Tempo 2002-
2003,” Istituto Nazionale di Statistica, Rome.
Jacobsen, J. P., and P. Kooreman (2005): “Timing Constraints and the
Allocation of Time: The EVects of Changing Shopping Hours Regulations
in the Netherlands,” European Economic Review, 49, 9–28.
Jenkins, S., and L. Osberg (2005): “Nobody to Play With? The Impli-
cations of Leisure Coordination,” in The Economics of Time Use, ed. by
D. Hamermesh, and G. Pfann. North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Jones, S. R. G. (1984): The Economics of Conformism. Blackwell.
Juster, F. T. (1985): “A Note on Recent Changes in Time Use,” in Time,
Goods and Well-Being, ed. by F. T. Juster, and F. StaVord. Survey Research
Center, Ann Arbor, MI.
Kandori, M. (1992): “Social Norms and Community Enforcement,” Review
of Economic Studies, 59(1), 63–80.
King, R. G., C. I. Plosser, and S. T. Rebelo (1988): “Production, Growth
and Business Cycles: I. The Basic Neoclassical Model,” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics, 21(2-3), 195–232.
King, W. I. (1923): Employment, Hours, and Earnings in Prosperity and De-
pression, United States, -. National Bureau of Economic Research,
New York, NY.
Kooreman, P., and A. Kapteyn (1987): “A Disaggregated Analysis of the
Allocation of Time within the Household,” Journal of Political Economy,
95, 223–249.
Lindbeck, A. (1997): “Incentives and Social Norms inHousehold Behavior,”
American Economic Review, 87(2), 370–77.
Lindbeck, A., S. Nyberg, and J.-W. Weibull (1999): “Social Norms and
Economic Incentives in theWelfare State,”Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114(1), 1–35.
Mattingly, M., and S. Bianchi (2003): “Gender DiVerences in the Quan-
tity and Quality of Free Time,” Social Forces, 82, 999–1030.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications of Japan (2003):
“Outline of the 2001 Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities,” Statistics
Bureau, Tokyo.
Nickell, S., L. Nunziata, and W. Ochel (2005): “Unemployment in the
OECD Since the 1960s: What Do We Know?,” Economic Journal, 115(500),
1–27.
NIWI (1993): “Tijdbestedingsonderzoek 1990,” Nederlands Instituut voor
Wetenschappelijke Informatiediensten, Amsterdam: Steinmetz Archive.
Parente, S. L., R. Rogerson, and R. Wright (2000): “Homework in De-
velopment Economics: Household Production and the Wealth of Na-
tions,” Journal of Political Economy, 108(4), 680–687.
Bibliography 101
Prescott, E. C. (2004): “Why do Americans work so much more than Eu-
ropeans?,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, 28, July.
Putnam, R. D. (2000): Bowling Alone : The Collapse and Revival of American
Community. Simon and Schuster.
Reid, M. (1934): Economics of Hosehold Production. Wiley, New York.
Robinson, J., and G. Godbey (1999): Time for Life: The Surprising Ways
Americans Use Their Time. Pennsylvania State University Press, University
Park, PA, 2nd edn.
Rogerson, R. (1988): “Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium,” Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics, 21(1), 3–16.
Schmemann, S. (1985): “In Soviet, Eager Beaver’s LegendWorks Overtime,”
New York Times, August 31.
Schneider, F., and D. H. Enste (2000): “Shadow Economies: Size, Causes,
and Consequences,” Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 77–114.
Schor, J. B. (1993): The Overworked American: the Unexpected Decline of
Leisure. Basic Books.
Solow, R. M. (1956): “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65–94.
Sorokin, P., and C. Berger (1939): Time-Budgets of Human Behavior. Har-
vard Univeristy Press, Cambridge, MA.
Stafford, F. (1986): “Forestalling the Demise of Empirical Economics: The
Role of Microdata in Labor Economics Research,” in Handbook of Labor
Economics, ed. by O. Ashenfelter, and R. Layard, vol. 1, pp. 273–304. Else-
vier Science Publishing, Amsterdam.
Statistiches Bundesamt (1999): Wo Bleibt die Zeit? Die Zeitverwendung
der Bevölkerung in Deutschland. Statistiches Bundesamt, Wiesbaden, Ger-
many.
Statistics Canada (1999): Overview of the Time use of Canadians in .
Statistics Canada, Ottawa.
Szalai, A. (1972): The Use of Time. Mouton, The Hague.
Weiss, Y. (1996): “Synchronization of Work Schedules,” International Eco-
nomic Review, 37, 157–179.
Wooders, M., E. Cartwright, and R. Selten (2003): “Social Conformity
in Games with Many Players,” Working Paper 121.2003, FEEM.
Young, H. P. (1996): “The Economics of Convention,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 10(2), 105–22.
